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Problems of Truth in Teaching Religion

C. EUGENE CONOVER*

TWO British observers of the state of religion in the United States have commented upon our lack of concern about its truth. Professor John Hick, now teaching at Cornell University, reports an encouraging interest of American undergraduates in religion, but he is troubled by "students' almost total unconcern with the issue of truth." Professor D. W. Brogan, of Cambridge University, sees that "religion in the USA, like many other things, is booming. . . . That there is a genuine religious revival, I do not doubt. That the churches are not in retreat I do not doubt. I do doubt if the intellectual truce can be kept up indefinitely, in which few people dare to ask, 'Is this true?'"¹

It is my experience, on the contrary, that our ablest students are now deeply concerned with the question of the truth of religious beliefs. It is also an evident fact that a searching "philosophical scrutiny of religion" is under way in our time. The probing questions about truth claims in religion now being asked by philosophers of various schools will not leave the climate for the teaching of religion in our colleges and universities in a state of polite truce.

It is the principal thesis of this paper that

any serious philosophical and theological study of religions must deal with the question of the objective truth of their basic beliefs. Since my own teaching responsibilities are principally in the field of philosophy, in this paper I shall examine some recent developments in philosophy which bear upon the problem of truth in religion, particularly in some analytic and existential philosophies of religion.

Morton White, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, in his recent book of essays entitled *Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning*, suggests a reason for the temporary truce between philosophy and religion. He writes: "Among religious intellectuals today the most important question, the question that exercises them the most even when it is not asked in this form, is not 'Does God exist?' but rather, 'Should I be religious?'"² Many such intellectuals consider evidences for belief in God, or evidence that being religious is an advisable policy, irrelevant. White rightly sees a distaste for traditional theology in this shift of emphasis in philosophy of religion. He points to Santayana as an important representative of the position.

When the question, "Should I be religious?" is central, the problem of defining religion comes to the fore. The definition of a religious man as one who believes in God cannot be used because it reintroduces the traditional questions. The result has been a confusing variety of definitions; it is a spe-

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cies of poetry (Santayana), or ethical culture, or a variety of shared experience (Dewey), or—in the case of some philosophers whom White calls “atheists for Niebuhr”—insight into man’s nature.³ But religion is, in White’s words, “a holy family of all these concerns, rather than any one of them by itself.”⁴ He sees that a religion is “a total way of life,” and that “being religious in the sense of the question ‘Should I be religious?’ involves commitment of all levels of experience, including one that is cognitive or taken to be cognitive by the religious man.”⁵ White also correctly notes that religion is always found in some particular form, Jewish or Roman Catholic or Protestant or other, and that the question should be asked in a particular form, “Should I be a Jew?” or “Should I be a Protestant?” or “Should I be a Roman Catholic?” Each religion, White adds, forms a culture pattern, and the elements of religions “cannot be torn apart and reassembled.”⁶

When the question is asked in its proper form, “Should I accept this particular form of religion?”, the question of the existence of God as conceived in the particular religion is bound to arise. In Morton White’s words, “I suggest now that it is not only pointless to ask the question ‘Should I be religious?’ without specifying a particular religion, but that we cannot disengage the purely affective and active elements of that religion from its cognitive or putatively cognitive elements.”⁷ I summarize the situation as follows: If a philosopher, or any other thoughtful person, assents to the doctrinal scheme as well as the ecclesiastical and liturgical forms of a theistic religion, he will find himself accepting doctrines concerning God and man involving truth-claims.

Despite Paul Tillich’s strictures against discussion of the existence of God, such statements seem necessarily involved in any theistic theology or philosophy. To be sure,

“existence” as it refers to God does not mean what Tillich means by the term: “Existing means being finite or being in time and space.”⁸ Nor does it mean, as Tillich maintains, deriving God from the world of nature. God exists, for the theist, not in a dependent sense, but as the self-existent Being, the Creator. Theistic religious statements, such as “I believe in God,” intend more than merely expressive meaning, or subjective truth. They assert that worship and trust are justified by the character of the Ultimate Reality. They assert that the name “God” correctly names an X, such that there is only one X, and X is eternal, supremely powerful, and supremely good, and such that the world and ourselves depend upon this X for our existence. The truth of the statement that the world depends for its existence upon God the Creator implies the falsity of the naturalistic belief that the world of Nature is “self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating, and self-directing.” What the theist *intends* is truth as *objectivity*. An existential account of truth as subjectivity does not provide a sufficient basis for dealing with the problem of the objective truth of religious belief.

This need not mean dismissal of the concept of “truth as subjectivity” as of no significance in a philosophical study of religion. For there is a difference between an objective study of religion, and a believer’s *acceptance* of that religion as true. To be religious implies subjective responses of assent, loyalty, and commitment. The following conversation, attributed to Lincoln Steffens, is to the point:

“Satan and I,” said Steffens, “were walking down Fifth Avenue together when we saw a man stop suddenly and pick a piece of Truth out of the air—right out of the air—a piece of living Truth.” “Did you see that?” I asked Satan. “Doesn’t it worry you? Don’t you know that it is enough to destroy you?”

“Yes, but I’m not worried. I’ll tell you why,” said Satan. “It’s a beautiful living thing now, but the man will first name it, then he will organize it

and by that time it will be dead. If he would let it live, and live it, it would destroy me. I'm not worried."

The perishable character of subjective truth is a reason for the risk involved in philosophical and scientific analyses in such fields as religion and aesthetics.

The existentialist is concerned with the kind of truths, whether religious or moral or political, which cannot be made one's own without commitment. This concerns both the discovery of truth and its appropriation. Karl Heim has been quoted as writing: "A proposition or truth is said to be existential when I cannot apprehend it or assent to it from the standpoint of a mere spectator, but only on the ground of my total existence."

It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that there may be truths which are to be discovered through the instrument of the total personality, rather than through detached observation alone. Morton White, while not to be classified as an existentialist, recognizes the distinction between an objective study of religion and belief in that religion when he asks universities to teach students to *be* physicists, but to refrain from teaching students to *be* religious. (Since this proposed solution to the problem seems to go beyond what is needed to deal with the perplexities presented to the university by the plurality of religions, denominations and ideologies, there is doubtless a clue to White's own philosophy in his attitudes towards the teaching of physics, and of religion.) White implies that something more than study of objective facts is involved in learning to be a physicist, and he advises us that philosophers who can help to clarify the social and political issues before mankind by analyzing social, political and moral discourse will have to be familiar with the facts in "a more direct and personal way than a disengaged anthropologist knows the convictions of his primitives."⁹ Such direct and personal knowledge can come only

through engagement in social and cultural affairs. Ninian Smart, author of the perceptive book entitled *Reasons and Faiths*, holds that the analytic philosopher can achieve no real understanding of religious propositions without what he calls "spirituality"—for "the truths of religion are not attained by simple cognition or observation,"¹⁰ and are more akin to moral insights than to plain descriptive statements.

But having said this much in support of "truth as subjectivity," I return to my thesis: the problem of the objective truth of religious statements about the nature of Reality is unavoidable in any serious philosophical study of religion. And, I would add, in any serious believer's commitment to his religion. For truth as subjectivity makes sense only if truth is objectivity as well. If, in religion, no distinction is made between "So-and-so believes this to be true," and "This is true," then complete subjectivity and relativity prevail. John Herman Randall, Jr., is quite right in reminding us that many Germans found existential truth in Naziism.¹¹ And the courageous opposition of many religious people to that particular form of subjective truth is an indication that something more than subjective truth is intended in the Jewish and Christian religions. Erich Frank, a philosopher who adopted a basically existential approach in his lectures, *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*, clearly stated the limits of truth as subjectivity:

No objective truth can ever be founded on the merely subjective truthfulness of the believer. . . . A belief that believes only in itself is no longer a belief. For true belief transcends itself; it is belief in something—in a truth which is not determined by faith, but which, on the contrary, determines faith.¹²

My own reading of Kierkegaard leads me to the conclusion that he would accept this statement, at least in part. For example, in *Philosophical Fragments*, when Kierkegaard

gives up the attempt to prove the existence of God, he does so on the ground that a proof of existence always moves *from*, not *to*, existence. And in rejecting the cosmological argument he writes: "So long as I keep my hold on the proof, the existence does not come out, but when I let the proof go, the existence is there."¹³ If the leap of faith is believed to lead to an encounter with God, the objective existence of God is implied.

But this is not a complete or sufficient answer to the problem of the truth of religious statements from the standpoints of the majority of philosophers. The most important criticism of an existentialist approach to religion has been concisely and ably stated, from an analytic point of view, by Ronald W. Hepburn, in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*:

Overwhelmingly concerned with the phenomenology of faith and the life of faith, existentialist thought is in continual peril of failing to emerge from the subjectivist circle at all. A subjectivist account can provide an informative description of what it is like to think and act *as if* there were a God, of the "upward" metamorphosis which accompanies belief. But it is unable to say whether the belief is justified or unjustified, whether or not there exists a Being before whom the believer has taken up the attitude of faith.¹⁴

Is an analytical philosophical approach able to deal more adequately with the objective truth or falsity of religious statements? Within the type of logical empiricism represented by Feigl and Ayer, religious statements, classified as emotive, seem to be even more clearly subjective only than in theistic existentialism, and meaningless to boot. But there are some interesting recent suggestions, from philosophers who begin with linguistic analysis, concerning possible ways of justifying religious beliefs.

Willem Zuurdeeg, who recently published *An Analytic Philosophy of Religion*, interprets the function of philosophy very much as Carnap and Feigl do. It is the function of

philosophy to analyze languages. And disinterested analysis of language is the *only* function of philosophy. The philosopher therefore renounces any access to a "higher" world than the ordinary, any claim to ascertain the "real" nature of good and evil, any attempt to disclose the "real" structure of the universe. Philosophy disclaims apologetic purposes.

It is my understanding that analytical philosophy means an approach which can analyze and *only* analyze, which *cannot* apologize, evaluate, prescribe, witness, persuade, convince, or preach.¹⁵

Philosophy is accordingly disqualified in the fields of metaphysics and ontology, and its ideal is to be entirely neutral.

As philosophers we cannot quarrel with the convictions which any person entertains.¹⁶

However, since people do have convictions, Zuurdeeg proposes to distinguish five kinds of language in philosophical analysis. The first four are familiar:

1. Indicative language, found in crude form in every day language and in purified form in the language of empirical science.
2. Tautological language, found in mathematics and logic.
3. The analytical language of philosophy, which refers to the various languages of mankind, seeking "the meanings of the various languages in which human beings refer to facts, values, and 'ideas.'"
4. Emotive language, which is non-cognitive in its meanings, and includes imaginative, affective, and directive linguistic functions.

The fifth kind of language is new, for Zuurdeeg considers Feigl's account of non-cognitive meanings, in his article on *Logical Empiricism*, inadequate to describe the languages of religion, morals, and propaganda. Terms such as "emotional" and "volitional" are "insufficient to give account of a Communist's dedication to his cause, or a Moslem's loyalty to Allah,"¹⁷ for much more is involved in such beliefs than emotional and volitional factors. So Zuurdeeg proposes a

new category of language, distinguishable from emotive language:

- 5 Convictional language, which is to include "all persuasions concerning the meaning of life, concerning good and bad; concerning gods and devils; concerning representations of the ideal man, the ideal state, the ideal society; concerning the meaning of history, of nature, and of the All."¹⁸

Scientific language is excluded as purely intellectual and objective, and therefore as indicative.

In contrast to the merely subjective implications of Feigl's terms describing emotive expressions, convictional language is recognized as having an objective reference. The element of decision stressed by the existentialist, and the objective claims of the believer in Allah, or the Communist's dialectical process of history, are both present in the language used by believers. Zuurdeeg proposes to recognize the reality *for the believer* of the objective reference of his beliefs, but to *deny* to the philosopher *as philosopher* the right to prove or to disprove "the reality and value of such objective references."¹⁹ He also adds an essentially existential element to linguistic analysis: the philosopher should investigate "convictional situations"—such as the power of the Communist movement to win assent to its doctrines—as well as the convictional language. This recognizes the existence of "confessional groups" of believers, and the usually social nature of convictions.²⁰

The result of Zuurdeeg's proposed emendation of logical empiricism is that *all* convictional languages, whether metaphysical, religious or political, become "theologies," or, if disguised, "cryptotheologies."²¹ And all convictional movements can be called religions or cryptoreligions. All philosophies which do not limit themselves to disinterested analysis of languages possess convictional elements, and in so far are cryptotheologies, whether they are naturalistic or

theistic. Even science includes certain convictional presuppositions, such as the assumption that reliable information is very valuable for human beings in arranging their lives. And there is a convictional element in empirical philosophy. Zuurdeeg writes:

Impartial science and philosophy are always set forth and defended by people who are *convinced* that such science and philosophy are indispensable for a way of life which in their eyes is good, and, indeed, many empiricists claim that neutral science and Philosophy should be and can be the arbiters of the great questions of life.²²

This diagnoses the anti-theological bias discernible in much of the writing of philosophical analysts as convictional and therefore cryptotheological. It insists that convictional and indicative language are bound up together in philosophical discourse, and that both languages refer to reality. And Zuurdeeg argues that "No science or philosophy exists in which convictions do not play a part."²³ The existence of differing schools within all philosophical movements, including at least three analytical "confessional groups" as Zuurdeeg would name them, seems to me to support Zuurdeeg's contention.

While I am not convinced by Zuurdeeg's analysis, I do think that he has made some important contributions to philosophy and philosophy of religion: 1. Convictions are not *merely* expressive or emotive; they make objective references, and there is a "strong intellectual element in convictional language."²⁴ This category of "convictional language" is a very significant one, and opens important areas for study. 2. Philosophical analysis, while rightly recognizing the convictional elements in religious and political movements, should also recognize the convictional standpoint of the analytical philosopher himself, and of his convictional associates. Philosophers, as well as theologians, use convictional language. 3. Analysis of the

"convictional situation"—a suggestion incorporated from the existentialists—makes sense in a study of religion, or of Communism, or of the Vienna Circle. 4. The ideal of impartial analysis, bracketing so far as possible one's own convictional biases and commitments, is more difficult of attainment than is usually assumed. There is a place for this in philosophy, even though it does not seem to me to be the only permanent philosophical approach.

These are very significant contributions to philosophy and to philosophy of religion. But for a number of reasons I do not expect Zuurdeeg's proposed solutions to the problems of the respective roles of philosophy and theology, or his views of the nature of convictions, to be widely accepted. 1. I do not believe that the limited and neutral role proposed by Zuurdeeg for philosophy is either realistic or desirable. It is unrealistic because philosophers are unlikely to agree with him. If, as he admits, no philosophy exists in which convictions do not play a part, then it seems unlikely that philosophers will accept the conviction that critical consideration of convictions has no place in philosophy. Nor does it seem desirable to me to keep the philosopher as philosopher strictly neutral. There are impressive examples of objective philosophical analysis. But how much of the writings of philosophers would remain if we eliminated all committed expositions of the implications of philosophical positions, and all critical analyses of positions not held by the critic? To cite two recent examples, I do not think that we could expect an essay such as Feigl's on *Logical Empiricism*,²⁵ or a book in the philosophy of religion like Ninian Smart's *Reasons and Faiths*, without an involvement which goes beyond detached observation. Yet I do not consider either of these recent works merely "confessional witnessing" and apologetics. They belong within philosophy conceived as critical as well as analytical.

2. I am sure that Zuurdeeg's position concerning convictional statements does not meet the questions of our most thoughtful students on the ground expected. While he recognizes that a convictional statement is more than an emotive expression, he defends religious convictions by making all convictional languages "theological" or "crypto-theological." Convictions arise when a person is "overcome" by a convictor—somebody or something which takes hold of us, overpowers us, draws us irresistibly. The testimony of witnesses, traditions, environment, and the nature of the convictor, are all important elements in the situation. And decision is not on the basis of empirical evidence, though there may be some evidence. "Rather," writes Zuurdeeg, "the evidence in the meaning of empirical, factual evidence is not decisive for one's convictions."²⁶ He prefers to drop the term "grounds" and "to say that the act of assent is an expression of the person." Since the person's very being, the meaning of his life, the way the world appears to him, are involved, assent is being drawn irresistibly. And no one can give a complete account of the grounds of his assent. "Nobody understands himself well enough to account for his convictions, that is, for himself, as well as for the convictor who is the center of his life." "We always remain a mystery to ourselves and to other people."²⁷ There are neither scientific nor philosophical proofs or arguments which can validate or invalidate any conviction. There is no public, objective court of reason which can decide who is wrong and who is right.²⁸

Now it is true that where convictions are involved, there are always alternative positions; the evidence is not conclusive. But are all convictions on the same level? And is the process of reaching convictions as non-rational, even irrational, as Zuurdeeg maintains? This position, too, seems to "fail to emerge from the subjectivist circle at all."

And it means that no one can ever know which convictional system, which faith, if any, is true. One can only know what convictor had overwhelmed him. And the thoughtful student resists being overwhelmed, because he is concerned with truth.

3. While I see that Zuurdeeg's philosophy of religion offers the initiative to the theologian in convictional matters, there are serious questions about it from a theological perspective. The theologian is accustomed to stand within his theological circle, and to "witness" to those outside it. Each religion is, or includes, a "convictor." But is the theologian prepared to admit that all convictions are on the same level so far as truth goes?

Zuurdeeg's proposal would remove the philosopher as a rival, and as a critic, of the theologian. But the most influential philosophers of our time are busily engaged in questioning the truth and the logic of theological statements. Is there a cognitive basis for theology? Are religious statements falsifiable? Why not admit that religion is a human realm which should be brought under scientific explanation, and recognized as giving only human vision of the ideal? If the theologian gives up, with Zuurdeeg, "grounds" of belief, and cognitive claims, how is humanism avoided? If science is recognized as giving knowledge, but theology is without grounds for its beliefs, is not the cognitive area in the stronger position?

In conclusion, I shall mention briefly two other books in analytic philosophy which are significant explorations of these issues, and which offer clarification and help to teachers of religion. One is *Faith and Knowledge*, by John Hick, which offers a survey of the nature of religious faith, and of man's apprehension of God. I refer to his book because he seems to me to understand the issue before us. He writes: "Theistic religion, in claiming that the world mediates a divine activity, must also claim that God exists as a real Being, transcending our world as well

as meeting us in and through it. This ontological claim is the final point of distinction not only between religion and aesthetics but also between religion and ethics."²⁹ Hick has also made constructive contributions to the questions he discusses.

The other book is Ninian Smart's *Reasons and Faiths*. The aim of his book is "to describe the nature of religious doctrines and concepts," through analysis of religious discourse "in a philosophical spirit of higher-order neutrality."³⁰ This neutrality is maintained in part by studying various religions. He sees that "doctrinal schemes" in religions must be understood in their settings in the religious activities which give them "life and point."³¹ He distinguishes three different logical strands in doctrinal schemes: *numinous* propositions about God the Creator, mystical propositions which may be confirmed in mystical experience, and the incarnation strand which includes propositions about an incarnate deity. He rightly indicates that belief in the divinity of someone appearing in the world assumes belief in the existence of a divine Being who is not identical with the world. And he shows that the *grounds* which may be given for belief in God will be rather different from the grounds for acceptance of a God-Man, which will include sinlessness and the power to save. Instead of stressing the irrationality of religious belief, Smart calls attention to "the extraordinarily complicated status possessed by religious propositions: for they are backed by such a variety of evidence."³² He sees clearly that "the primary sense of *religious belief* is belief in religious entities, not in doctrines," and that beliefs in spiritual entities are not ordinary empirical beliefs.³³ The canons of correct reasoning in this field differ greatly from those in mathematics or physics.

Smart, I think, starts in the right place: with religious discourse, and with the religious activities which make religious lan-

guage meaningful. He asks for the justification which can be given for the various strands in religious discourse. He investigates the logic of religious language and of doctrinal schemes. He throws light upon the uses of religious language in various religions. He shows that religious language is meaningful, and various kinds of evidences are offered in religions. He suggests the need for more adequate distinctions between reason and revelation, religious truths and scientific and everyday truths. Such sensitive and skilled and sympathetic investigation of the language, the experiences, and the logic of religions offers much to those who seek to understand our religious heritage. It suggests that we are approaching the day when more adequate philosophies of religion will be formulated in the light of the new approaches to religion in our time.

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² Morton White, *Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 85.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

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¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

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²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

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²⁵ Herbert Feigl, *Logical Empiricism*, in *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), pp. 373 ff.

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Christian Theology and the Challenge of Non-Christian Religions

HIDEO HASHIMOTO*

THE current widespread interest in Zen Buddhism and Vedanta philosophy is both a threat and a blessing to the Christian faith. It is a threat because it tends to further eat away the foundations of the Christian faith, already being eroded by the process of secularization of basic world views of Western man and the depersonalizing tendencies of a technological society. This process of dechristianization is being accelerated by the infusion of Hindu and Buddhist philosophies through various manifestations of the "metaphysical movement," as noted by Stillson Judah¹ and D. T. Suzuki.²

However, contemporary interest in Eastern philosophy and religion may be a blessing. Confronted with another culture and world view, Christians are being challenged with the necessity of decision. Decision has always been before them. They have been told of the *krisis* by Crisis theologians. They have heard of the demand of existential decision from the Existentialists. But now the decision is immediate, and, indeed, existential. To be sure, the general public is still quite unaware of the "inevitable choice" before it, to borrow the title of the book by E. D. Soper addressed to this particular issue, or that the gospel is in dispute (Edmund Perry).

As Paul Tillich has pointed out, it is the task of theology to test the statement "that Jesus is the Christ and therefore the incar-

nation of the universal *logos* of God" in encounter with other religions.³ This paper is an attempt to engage in such a theological interpretation of religions. As such, it is a biased (though, we hope, not a prejudiced) interpretation. A theological interpretation of religions is parallel to, though not identical with, a scientific, philosophical, historical, or phenomenological interpretation of religions.

I

A number of Hindu and Buddhist scholars have written on the relationship between their own religious faiths and Christianity. Foremost among them are S. Radhakrishnan and D. T. Suzuki. Unlike the Christian and Western writers there is an underlying agreement among the Hindu and Buddhist authors. This agreement may be summarized as follows: (1) Truth is one. This Truth is represented by the Absolute Truth of the Brahman-Atman, in the case of Vedanta Philosophy, or Tathata (Suchness) Doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism. This is the unshakable, unanalyzable, fundamental, dogmatic presupposition of these writers. (2) Therefore, all religions are relative, including their religions. (3) Everyone must be tolerant toward all religions.⁴

Compared with this apparent agreement that exists among the Hindu and Buddhist philosophers, there is the widest possible gap among Western and Christian writers—all the way from the Universalists to Barth. These various positions may be classified in a number of ways. A group of Indian Christians classify them under three main headings: (1) "The attitude of aggressive condemnation"; (2) "The attitude of

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sympathetic appreciation and coöperation," exemplified by W. E. Hocking; (3) "The attitude of proclaiming a unique and final Gospel, without denial of value in other religions." This last-named group is further divided into three approaches: (a) Thomistic approach; (b) the Barthian approach, represented by Emil Brunner; and (c) the constructive approach, which affirms that "the final revelation in Christ is in varying degrees regarded as being 'judgment,' 'fulfillment' and 'redemption' to other religions." Under this omnibus category are included such widely differing positions as those of Hendrik Kraemer, G. E. Phillips, E. C. Dewick, N. Micklem, A. G. Hogg, P. D. Devanandan, D. G. Moses, J. N. Farquhar, and Paul Tillich.⁵ W. E. Hocking discusses three ways to a world faith: the Way of Radical Displacement, the Way of Synthesis, and the Way of Reconception.⁶ Douglas V. Steere lists four: (1) mutual extermination, (2) syncretism, (3) coexistence, (4) mutual irradiation.⁷ A. C. Bouquet discusses a very comprehensive group of theological positions in *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions*.⁸

Underlying these positions are differing views as to the nature of religion, very often assumed or unconsciously held. First: religion is understood as an aspect of culture. Much of the controversy on both sides of the Laymen's Inquiry seems to have viewed Christianity as an aspect of Western culture. The Commission on Appraisal, headed by W. E. Hocking, asserted: Christianity "must not be thought of as solely the religion of the West." It also states, "Around this picture of the universal Christian community gathered obscurely all that we now think of as preparation for world unity in civilization."⁹ Second: religion is viewed as philosophy. The superiority or inferiority of a particular religion is to be judged by a higher norm—conceived usually in terms of reason. This view is very pronounced in Radhakrishnan

and Vedanta and Buddhist philosophies and shared by Toynbee and Hocking. Third: religion is regarded as mystic experience. This emphasis is found in Suzuki, Radhakrishnan, and Vedanta philosophy, again shared by Hocking and many other Western philosophers. This view is very often combined with the view of religion as philosophy. Very closely associated with this position is the view that religion is the attainment of the authentic self, or non-self. Zen Buddhists and Existentialists become strange bed-fellows.¹⁰ Fourth: religion is understood as faith. This view emphasizes that Christianity (or Buddhism or Islam) is not an instance in the general category of "religion." This position is best represented by the title of Kraemer's book, *Religion and the Christian Faith*, in which the author judges the Christian "religion" along with other religions of the world. It is when the Christian faith is understood in this sense that a real problem arises in relation to other "religions," especially when other religions understand their particular faith in the same way. From this writer's point of view, Radhakrishnan's conviction that "the truth which is the kernel of every religion is one and the same,"¹¹ is a commitment of this sort. Perhaps Kraemer and Bouquet are wise in not even attempting a classification of various approaches. Since this particular article is concerned with the theological interpretation, it is the understanding of religion as faith that concerns us. However, it may be helpful to summarize briefly the positions of Ross, Toynbee, and Hocking.

II

Among the teachers of World Religions, Floyd H. Ross probably comes closest to the universalist position. He urges us: "Our primary allegiance must be to that pattern of divinity as it emerges in all things human." He adds that we must constantly be learning that "Divinity is round us—never gone."¹²

The position of Toynbee is that of Symma-

thus, whom he quotes many times: "It is impossible that so great a mystery should be approached by one road only."¹³ He finds the common ground of mankind on which the great religions of the world are to approach each other in human nature, "especially the self-centeredness which is the Original Sin in human nature."¹⁴ It is interesting to note that this is precisely the point of fundamental difference between the philosophies of India and the biblical faith. Toynbee is particularly impatient with the concept of the "jealous God" in biblical religions.¹⁵ He finds the highest forms of higher religions in the Boddhisattva ideals of Mahayana Buddhism and the crucifixion of Christ in Christianity.¹⁶ Toynbee makes a very pertinent plea for contrition and for "conviction without fanaticism," and for preaching not only by word but also more effectively by action.¹⁷

Hocking is frequently cited as the starting point of the discussion of this problem. It was the report by the Laymen's Inquiry which he headed that set off a whole cycle of debate which is now entering into a new and more fruitful stage. Kraemer writes: "With the bombshell of this Report in mind my book *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* was written, and acted, at least for a great part of the American missionary world, as another bombshell."¹⁸ These two books, especially Kraemer's, became the center of discussion at the meeting of the International Missionary Council at Tambaram, India, in 1938. A quarter of a century after *Rethinking Missions*, Hocking in his *Coming World Civilization* continues to advocate the process of reconception of the essence of one's faith to include a new element from another religion,¹⁹ "which would involve putting away an inherently noble but limited type of Only-Way Christianity." It is significant that Hocking comments in the footnote to this particular passage: "Perhaps implied in Radhakrishnan's remark: 'The distressing feature of our age is not its

atheism but its belief, the strange forms of superstition which it is willing to adopt.' *Recovery of Faith*, 1955."²⁰ There is a basic similarity between these two great philosophers as noted above.

III

It is when we come to Kraemer, Brunner, Bouquet, Tillich, and others that we find real grappling with the theological problem: "What is the relation of the Christian faith to non-Christian religions?" Here we find a wide range—all the way from Barth to Tillich. In the discussion of the theological interpretation of non-Christian religions, the point of dispute centers around the question of the "point of contact," which is in turn dependent on the understanding of revelation and the meaning of the *Logos*.

After summarizing the history of the Logos doctrine through the Apologists, Origen, Augustine, Dionysius the Areopagite, the Reformers, Pascal and Kierkegaard, Brunner writes: "For they all taught that the light of the reason is a divine light, given to us that we may know the world, but not able to lead us to know the Living God; that it does indeed point back to its origin in God, but in so doing does not open a way to the knowledge of God."²¹ This position of Brunner may be characterized as the recognition of the negative nature of the universal logos as the "point of contact" between the Christian faith and other religions. In his specific reference to world religions, Brunner writes: "no 'other religions' can assert revelation in the radical, unconditional sense in which the Christian faith does this, because no 'other religion' knows the God who is himself the Revealer."²²

While Kraemer takes a dialectical position in regard to the "point of contact," his emphasis is on the "No," rather than "Yes," in this matter. He writes: "There is no point of contact. There is, theologically speaking, no

point of contact between the world of God's Righteousness and Wisdom in Christ, and man's . . . righteousness, and wisdom, whatever it may be."²³ In reference to the Logos-idea Kraemer's position is equally clear. He states that "the Logos-idea of the Johannine Prologue is peculiarly unfit to put upon it the constructions which have been used in relation to it since Justin Martyr, regarding our problem." He rejects the interpretation of non-Christian religion and philosophy as *praeparatio evangelica*, although he emphasizes that he does not mean to belittle or despise the "best and highest elements" in other religions, which "would even be contrary to the meaning of the Johannine Prologue." But, he adds, "It should not be forgotten, it expresses in its own peculiar way in the same breath the mysterious enigma of Sin and Fall, by asserting, unflinchingly, that the world has not apprehended the Logos. . . . It is logically outrageous, but existentially, it is true." He quotes Kittel who says that the New Testament Logos "is fundamentally something different from the Hellenistic Logos-speculation."²⁴

A. C. Bouquet disagrees with Kraemer. After commenting that "Dr. Kraemer is hardly just in dismissing the influence of Philo as he does," he lists fourteen points of close affinities of the Fourth Gospel and Philo, based on the writing of R. G. Bury.²⁵ Bouquet points out the implications of his exegesis for the Christian preacher to the non-Christian world. "He will begin by recognizing that if its inhabitants have enough serious purpose in them to want to talk to him about religion, or to listen to what he has to say about Christ, they have already within themselves encountered the Divine Logos. . . ."²⁶ One should approach non-Christians as C. F. Andrews did earnest Hindus: "I always take it for granted that they *are* Christians, and as I talk to them, I often see the light of Christ come into their eyes."²⁷

C. H. Dodd's writing supports the interpretation of A. C. Bouquet:

The opening sentences, then, of the Prologue are clearly intelligible only when we admit that *logos*, though it carries with it the association of the Old Testament Word of the Lord, has also a meaning similar to that which it bears in Stoicism as modified by Philo, and parallel to the idea of Wisdom in other Jewish writers. It is the rational principle in the universe, its meaning, plan or purpose, conceived as a divine hypostasis in which the eternal God is revealed and active.²⁸

Alan Richardson takes essentially the same position as Bouquet when he supports the theory of general and special revelation. "General revelation is not and never can be the consummation of man's knowledge of God; it is only God's 'point of connection' with men. . . . It is a means to an end, a *praeparatio evangelica*, a possibility of salvation; it is on the human side what makes man capable of responding to the challenge and summons of Christ."²⁹ Richardson regards this view to have the advantage over the "Barthian" view that it does not have to denigrate the non-Christian systems in order to magnify the Lord of Christian faith."³⁰

Surjit Singh finds the doctrine of the Logos as the pedagogue, held by the early Church Fathers, helpful in dealing with the relation of the Christian faith to modern Hinduism. He suggests that one might substitute Hindu for Greek in the saying of Clement of Alexandria, "The same God that furnished both the Covenants was the giver of Greek philosophy to the Greeks, by which the Almighty was glorified among the Greeks." He cautions, however, against the "gnostic" reaction such as offered by Professor Radhakrishnan.³¹ Singh writes:

There is then in the non-Christian religions a genuine element of truth. Moreover there are heroic examples of living out this truth in life and thought. Such lives and their achievements are neither to be underestimated nor neglected. They are the allies of the Christian truth. They are the children of the Christ. They will find their proper fulfillment

and criticism in Jesus Christ. . . . It is because of them that Christ is expected and it is because they cannot create the Christ that the Christ comes. Jesus Christ is, therefore, the fulfillment and judgment of the Hebraic-prophetic tradition as well as of other traditions.³²

Kenneth Saunders expresses the same thought in his *The Gospel for Asia*, when he urges the Christian Churches to build upon the "noble foundations" of Hinduism and Buddhism.³³

Paul Tillich states his position regarding the Logos in a distinctive way:

The Christian claim that the *logos* who has become concrete in Jesus as the Christ is at the same time the universal *logos* includes the claim that wherever the *logos* is at work it agrees with the Christian message. No philosophy which is obedient to the universal *logos* can contradict the concrete *logos*, the Logos "who became flesh."³⁴

Logos, according to Tillich, is the ontological reason as distinguished from technical reason, which is the capacity for "reasoning." Ontological reason, or Logos, has subjective and objective aspects: "the rational structure of the mind and the rational structure of reality."³⁵ "Revelation is the manifestation of the ground of being for human knowledge,"³⁶ and "the manifestation of the mystery of being for the cognitive function of human reason."³⁷

Tillich, for all this "universal" and ontological approach to revelation, is fundamentally confessional in his basic presupposition or starting point. He writes as a Christian theologian at this point:

In accord with the circular character of systematic theology, the criterion of final revelation is derived from what Christianity considers to be the final revelation, the appearance of Jesus as the Christ. Theologians should not be afraid to admit this circle. It is not a shortcoming; rather it is the necessary expression of the existential character of theology.³⁸

Nothing can be more unequivocal. Final revelation means more than last, it means "the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable revelation,

that which is the criterion of all the others."³⁹ It is not Christianity which is final or universal; Christianity bears witness to the final revelation.⁴⁰ Final revelation is true "only for the person who participates existentially in the final revelation."⁴¹

Tillich divides the history of revelation into a period of preparation and a period of reception. Universal revelation is the revelation which occurs in the period of preparation. Universal revelation is not "general" or "natural." Nor does revelation occur always and everywhere. Universal revelation also must be existentially received. It is because of the preparation for the Christian message in universal revelation that Christian missions are possible.⁴² Here Tillich is definitely on the side of Bouquet, Richardson, Singh and opposed to Kraemer and Brunner. However, we must not lose sight of the agreement in all of them that Christ is the final revelation, and criterion of all revelation.⁴³ Tillich, like Kraemer and Richardson, makes a distinction between direct, concrete and immediate preparation in Old Testament prophetism from the universal preparation as such.⁴⁴

However, as Barth emphasizes, God who reveals himself makes himself known as the hidden God.⁴⁵ Dillenberger points out that revelation itself "is mystery as well as meaning and comes out of a God who remains unfathomable, but of whom it may be affirmed that he is trustworthy on the basis of faith."⁴⁶ On the basis of this relation of revelation and hiddenness, it may be maintained that "the history of religions is a genuine experience, though not the experience of God as he is fully manifested," and that one may ascribe to it "a place in the preparatory revelation."⁴⁷ Revelation "grasps and transforms the total man."⁴⁸ It is this transformation that needs to be effected in Jesus Christ, who is the revelation of the God of justice and grace. Only in this sense can the history of religions be considered a "preparatory revelation."

And in this sense revelation in Christ is judgment of both Christian and non-Christian religions. All must accept judgment with repentance, and grace with faith.

In the discussion of the "point of contact," we have so far concentrated on the Logos in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. An even more fruitful discussion should center around the word, "Wisdom," used by Paul. W. L. Knox points out that Paul did not use the more convenient word, Logos, of Philo, while the Fourth Gospel does, even though the latter has less real contact with Philo's outlook than Paul himself.

It was therefore an easy matter for Paul in writing his first letter to Corinth to transfer the person of the historical Jesus from the category of the heavenly Messiah of Palestinian Judaism and Christianity into that of the divine Wisdom which was the centre of Hellenistic-Jewish speculation, where the term Logos had not yet ousted it under the influence of Philo.⁴⁹

William D. Davies points out similarly that "we are not . . . confined to the passage in the Epistle to the Colossians in our attempt to trace the lineaments of the figure of Wisdom in the Christology of Paul." He adds: (1) I Corinthians 10: 1-4 "Rock was Christ"; (2) Romans 10:6 ff.; (3) I Corinthians 1:24 and I Corinthians 1:30.⁵⁰ He concludes: "When Christ is the agent of creation surely that creation must witness to Him; there is continuity not discontinuity between God's work as Creator and as Redeemer."⁵¹

Karl L. Reichelt, after long years spent in China as a missionary among Buddhists, testifies that it is "an indisputable fact that the cosmically awakened have exerted beneficial influence on their surroundings." He finds it "incontestable . . . that it is the duty of the Christian student of religious history to give full recognition to what he has verified as a reality in actual life." He regards the cosmic awakening as "one of the most beautiful evidences of God's prepara-

tory work within the sphere of Natural Revelation."⁵²

It is interesting to note that Ryoun Kama-gaya, who was born to succeed his father as the chief priest of his Shin sect Temple, but after being converted to Christianity, returned to his native city to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ, writes in a similar vein.

Buddhism originated with atheistic Gautama, developed into a theistic religion, and finally reached the absolutely Other-Power faith of Shinran, thus approaching Christianity. Would it be wrong to say that this is God's preparation in the Orient toward Christ, according to the providence of God? Who could say that it is not the holy will of Christ to fulfill also this subsidiary Old Testament, if this is not to be regarded the Old Testament proper? Surely Christ is the fulfiller of all religions and all morality.⁵³

It is significant that Reichelt, while being so emphatic about the positive values of "cosmic awakening," recognizes the insufficiency of such a "break through" in itself. "To breach the gap something more is needed, an existential experience of Christ in which man meets God in the depth of his conscience."⁵⁴ This is precisely what Brunner and others emphasize as crucial. Here, there is no disagreement between Bouquet and Kraemer, Tillich and Brunner. For example, speaking of the value of pre-Christian literature, Bouquet writes: "But here again there must be a strict testing of that inheritance by the words of Jesus Christ: 'It was said by them of old time, but I say unto you.'"⁵⁵

The observation of H. V. White clarifies the issue at this point. In reference to the question of the "point of contact," he says that Christianity is not the fulfillment of the religions of the world in the sense that it brings to completion the spiritual quest as it has been already carried on. Christian faith is not merely the "final point on a straight line of development."⁵⁶

The words of Jesus in Matthew 5:17 ff., so frequently quoted in this connection, are more pertinent and bear more directly on the

issue than those even of Paul and the Fourth Gospel. In commenting on these related passages in the Gospels, A. N. Wilder emphasizes that the situation, "the Time of Salvation," which had arisen with the presence of John the Baptist and Jesus, inaugurated a "different relation between man and man, and man and God."⁵⁷ Consequently, "Jesus virtually supersedes the law by the length he goes in appealing to its deeper principles." The dispute as to whether Jesus did or did not overthrow the law is ambiguous.

But we are satisfied to rest the case for his *virtual setting aside of the law on the degree of independent interpretation he exercises. He goes so far beyond such scribes in matter of emphasis and spirit that the difference in degree becomes a difference in kind*, and confirmation of this is found in the attitude to him of the scribes and Pharisees (*Italics his*).⁵⁸

If the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets meant the "virtual setting aside" of the Old Testament proper, how much more does it mean setting aside the "extra-canonical" or "subsidiary" Old Testament (if we can speak of non-biblical religions in these words)! "But I say to you. . . ."—these are ever the words of Jesus as he calls men, "Come, follow me." "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe in the Gospel." This is indeed the time of salvation and decision, for or against Jesus the Christ. It is the moment of personal meeting of God in Christ and the response of repentance and faith. Fulfillment always involves judgment and "setting aside." All must join with Paul, "Whatever gain I had, I counted as loss for the sake of Christ. Indeed I count everything as loss because of the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord" (Philippians 3:7, 8). By "gain" Paul meant precisely what we have been dealing with, the cultural and religious heritage of his people, a proud possession indeed for this "Hebrew born of Hebrews." It is this that Paul found to be the impediment. And this, the cultural and

religious heritage, is what stands in the way of both the Christian and the non-Christian. For both, Christian and non-Christian, fulfillment comes through repentance, and acceptance of grace in faith.

It is when one has clarified one's own theological approach to non-Christian religions, one is able to enter into the religious life of another faith with a genuine sense of empathy and identification. Edmund Perry states this in a dramatic way, when he likens our endeavor to that of the incarnation:

So we also, unheralded and without fanfare, enter into the whole life of another faith-folk, espouse their ambitions and aspirations, subject ourselves to their needs and anxieties, and allow ourselves to be tempted, really tempted, by the claims of their faith.⁵⁹

Though it may be difficult to reconcile one's "loyalty to the gospel which leads him to prejudgment"⁶⁰ with one's willingness to be tempted, it is the task that must be undertaken.

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- ¹ Stillson Judah, "Indian Philosophy and the Metaphysical Movement in the United States," *Religion in Life*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (Summer, 1959), pp. 353 ff.
- ² "Is it not an interesting phenomenon that certain parts of Buddhist thought, instead of being taken as a whole, are separated and combined harmoniously with existing thoughts and feelings of Europe and America and spread as Theosophy or [Christian] 'Science'?" D. T. Suzuki, "Obei niokeru Bukkyo Shiso no Denpa" ("The Spread of Buddhism in Europe and America"), *Zoku Suzuki Daisetsu Senshu (Selected Works of Daisetsu Suzuki, Continued)* Vol. 6, p. 220. (Hereafter cited as *Senshu*.)
- ³ Paul Tillich, "Christian Century," Vol. LXXV, No. 19 (May 7, 1958), p. 555.
- ⁴ S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, Oxford, 1939, 1940, p. 317 (1) and p. 323, 335 (2). Also S. Radhakrishnan, *East and West*, Harper, 1956, p. 25.
- ⁵ D. T. Suzuki, *The Essence of Buddhism*, Kyoto: Hozokan, 1948, p. 7.
- ⁶ D. T. Suzuki, *Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist*, Harper, 1957, p. 112.
- ⁷ M. Anesaki, "How Christianity Appeals to a

Japanese Buddhist." *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (October 1905), pp. 1-3, 10.

However, it is interesting to note that Suzuki writes: "Buddhism does not try to give a special status to God as the Creator as does Christianity. Thus it does not recognize God. It does not give God the characteristics of time or space. Therein lies the peculiarity of Buddhism. Buddhist standpoint is that God transcends space and time and yet expresses itself [himself is a better translation but hardly seems congruous with the thought] in space and time. . . . This viewpoint stands in direct opposition to Christianity. Rather, Buddhism can include Christianity but Christianity cannot include Buddhism. . . ."

"Buddhism is the great enemy from the viewpoint of Christianity. . . . However, from the perspective of Buddhism, Christianity . . . is simply an accommodated truth (Hoben) arising out of Buddha's compassionate vow. Opposition is the attitude of Christianity. There is nothing but a balmy spring breeze from the side of Buddhism." D. T. Suzuki, *Senshu*, Supplementary Vol. 5, p. 170.

This quotation is typical of the attitude of superiority assumed by Indian and Buddhist writers both when they emphasize unity of truth and diversity of religions.

⁵ Rajah B. Manikan, ed., *Christianity and the Asian Revolution*, Friendship Press, 1954, pp. 187-198.

⁶ William Ernest Hocking, *Living Religions and a World Faith*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1940, pp. 143-208.

⁷ Douglas V. Steere, "Mutual Irradiation," *Religion in Life*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (Summer, 1959), p. 399.

⁸ A. C. Bouquet, *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions*, Harper, 1958, pp. 335-423.

⁹ The Commission of Appraisal, W. E. Hocking, Chairman, *Rethinking Missions*, Harper, 1932, p. 8.

¹⁰ See Carl Michalson, "The Issue: Ultimate Meaning in History," *Religion in Life*, Vol. LXXVII, No. 3 (Summer, 1959), p. 382. "Martin Heidegger is said to have commented after reading a piece by the Zen Philosopher, D. T. Suzuki, 'This is what I have been trying to say in all my writings.'"

See also Yoshinori Takeuchi, "Buddhism and Existentialism: The Dialogue between Oriental and Occidental Thought," Walter Leibrich, *Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich*, Harper, 1959, pp. 291 ff.

¹¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *East and West*, Harper, 1956, p. 25.

¹² Floyd H. Ross and Tynette Hills, *The Great*

Religions by which Men Live, Fawcett Publications, 1956, pp. 188-189. See Edmund Perry, *The Gospel in Dispute*, Doubleday, 1958, p. 7.

¹³ Arnold Toynbee, *Christianity Among the Religions of the World*, Scribner's, 1957, p. 112. Arnold Toynbee, *An Historian's Approach to Religion*, Oxford, 1956, pp. 253, 297-299.

¹⁴ Toynbee, *Christianity Among the Religions of the World*, p. 85.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 19 ff., 97.

¹⁶ Toynbee, *An Historian's Approach to Religion*, pp. 286-299. See also Toynbee, *Christianity Among the Religions of the World*, p. 108, 109.

¹⁷ Toynbee, *Christianity Among the Religions of the World*, pp. 96 ff.

¹⁸ Hendrik Kraemer, *Religion and the Christian Faith*, Westminster, 1956, p. 224.

¹⁹ W. E. Hocking, *The Coming World Civilization*, Harper, 1956, p. 147.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

²¹ Emil Brunner, *Revelation and Reason*, Westminster, 1946, p. 355.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 236.

²³ Kraemer, *op. cit.*, pp. 363, 364. Since we are concerned with only the theological question at the moment, his "yes" has no direct relevance here.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-278. (Bultmann, according to Colwell and Titus, believes that most of the Prologue comes from a Gnostic cult and has "nothing to do with Christianity and very little with Stoicism." E. C. Colwell and E. L. Titus, *The Gospel of the Spirit*, Harper, 1953, pp. 143-144.)

²⁵ Bouquet, *op. cit.*, pp. 146, 147.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

²⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 160.

²⁸ C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, Cambridge, 1953, p. 280.

²⁹ Alan Richardson, *Christian Apologetics*, Harper, 1947, p. 130.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

³¹ Surjit Singh, *Preface to Personality*, The Christian Literature Society of India, 1952, pp. 114-115.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 132.

³³ Kenneth Saunders, *The Gospel for Asia: A Study of Three Religious Masterpieces: Gita, Lotus, and Fourth Gospel*, Macmillan, 1928, p. 208.

³⁴ Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, University of Chicago Press, 1951, Vol. I, p. 28. (Hereafter cited as S.T.)

³⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 71-75.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 94.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 129.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 135.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 132-133.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 134.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, I, 138.

⁴² *Ibid.*, I, 139. In an article entitled "The Theology of Missions," published by the Missionary Research Library, August 19, 1954, Tillich writes of the latent and the manifest church. "The manifest church opens up what is potentially given in the different religions and cultures outside Christianity. In some way and on some level, every human being is longing for a new reality in contrast to the distorted reality in which he is living. People are not *outside* of God; they are grasped by God: on the level in which they *can* be grasped—in their experience of the Divine, in the realm of holiness in which they are living, in which they are educated, in which they have performed acts of faith and adoration and prayer and cults, even if the symbols in which the Holy was expressed seem to us extremely primitive and idolatrous. It was distorted religion, but it was not un-religion. It was the reality of the Divine, preparing in paganism for the coming of the manifest Church, and through the manifest Church the coming of the Kingdom of God. This alone makes missions possible." p. 5.

⁴³ Bouquet, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 133 ff.; Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 132; Kraemer, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7; Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Perry, *op. cit.*, Chapter IV, pp. 83 ff.; Saunders, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

⁴⁴ Tillich, *S.T.*, I, 142.

⁴⁵ Karl Barth, *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God*, Scribners, 1939, pp. 25-28.

⁴⁶ John Dillenberger, *God Hidden and Revealed*, Muhlenberg Press, 1953, p. 171.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁴⁹ W. L. Knox, *St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, Cambridge, 1939, p. 114.

⁵⁰ William D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, London: SPCK, 1948, pp. 151-154.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

⁵² Karl Ludvig Reichelt, *Meditation and Piety in*

the Far East, Harper, 1954, p. 18. Over a quarter of a century before, in 1927, he had observed:

"In numberless ways, it will be shown how the innermost lines of thought in Chinese Mahayana Buddhism all lead out to that great thought about one universal saviour who is dimly perceived, and who, it is hoped, will offer the great response to all longings and ideals. If ever Justin Martyr's famous saying about Christ as 'Logos Spermatikos' (the Word, which, like the seed-germ, lies behind the religious systems of salvation) has had its application, it is surely here. . . ."

"Think not that I came to destroy the law, or the prophets: I came not to destroy but to fulfill." (Matt. 5:17) Karl Ludvig Reichelt, *Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism*, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1927, p. 7.

⁵³ Ryoum Kamegaya, *Bukkyo kara Kirisutoe (From Buddhism to Christ)*, Tokyo: Fukuinkan, 1951, p. 283.

⁵⁴ Reichelt, *Meditation and Piety*, p. 18. Kamegaya also recognizes that sunlight and moonlight are completely different. "Yet moonlight is nothing else than the reflection of the sunlight." But "Buddhism is polytheistic . . . it does not know the triune God. Mankind cannot stay in Buddhism." Kamegaya, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

See also R. L. Slater, *Paradox and Nirvana*, University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 51-53.

⁵⁵ Bouquet, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

⁵⁶ H. V. White—in conversation with the writer—July 28, 1959.

⁵⁷ Amos N. Wilder, *Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus*, Rev. Ed. Harper, 1950, p. 147.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 162. See also Carl Michalson, *The Hinge of History*, Scribners, 1959, p. 45.

⁵⁹ Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁶⁰ F. Dean Lueking, "Straight from the Shoulder," *The Christian Century*, LXXVI, No. 12 (March 25, 1959), p. 360.

The Meaning of Man in the Bhagavad Gita

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ONE of the great dangers of summaries of cultural traditions is the temptation to impose more harmony than in fact exists. The greater one's ignorance the easier it is to find non-existent harmony. This is amply illustrated from the popular fallacy that basically all religions are alike, that all are making the same fundamental assertions, that all hold the same truths, that all have the same goal. My intention in this paper is to show that while there is a common stream in Indian philosophic and religious thought, it is running in different channels than does ours and the current is carrying us into different seas.

The Bhagavad Gita does not cover the entire spectrum of oriental thought. But it is a characteristic statement of the Oriental answers to the question of the meaning of man. It is the most widely read piece of Indian religious literature, and Hindus find in it much the same kind of inspiration and guidance which Christians find in the New Testament. Gandhi ranked it with the New Testament of Christianity as a prime source of his own religious inspiration, and those who would like to baptize Gandhi into Christianity or adopt his non-violent political strategy as the full expression of the Christian ethic should remember that he identified himself with the Hinduism of the Bhagavad Gita.

Critical opinion is divided as to whether the Gita is an integral part of the epic, the Mahabharata, in which it appears, or whether it is an independent piece, which

was later added. Its authorship is unknown, as is that of the rest of the Mahabharata which seems to be a collection of diverse materials from many hands and periods detailing a series of wars between the Pandava and Kaurava clans. The Gita is dated variously between 500 and 100 B.C. and probably was combined with the Mahabharata by 100 B.C. There is probably some history behind the wars described, and Krishna may have been an early hero, an historical person. The Gita itself purports to be a conversation between Arjuna, a prince of the Pandava clan, and Krishna, his charioteer, as they sit in his chariot drawn up between the armies just before the battle begins against Arjuna's relatives, the Kauravas.

I

As soon as these critical questions are raised a significant difference between the Indian approach and our own becomes apparent. Our inclination is to establish first the exact nature of the specific phenomenon or piece of literature before us because we tend to make the truth it can convey depend upon that nature. This is our mood when certain pieces of our sacred literature or certain truths are declared exempt from investigation because they come from God. Thus they are given a precise character which defines our response or behavior toward them and controls the meaning they can convey. The case is the same when a skeptical scholar denies that the sacred literature could have this special character. He is only defining a different nature for the document and establishing a different kind of meaning. Not even a devotional reading of the New Testament escapes this attitude. If God appeared and acted in history in Jesus called the Christ,

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then that event has a necessary determinable factuality which cannot be divorced from the truth these acts hold for us. If it then becomes the case that the only essential truth lies in certain facts about the person or event or the documents which convey the events to us, we have a complete scientific objectivity which is concerned only with facts about things or writings.

The Hindu does not operate this way. The first question he asks and almost the only one—until he is contaminated with western influences—is what does this tell me about the meaning of life? What does it tell me about who I am and what my existence means? The answer to these questions does not depend upon who wrote, or when, or whether the actors are historical or not.

From this point of view truth is without time or date or place. The nature of ultimate reality and truth does not change. Only the fleeting phenomena in which it is manifested change. For the Oriental the eternal truth transcends the many forms in which it comes. Both Christ and Krishna in their different ways are avatars, descents of Vishnu who is the personification of Brahman, that which is behind all things and is all things, the eternal unchanging Atman which manifests itself in all changing and transitory lives. In our view history is a movement from a beginning to an end, from creation to the Kingdom of God. In the Hindu view history is a great turning of the wheel, the flowing forth of the manifestations of Brahman and its return to itself.

This difference in the estimate of the significance of things and events in the world prompts Arjuna's question with which the Gita begins. Seeing his relatives who will soon die in the ensuing battle, he asks Krishna the eternal question, what does life mean? What is my duty, and what is the meaning of victory which must be purchased with fratricide [I, 28-31]? Of course we all know of persons in western history—and one

or two in the Old Testament—who were not deterred by such considerations. Instead their own direct self-interest was the ruling factor which justified obliterating any opposition.

Krishna offers three basic answers to Arjuna's and our question of the meaning of life and the nature, purposes and duties of man. One answer lies in a certain kind of knowledge implied by the philosophic basis of Hinduism, both Vedanta and Sankhya. The second answer is the yoga of works, action, duties which are the functions of the several castes, which makes the whole social system of India a means of celebrating the meaning of life and participating in the process of salvation. The third answer of the Gita is Bhakti, devotion to the deity whose grace will save. While superficially these seem to be different paths the fundamental meaning of the Gita is that these are alternative ways to the same saving knowledge. One can reach this knowledge directly or through fulfilling his caste duties or through worship and devotion. But these must not be so concretized or made final in their significance that one is saved because he has done certain things or fulfilled certain duties. One is saved by the knowledge these duties or devotion lead him to.

II

Krishna states the main thesis in his first reply. The real clue to man, to Arjuna's problem, is that behind the specific identities of persons, things, and events, even God's, is a reality, the Atman or Brahman which binds them all together and gives them a common ground. It is the source of their individual being but is itself changeless because it contains all change within itself. Arjuna's mistake was to think that his action was tied to his own identity as a separate self, as if *he* were killing, and to think that the fate of his slain kinsmen was their individual fate, as if each of them must die [II, 11-18].

The Gita does not assert pure Vedanta

philosophy. Individual existence or experience is not for the Gita an illusion of a clouded mind which will disappear when the mind is enlightened. The school of Sankara and the Buddhist Madhymika School of Nagarjuna do go this far. In their view the individual is an illusion and behind everything there is Nothing [Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. II, Ch. 21].

The Gita presents a double truth about man's nature. On the one hand a man shares the ultimate nature of Brahman and is not himself in any sense ultimate. On the other hand Arjuna, his enemies, all things and events are real. Their experiences occur. Each occupies a place in the total social structure which imposes upon him certain duties which he cannot evade. Arjuna's error was to think that his own being and that of his fellows was itself final as if throughout all time and space he would continue to be his own separate self with a continuing self-identity indestructibly set apart from all other selves. The problem of life is so to live the demands of real individual existence that the living gives full and appropriate expression to the more ultimate truth about the identity of all selves and beings in Brahman. All things come forth from Brahman and when the cycle is ended they return to him who speaks through the voice of Krishna [X].

As Arjuna saw himself, he was caught in the error of tending to make his selfhood and his experiences of things final and ultimate, as if they were unchanging elements which go to make up the universe [I, 40-43]. In terms of this error, Brahman must become something other than the universe of beings which flows forth from him. But one is not in his present state a portion of Brahman in truth, although one is because he participates in Brahman. To realize this fully is the final knowledge which will bring release from the round of existence with all its pains, pleasures and transitoriness [IX, 11 ff.]. Yet identification between this individual self and the ultimate Self, Brahman, is not of the

kind which simply equates the two. This would be the pantheism which limits the divine to the specific manifestations it takes in the several things and events in the natural order. The Bhagavad Gita is not pantheistic, for no individual thing is a valid clue to the nature of the Brahman nor is the Brahman in purity.

How does one attain this knowledge? Here a firm distinction must be made between knowledge and information. You already have the information that all things are Brahman and that Brahman is in all things. But the world looks and sounds no different than it did. Each thing of your experience is still just as specifically what it uniquely is as before. Your own separateness from other beings is not less than before. The reply is simply that information is not knowledge.

The knowledge that one's self is also Brahman, and that one's true meaning and destiny is in losing one's selfhood in return to Brahman comes only after the senses have been quieted and one comprehends with the inner eye with direct, unmediated vision, not by the mediation of experience [IX, 2]. It is the knowledge which transforms experience. Those who obtain it have their lives changed in the round of existences until at last their existences. Those who fail to find it continue in the round of existences until at last their minds are illuminated [II, 1-3]. More is at stake than data which can be stated or a proposition which can be affirmed. When we reply by asking to have the content of this knowledge made specific we are still caught in the error it identifies which is to assume that in some sense one may stand apart from Brahman to establish his nature and one's relationship to that nature independently and objectively. Here in a most thoroughgoing fashion is the God behind God. One knows that reality only by an immediate apprehension which transcends individuation by an insight opened to the contemplative mind. To attain this knowledge is the first answer to man's problem of meaning.

III

What follows from the direct and unmediated appropriation of one's identity with Brahman and Krishna? If the Gita were of the nihilistic schools of Vedanta or Madhyamika the result of this insight would be extinction of the individual self. But here the Gita affirms the doctrine of works. The second great answer is that one now is to act with non-attachment, that is without concern for the result of the act or without anxiety for one's fate in the act [V, 7-13].

The doctrine of works in non-attachment bridges the apparent contradiction between the dissolution of the individual implied by Vedanta monism on the one side and the whole structure of rituals and obligations of society described by the caste structure on the other side [V, 4-5]. This doctrine reflects the influence of Gautama's reform, although with him the whole structure of society embodied in caste and its accompanying responsibilities and activities tended to disappear. It may be that the Gita represents an attempt to accept Gautama's teaching while rejecting its social consequences, so that the Gita may be a way by which Buddhism was reconciled with orthodox Hinduism and ultimately reabsorbed.

Non-attachment must be seen in two ways. It is both a teaching about the nature of man and a teaching about the nature of his duty [XV, 1-5]. As a teaching about the nature of the person its meaning is to detach the self from its identification of its nature with its sense experiences, with its emotions, with its desires, its good fortune or ill.

The normal, almost we would say natural and proper way for one to conceive himself is in terms of his experiences which he has from the external world. Man is made by his response to the external world, especially to his human environment, we tend to say. But the consequence is to make man an object determined by his external world as it impinges upon him. The Indian view expressed

in the Gita is quite the reverse [II, 60-63].

The error which the Gita identifies in sense experience is not that the senses deceive or that our information about the external world must come by some other means not specified. Instead the error is in what it does to man himself. Sense experience makes him a separated individual and leads him to concentrate upon the content of his particular sense data. They give him pleasure or pain and he becomes the one who possesses these experiences. They determine his life. Ultimately they define his life as he strives to obtain some of them or to avoid others, and he can have only the peace they can give him, which in the end is none at all [V, 22].

Whatever comes from the senses represents that phenomenal Prakriti world, which while it flows forth from Brahman, is not Brahman in purity [IX, 4-10]. One must therefore reject pleasure and quench the desire for its possession, and likewise reject the desire to be released from pain. In either case to be concerned for whatever happens is to grant to that event and to one's self an ultimacy and finality, a permanence and significance which not only is false to one's true nature but also more firmly binds one into that world of events to make escape more difficult than ever [II, 14-16; XIV, 22-25, 14-15].

Non-attachment breaks the bondage of the senses over the self. One knows that *he* is not the actor. Only his embodied nature is the actor, and *he* is not involved in the actions which occur. They no longer bind him to the wheel of existence so that he comes to the same goal as those who reach Brahman by pure knowledge only [V, 7-13; XIV, 19-20, 26-27].

The first meaning of non-attachment is to divorce the self from its seemingly natural ties to the world of sense and sensation, of desire and emotion, so that these become merely surface phenomena without significance or impact upon one's self [V, 22].

They continue to happen for they are not imaginary, but they are now without meaning or importance. Their power to push or pull the self has been denied so that they and the events from which they arise flow over the self without touching or influencing him [XIV, 22-27].

This release is not based upon any mind-body dualism in which the mind is turned toward higher things away from things of the body, despite the implicit dualism of Brahman and nature in the Sankhya terminology which the Gita uses [IX, 7-10, XIII, XIV]. In the Sankhya system of the Gita the mind is part of the phenomenal world of the senses and is not synonymous with the true self. Mind also is an instrument which must be disciplined and controlled and is not the locus of the true person. The conception of the higher life of the mind popular among us fails to reach the level of true non-attachment Krishna describes [II, 52-53, 67; III, 42; V, 22; VI, 33-36].

IV

The other meaning of non-attachment specifies the manner in which one must carry on his duties and activities now having come to know that his real nature is not sense or passion or experience. The apparent implication of this kind of knowledge would seem to be complete asceticism. Ordinary life ought now to cease to exist at all, for having become enlightened caste duties and daily affairs should drop away. This kind of ascetic abandonment of life is implied by the Vedanta teaching and by Gautama. It is embodied in the traditional Hindu pattern of the four stages of life of the twice-born man. The first and second stages as student and house-holder represent the ordinary obligations of life [Sacred Books of the East, vol. VII, 114, 189 ff.].

The Gita's position is that these stages can and must be lived with non-attachment, thus affirming the possibility of attaining the goal

without taking on the full asceticism of the third and fourth stages of the twice-born's life [Sacred Books of the East, VII, 276-291]. Yet asceticism as such is not denied. The alternative of action in non-attachment replaces it as a better way [V, 2].

But to see complete asceticism as the only proper expression of non-attachment is to see the problem in terms of our understanding of the function of asceticism. Our view, reflecting Zoroastrian and Manichean influences supporting a mind-body dualism, tends to say that this material existence of the individual is sufficiently real and evil that the only way to release life from its bondage to these experiences and obligations is to suppress them. To abstain from these things is to admit that what one abstains from is dangerous enough that the only thing one can do is to drive these things out of his life. But when he drives them out he still takes them with him [II, 59]. Asceticism is the wrong road because by suppression one only ties himself more firmly to the transient world he seeks to escape. But insofar as asceticism represents the rejection of the relevance of life's duties, it is again the wrong road for this solution makes the circumstances of life entirely illusory and grants to the individual self only the reality of error [V, 2; VI, 1].

The Bhagavad Gita advocates another way. One cannot escape by refraining from acting. One can escape only by acting, by fulfilling his duties in a certain way. This is the second meaning of non-attachment, not ascetic withdrawal or denial, but non-attached participation which does not involve one in what he does [IV, 13-24].

The basis of the Gita's position is that one cannot avoid acting in some fashion or other and upon some basis or other. The only real question is what is the proper basis for action since one must act [III, 4-9]. The necessity for action comes from one's own nature. One is an embodied being and this embodiment, his nature, Prakriti, has a dy-

namic, a power, tendencies and necessities which cannot be denied [III, 33]. Here the Gita asserts the Sankhya dualism which gives to the Prakriti individualization and materialization of the Brahman a genuine reality without beginning [XIII, 19]. But the Gita does not seem to accept the full implications of this position [cf. VIII, 19-20; XIII, 12]. Instead Prakriti flows forth from Brahman as the form in which necessarily Brahman manifests itself [IX, 4-10; cf. ch. XIII, XIV].

Man's nature comes into being through karma as the working out of the consequences of past deeds. In turn the actions performed now have their karma which determines one's future state and nature. Bad karma will return one to existence to continue his struggle for release. If one acts now in the way his nature requires, but from the basis of non-attachment, his karma will be good and he will not return to existence [III, 4-9, 37-43]. Accordingly if Arjuna thinks he can escape his duty he is only deceiving himself. He can choose only the end for which he acts. He cannot choose the means, nor the path of action. These are already determined by his nature [XVIII, 59-60]. Arjuna is a Kshatriya, a warrior, a commander of armies. For him the path of enlightenment, knowledge, non-attached action, leads to the battle field.

V

Action in non-attachment which does not involve the actor does not as it might seem rob actions of their moral content. The Bhagavad Gita is not advocating moral chaos. On the contrary the established obligations and functions of the several castes are made morally obligatory as the appropriate and necessary expression of the nature one has earned. But the locus of moral evaluation shifts from the act itself or its consequences for the social welfare to the kind of self-understanding it expresses [Hiriyanna, *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*,

Allen and Unwin, 1956, pp. 54-55]. If the action expresses the right self-understanding it is good. It will have good karma and will lead to release from existence. If the action expresses the wrong self-understanding it will have bad karma and will generate future consequences which further existences must work off [III, 17-19].

Again the main theme returns. Those actions are good which arise from the understanding that one's self is not the real doer but instead it is his nature which acts. Therefore he acts without involvement in his act or its consequences. Such control of action is possible only if one understands his real nature, only if one understands and controls the gunas or qualities which compose his nature [cf. XIV].

On an objective level to fulfill one's caste duties is good. One thus does what his nature which determined his caste requires him to do. The differentiation of caste is a differentiation of natures, a different balance of the gunas or qualities which compose man's nature. Accordingly each caste has appropriate duties [XVIII, 42-44]. In this way the stratification of society in castes which were defined by the time the Bhagavad Gita was written was solidified by making the traditional duties and privileges of each caste a means of celebrating the ultimate truth about man. To be a dutiful member of one's caste is to be on the way to salvation. One who follows out his caste duties incurs no sin because he follows his nature [cf. Hiriyanna, pp. 54-55].

The last chapter of the Gita specifies the operation of the gunas or qualities in one's nature. The highest is satwa or wisdom. Actions on such a basis are good. Such actions fulfill caste duties, perform the sacrifices and other acts of worship, all without really involving the self. If one rejects these necessary actions he chooses out of tamas or ignorance, and this is the lowest and worst of acts for this is the blindness which fails to recognize what one is and what goal actions

should be directed toward. If one refrains from any action for fear of pain or because it is disagreeable, he acts from *rajas* or passion. From such abstinence he will reap no benefit for the real goal in action in passion is either the desire for some sense experience or the desire to escape from some other sense experience. The only good is in renunciation of the fruits or consequences of all actions. Renunciation is not an intrinsic good in itself. It is good because it exhibits the understanding that one acts according to the pattern of his duties without interest in any consequences which follow for himself because he is not the real actor [XVIII, 5-10, 17].

But routine performance is not enough. One's duties must be an act of worship. Thus one attains perfection even though performance may not itself be perfect. One may not take over the duties of another person or another caste as if perfection in performance were itself the goal. Instead one must fulfill his own nature, not another's, and that nature is defined by *gunas* and caste position rather than by some profile of individual skills or capacities. One must live the life which he has earned. But he must also control the living of it so that he can make it an offering to Brahman by so detaching his real self from all involvement in what he does that his unity with Brahman is unbroken by the events of daily activity [XVIII, 45-59].

VI

If the whole matter were left here we would have only a *karma yoga*, a works interpretation of the Gita. There is a third element in the Gita, the road to enlightenment and return through devotion to Krishna, which makes the Gita the testament of theistic Hinduism and Vishnaism especially. Those who love him will find the way of return [VII, 1]. This is the *bhakti* solution to the problem of the meaning of man, the dedication of the heart which turns any offering into a gift of love [IX, 26]. In

this answer the important thing is the attitude of devotion itself. If one is devoted to Krishna, if one loves Krishna, it matters not what the gift. If it expresses one's single-minded love for Krishna it is enough to replace all the other gifts of obedience or duty and brings all the reward of enlightenment and release which come by other paths [VII, 1-2; IX, 22-25].

If these lines are separated from the rest of the Gita then we have the notion that man is saved simply by trust in a divine power which takes him from this existence to bliss. Thus the meaning of man would become only that he devote himself to the deity, and to whatever deity he devotes himself he will go [IX, 22-25]. In the total context of the Gita devotion takes a different turn. The love which one bears for the God clarifies the mind, focuses it, excludes distractions and errors. Thus one finds the deity and through him Brahman by the concentration of the self upon the God [VII, 29-30]. Here also the whole pantheon of Hinduism enters the picture because the devotee goes to the deity whom he worships. In principle all Gods are Brahman, just as is Krishna. But Krishna is the true path to Brahman for those who are devoted to him go to him, and his identity with Brahman is the foundation of the Gita's interpretation [VII, 20-22]. He is the true object of devotion and love which makes him the sole center of one's life is superior to pure knowledge which comes from concentration or meditation [XI, 55; XII, 2].

Such devotion is no simple emotion. It is instead the complete concentration of the self upon Krishna [VIII, 5-7, 14-16]. It is not affection, and I do not see that it expresses the Christian view in I John 4:19. The entire passage in I John expresses a quality of divine concern for specific individuals and an intensity of human response to God's act in Christ which seems foreign to the Gita despite statements of Krishna near the end of chapter XVIII in which he speaks of his love for Arjuna [XVIII, 64, 65, 69].

Krishna's coming to earth is but one of many avatars or descents of Vishnu. When virtue declines and men must again be taught in order to be saved Vishnu returns [IV, 7-8]. Why does Krishna come to each age? There is no clear answer such as Christianity offers in terms of God's concern for his erring creatures. The implied answer of the Gita is man's need of a teacher to lead him into truth and understanding for few men find the truth unaided. A student needs a guru or teacher, and Krishna's real function is to be a teacher to disclose the truth to those who can appropriate it [XVIII, 72-73].

The reason for Krishna's coming can hardly be any personal love he holds for men. It is not his concern for men which brings them to Brahman. Instead he is the channel through which they return to Brahman. Krishna does not save; he is the occasion through which men come to the realization of their nature and it is this which saves them [IX, 27-28]. His attitude toward men is neutral. He holds the same attitude of non-attachment toward men which he has advised Arjuna to take toward his own actions [IX, 29]. All men are equal to him, both sinner and good man, and it is man's devotion to Krishna which itself works the change in him from sinner to holiness. In the end it is one's identification of himself with Krishna which saves him from the necessity of rebirth. It is no act or attitude of Krishna himself which ensures his worshipper's reunion with Brahman [IX, 29-34].

Krishna is available to all those who will love him. But there is no slightest hint that he will be either disappointed or overjoyed at the response of any person to his availability. It is up to each one to decide whether he will by loving Krishna escape from the round of existences or return to it again and again until at last he finds wisdom and true knowledge of his being [XVIII, 63].

When we speak of incarnation we mean a

being who has a specifiable character and a historicity sufficient that we can truthfully, and not just metaphorically, say that in this man God has come to us. For this reason it matters crucially whether the faith of the Christian can find a locus in a historical person and the events of his life. Unless God revealed himself in *the* Jesus the Christ who came in history as the creed says, Christianity has no special truth for man about the nature of God, man's status before him and his way of love with man. If the Christian's faith about the function of the Christ as revealer can find no base in history then Christianity has lost its claim that men are saved by the act of God in Christ. The Christian then becomes but the spectator of a timeless cosmic drama of the impersonal relations of ultimate power to men, and the form of the drama speaks effectively only to those who share the cultural tradition which produced it.

It is precisely this cosmic drama which Krishna represents. It is precisely this cultural conditioning of Krishna for Hindus and Christ for Westerners which Hinduism today affirms, and it can be so affirmed because in the end for Hinduism no revealer really reveals at all. He is only the occasion through which those with true insight can find the truth which is not to be identified with the specific object or occasion of discovery [VII, 24].

VII

This is no chilly gospel despite its austerity, for the Gita holds forth hope for all men. In one way or another every person can find the way. Some are capable of knowledge and this will enable them to serve with non-attachment in the role they have earned. Others who cannot attain such knowledge or who fall short of worship by action in non-attachment can still love. They can with single minds devote themselves to Krishna himself and thus be led to the goal of release from individual existence in return to Brah-

man [VII, 1-2; XII, 9-11; XVIII, 65-66].

What then is the meaning of man? The Gita proclaims Hinduism's view that men are Man and that Man is identical with the Ultimate. But men feel their separateness and individualness. They think that this is the real meaning of their existence. From this error comes the suffering which life inflicts upon creatures. Our very being is tied up with the experiences of our existence so that with every shift of sense our lives are rocked. When storms of disappointment, and fear and loneliness of death come upon us, like houses built on sand, our lives collapse. Then comes the answer of Krishna: this is not the end; this is not the meaning of life. This is the delusion of sense which must be set right by knowledge or by devotion to him so that we may know that we are not really separate selves at all, and knowing this may be reunited to Brahman and released from this transitory world of relative things [VII, 26-30].

On this basis what happens today is of no great import so long as it is not permitted to disturb our identification with Brahman through Krishna. Some people are in pain, others are in joy, some have ease, and others must labor long, some live to old age, and others are snuffed out before their proper time—or so it seems to the unenlightened. But all reap the lives their karma built. To try to set things right is only to intrude our own feeble insight, to substitute it for the wisdom of the universe itself. And not even the impersonal forces of nature remain to be the eternal arbiters of men's fates. In time all things return to Brahman from which they came. Why then are you concerned for yourself, for another, for war, or peace, or prosperity, or food, for all these, too, shall pass away. In the silence of Brahman there is peace at the last for the undifferentiated can know no joy nor sorrow.

VIII

What is one to make of this? To call it

false is to be only trivial. There are those who maintain that this is the perennial philosophy which is fundamental to religion, and that every authentic religion teaches this philosophy to its adepts. So Aldous Huxley in his "Introduction" to the Mentor edition of the Bhagavad Gita.

Suffice it to say that the meaning of man in the Gita is not Christian despite the enthusiasm of many present day Christians who knowingly or unknowingly hold views essentially similar to what I have been describing. The kind of irenic compatibility which Hinduism expresses toward all differing faiths including Christianity as variants of its own basic teaching is also not Christian. From the Hindu point of view both Hinduism in its several forms and Christianity are equally true. From the Christian point of view both cannot be true. If man is what Christianity says he is: a willful creature who asserts his autonomy by rejecting the covenant relationship God offers to him, and needing therefore to be redeemed by God himself who by becoming man took to himself the burden of man's sin and brokenness, thus to heal and restore his erring children to fellowship with himself, then man cannot be what Hinduism and the Bhagavad Gita says he is.

Which then is man? A self to live in restored covenant with God, and in this relationship to find the full meaning of selfhood, or a self which by losing itself in absorption in the ultimate Self finds release from the burdens of selfhood? Both cannot be true. Which you will call true depends upon the kind of release you seek. Is it to find yourself in the fullness of your selfhood as one related to Another? Or is it to find yourself by losing that identity which is you by being drawn into the source of all being there to disappear? Does God speak through Christ or Krishna? Which message you call true depends upon what you believe man's history is: the promise of the Kingdom or the turning of the wheel.

A Symposium on Psychology and Religion

Religion, the Id, and the Superego

ORLO STRUNK, JR.*

THE first reaction to the title of this paper might well be, "My! What an old-fashioned approach!" Behind such a reaction may lie the legitimate observation that such terms as id and superego no longer appear in the respectable literature of psychological science. Such terms are, in other words, "old hat."

There is certainly an element of truth in such an observation. Many of the classical psychoanalytic terms are rarely found these days in psychology proper. Psychiatry and, of course, psychoanalysis itself, still harbor and nurture these classical terms. But a very large number of contemporary psychologists, especially those who find themselves repelled by the homunculus character of such terms, systematically avoid using these concepts.

However, I am certain that every counselor and clinician would admit that each and every day he views certain kinds of behavior which might properly fit into these rubrics. And this is, of course, what we are concerned with in this paper; that is, human behavior. The psychoanalytic concepts may not be overly popular in academic psychology, but let's accept them as a short-hand way of saying a great deal about human behavior.

Definitions

One of the first things I shall attempt to do is to define the three major terms in the title of this paper.

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Religion. Religion is a pattern of partially unique cognitive-affective-conative factors perceived by the individual as being appropriate or inappropriate in the solving of life problems.

But religion, as we all know, is perceived differently by different individuals. Some individuals embrace it with great fervor, others keep it at arm's length, and some view it hardly at all. In light of these variations, so amply demonstrated in the research literature, I should like to make the following subsidiary psychological definitions of religion:

(1) *Propriate*¹ religion is a dynamic pattern of partially unique cognitive-affective-conative factors perceived by the individual as being especially appropriate in the solving of important life problems.

(2) *Peripheral* religion, on the other hand, is a pattern of partially unique cognitive-affective-conative factors perceived by the individual as being relatively inappropriate in the solving of life problems.

Though this distinction needs careful examination, I am convinced that some such differentiation needs to be made. I might add, parenthetically, that these definitions have their roots in my own research in the psychology of religion, and, also, in the writings of Anton Boisen (1936, 1955).

Id. English and English (1958) have defined id as "that division of the psyche from which come blind, impersonal, instinctual impulses that lead to immediate gratification

¹ *Propriate* refers to that kind of behavior perceived as being personal, warm, and important to the individual, as compared to behavior perceived as being impersonal, cold, and relatively unimportant. (See Allport, 1955, pp. 41-58.)

of primitive needs. . . . It is not an entity but is merely a description of a system of actions." Mullahy (1948, p. 37) has depicted the id as a "cauldron of seething excitement, . . . the great reservoir of the libido and of the destructive instincts."

As has already been indicated, we are not here concerned with *exact* psychoanalytic terminology. In a general way, and with the purpose of this paper in mind, we may consider the id as representing those forces which result in behavior considered negative and destructive by a majority of a civilized population.

Superego. Again, English and English (1958) view the superego as a "system within the total psyche developed by incorporating the parental standards as perceived by the ego; or, somewhat more broadly, by incorporating the moral standards of society as perceived by the ego." More important to us in the present context is *superego motivation* which refers to "conscious and unconscious motivations that derive from parental and social standards and injunctions."

For our purposes we need not restrict the formation of the superego to identification with the father, as Freud suggests (Freud, 1953, p. 231), but, rather, let it represent implicit and explicit behavior dependent upon early parental and other social influences.

Behavioral Events Manifesting Id and Superego Forces

Because it is the major purpose of this paper to indicate a possible relationship between id and superego not usually found, it might make explanation more lucid and cogent if we examine in some detail actual case material.

Let us look, then, at the case of Tony Costello, a thirty-five-year-old man, who, after frequent contact with social workers, was referred to a religious counseling agency because the case worker considered his prob-

lem to be "basically religious." The material to follow is a summary drawn from approximately twenty interviews:

Tony is a stocky, dark-complected man of Italian descent. He is married to a frail Canadian girl. He and his wife live in a small apartment in the heart of a metropolitan area. Their only companions are their two pet cats. Mrs. Costello works in a restaurant. She makes \$38 per week, though she has had some college and nursing training. Tony has not worked for over six months. He has had a psychiatric interview, following a fainting spell to be described later. The psychiatric interview resulted in the general diagnosis "borderline mentality and mild malnutrition."

Tony spends all his time at home. He does the cleaning and cooking. He refuses to seek employment for reasons which will soon be evident.

But let's permit Tony to tell his own story. The following description, not a verbatim account, comes from Tony's first contact with the counselor:

"... I'm a flunky. That's the whole story: I'm a flunky! I was born to be a flunky and that's what I am. There's nothin' nobody can do about it. Right now I'm happy because nobody can push my head down. I just stay in the apartment and mind my own business. Miss Townsend (the case worker) don't understand. All she says is 'You've got to pull yourself together! What kind of a man are you, sitting around in an apartment all day while your wife works?'

"But she can't fool me. She's just tryin' to make me mad so I'll go out and get a job. But I'm not ready. Not yet. Why should I get a job? No, sir, man, I'm not that stupid! Soon as I get a job somebody reminds me how stupid I am. . . . I'm a flunky, but I don't need some wise guy to tell me. No, sir, I'm goin' to stay right where I am. Let's get that straight right off!"

Once Tony learned that the counselor was not going to tell him "to pull himself together" he settled down during the next interview and revealed some significant data.

He told, for example, how when he was small his father used to beat him. Tony didn't blame his father for this, because, as he put it, "he was brought up in the old country and that's the way you're supposed to bring up the kids over there."

Tony claims he learned one thing from his strict parents, the "difference between right and wrong!"

At an early age Tony learned that he was "stupid." His teachers told him this and his parents, peers, and siblings reinforced the belief until one day Tony concluded, "Yes, I am stupid. What's the use. I quit." This ended formal schooling for Tony.

In his early teens Tony joined the CCCs. For a short time, he was happy. He says, "They gave me a uniform, and they made me work hard. But I liked it. But then one day, like always, my boss tried to get me and another fellow to fight. I didn't want to. Neither did the other guy. But they kept after us until we both started hitting each other. We both cried 'cause we didn't want to fight."

Tony's life is filled with such incidents. He enlisted in the Army and soon found himself being ridiculed by a corporal. "He called me a 'wop' and an 'idiot' and other names. He was always after me. I liked the Army except for that sonofabitch. So I ran away."

Tony came home and got a job in a theatre as an usher. Soon, however, the MPs came and took him back and he found himself in the guardhouse. Even the guardhouse wasn't bad until one of the guards started laughing at Tony's way of talking. "I wanted to kill him!" says Tony with obvious emotion. "But I know that's wrong—so I just try to stay away from him."

The guardhouse experience produced one rather affirmative encounter. A Protestant chaplain called on Tony every week. Tony tells about this friendship in glowing terms: "I'm a Catholic, but not a good one because the Church don't like my getting married to a Protestant girl. But I'm religious, and this chaplain came and talked to me every week. He taught me to sing hymns. Gee, but I really got to look forward to his visits. I learned all the words to almost twenty hymns. Then, he got transferred and nobody came to see me."

Tony returned to civilian life and worked at many jobs. The pattern appeared about the same. There would be a brief period when things would go well and then something would happen. Once he had a job in an office and all the office girls got to teasing him because he could not spell simple words. They literally laughed him out of the office. "Sometimes," Tony reflects, "I wanted to take my hands and strangle them!" By the way Tony says this, he means it.

During World War II, Tony again came in contact with the military. Frequently he was on sick call. He suffered a great deal from headaches. But officials never really took his complaints seriously. They accused him of being a coward. Tony, however, insists to this day that his complaints were legitimate. Finally, however, he was given a dishonorable discharge and sent home.

Tony feels strongly about the little piece of paper he carries around in his wallet. It keeps him from getting jobs, for one thing.

"For a long time," Tony says, "I always told the employer about my discharge. After a while,

though, I stopped telling them 'cause they wouldn't have anything to do with me if I told them. I know it's wrong to lie, but I had to work. . . ."

Tony got married. His wife had two miscarriages and was informed that she was unable to have children. She then went to work.

Once, near Christmas, Tony got a job in the post office in order to make some Christmas money. As usual, things went smoothly for a few days. Then one of the supervisors noticed that in sorting mail Tony skipped certain packages or asked a fellow worker to read the labels for him. Tony knew the names of most of the big cities but some of the smaller towns with odd names he could not read. The supervisor told him to read them all or "get the hell out!"

"I got real shaky then," Tony says. "I was scared. I just couldn't read some of the names, and he used to just stand around and watch me and grin. I shook all over and got dizzy spells."

It was one evening after working in this environment that Tony fainted on the way home. He got dizzy and fell over. He was in the park at the time and people hurrying home from work ignored him.

"I hate people!" Tony sobbed when telling this incident. "There I was; I couldn't stand up. People just looked and kept going. I guess they thought I was a drunk. But I never got drunk in all my life. I had to crawl three blocks. I got a cab. When I got home, I went to bed. That's the best place. Nobody hurts me there."

Frequently Tony talked about religion. He had read quite a bit, despite his limited formal education. At times he amazed the counselor with his theological vocabulary. He had developed a theology of his own, a somewhat mystical theology, but one which seemed to make sense. Obviously, Tony had something of a time with the problem of evil. In Jobian fashion, he felt that God had something against him. He wasn't quite certain what, but surely God would not cause him to suffer so much without a very good reason.

Now let us stop here and examine briefly Tony's plight. Once in discussing this case with a clinical psychologist, the clinician said, "I can't understand why Tony hasn't turned to crime. He has every reason to hate society."

I feel that if you should ask Tony why he hadn't turned to crime, he would reply, "But it's wrong to steal or kill" and that would have been that.

Tony's superego is simple but relatively

strong. The traditional interpretation of this fact would be that Tony's superego is indeed too strong, that what is needed here is to make the unconscious conscious, to release some of those hostile forces which Tony has had to carry about with him. Indeed, a popular notion would be that once these forces are released, Tony would somehow be a healthier personality.

It is undoubtedly true that conflict and anxiety have resulted from Tony's deep desires to strike out at the environment which has continuously dealt him low blows. At the same time, his simple but stern sense of oughtness prevents him doing anything rash. Now the question is, would Tony be a healthier person by releasing some of his negative and hostile tendencies?

This is a serious question and one which it seems to me religion has much to say, though religion's guidance may not be in accord with certain psychological treatment.

Freud insisted that people like Tony became neurotic because of too much virtue, and that it is only when one's conscience is modified, made less severe and less rigid, that healing occurs.

It is my thought, however, that the Christian religion holds to a quite different approach, namely, that release of negative forces leads to destruction and guilt. Only goodness leads to the full life.

Of course this contrast is not original. Dr. O. Hobart Mowrer of the University of Illinois has written rather extensively on this theme. His point, however, is a bit different than the one being proposed here. Permit me to present Dr. Mowrer's view in his own words:

Freud's classical position was to the effect that psychopathology arises when some biologically given impulse, such as sex or aggression, is repressed. As early as 1906, Wilhelm Stekel and, more recently, others have taken the position that the trouble may come instead from repressed conscience or superego. But in either case, the objective was to make the unconscious conscious, i.e., to

release repressed forces, on the theory that a healthier, more wholesome resolution of conflict would then, somehow, follow.

Neither of these approaches, alas, has worked out very satisfactorily, so today I venture to call attention to yet another possibility. A child can operate in either of two ways: (a) of his own free will and wish or (b) under parental compulsion. But acting "like a big boy (or girl)," that is to say, maturely and responsibly, the child enjoys many privileges and feels and indeed is "free." But if the child "forgets" or ignores what his parents have tried to teach him, they have to reassert their authority, with an ensuing loss of freedom and self-direction on the part of the child.

In like manner, may we not assume that an adult is free, i.e., self-determining and autonomous, only so long as he is "good" and that when he violates the trust of conscience, the latter "takes over," perhaps far from gently and almost certainly with a feeling on the part of the individual that "things are happening to me"? (Mowrer, 1957, pp. 12-13.)

Mowrer has been criticized for holding this position; and, it should be added, he has been misunderstood at points. For instance, Mowrer holds that the neurotic's conscience should be released, but never does he say that it should be strengthened in therapy.

Here, however, I should like to suggest that from the point of view of traditional religion, conscience should indeed be strengthened and increased.

This, then, is my major thesis: one's conscience (superego in our loose use of these terms) should be so strong and so all-pervading that id forces are hardly influential in determining the behavior of man.

In terms of Tony's case, if Tony had developed a stronger and more effective superego in childhood, conflict now would be less. Fortunately for society, Tony released his superego tendencies, but, unfortunately for Tony, his superego is not nearly strong enough or sophisticated enough to handle his hostile forces.

Now, you might well ask, do I *really* believe this?

Frankly, I am not completely convinced. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between

the two positions I have outlined. However, I am convinced that this latter view is rarely found in either psychology proper or in current religious psychology, despite the fact that religious history shows it to be an exceedingly important way of viewing such problems.

We might say in the language of a three-year-old friend of mine, "If we're not gooder, we'll git licked." That's about what the Old Testament seems to say also.

For example, Mowrer turns to the 4th chapter of Daniel to show the emphasis in the Old Testament as to the cause of men's emotional anguish. Here, you will recall, Nebuchadnezzar, suffering from anxiety, called in Daniel to interpret his dreams and visions. Daniel's interpretation was clear enough. The king just was not "good" enough. Daniel's prescription was also clear and not exactly non-directive: ". . . break off thy sins by righteousness, and thine iniquities by showing mercy to the poor." Surely this is not a plea for the release of id forces!

Here, again, the point is not only that we release *superego* forces rather than id forces. But, instead, we must strengthen *superego* forces so that id forces become hardly a problem.

Not being a biblical scholar, I hesitate to back up my point with biblical quotations, but permit me to make a reference to one of Jesus' assertions. In the book of Matthew (5:27-28) we find these sentences ascribed to Jesus: "You have heard it was said, 'You shall not commit adultery.' But I say to you that every one who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery . . ." Clearly Jesus is saying that such an act should not even enter our heads.

Here, of course, we are bound to squirm and perhaps shake our heads a bit. With what we now know about the power of unconscious forces, can we really say that *superego* motivation can ever be so strong

as to deny id forces, and, at the same time, keep the individual entirely healthy?

As a psychologist, and as a very human being, I automatically shake my head at such a suggestion. But, perhaps, in the long run, this is exactly what religion demands of man!

If so, a great task faces man.

From what we now know about learning, it is evident that the internalization of those factors making up the *superego* must begin at the moment of birth. These factors must be internalized and become so much a part of a person that they are indeed "natural" to him.

This is clearly an educational problem; and, just as clearly, such an educational approach must be family-centered, because it must start so very early.

Now, it seems that all I have said really is (1) people need to be "gooder" or else, and (2) this can only be done by starting very early in life.

In psychological lingo, the *superego* must be strengthened and freed, rather than repressed, or else we can expect not only negative acts but intense guilt. Also, inner control is the cumulative result of the early socialization of the child and therefore the formative years will determine to a great extent how life is handled.

The Place of Religion

Our final concern is that of the function of religion in the strengthening of the *superego*. Previously I defined *proprie* religion as a dynamic pattern of partially unique cognitive-affective-conative factors perceived by the individual as being especially appropriate in the solving of important life problems. This dynamic pattern, or system, must be of such a nature that id forces hardly have a chance.

The exact content of this dynamic system is as yet unknown to me. It is my personal belief that the only way we shall ever define this content to a predictable degree is

through empirical research. This, it seems to me, should be the major problem of the sciences of religion.

The over-all questions to pose are (1) What is the best system of cognitive-affective-conative factors that will solve man's problems? and (2) How can such a system, once codified, be thoroughly internalized?

I do not propose to even attempt to answer these questions. But the following speculation appears to be pertinent. Whatever the content of the system, or systems, it must be a *whole* system. By this is meant that the dynamic system must be complete and integrated or behavior will be inconsistent and perhaps even bizarre.

For example, the Christian theologian might well answer the first question with the rather voluble assertion that "Christianity is *the* system, pure and simple!" This might indeed be the correct answer *if* the whole of the Christian Gospel could be truly stated *and* internalized. But history and the contemporary scene indicate that man internalizes only certain factors of this religion. He might internalize one factor; e.g., that man should not covet his neighbor's wife, but another factor—e.g., that all men are brothers—might escape him quite completely. He then has only a partial system. His behavior cannot help but be inconsistent. All of us, I suppose, carry such crippled systems about with us.

Here it appears to me is where we should see the need of the complete and serious cooperation of the physical sciences, the behavioral sciences, and theology. Together, through research and open conversation, the problem of defining and internalizing a system might be solved. The biblical scholar, the anthropologist, the theologian, the psychologist, the religious educator, the historian, the psychiatrist, the educator—together might be able to define the good, or at least a better, cognitive-affective-conative

system capable of handling all of man's problems.

One final note. Coöperation on the part of all disciplines is essential, but so also is the retention of autonomy. It is my firm conviction that there is at present a real danger that professional religionists have moved along too willingly with certain psychological and psychiatric disciplines. I have spelled this out elsewhere in the case of the pastoral psychology movement (Strunk, 1959).

Today I have tried to indicate this same propensity in regard to a single theoretical problem in psychological science; namely, the relationship and significance of superego and id forces.

Of course, it goes without saying that psychology can and should make a significant contribution to the serious search we are involved in, but it is hard to believe that—to quote a contemporary psychologist—"the world will either be saved by psychologists . . . or else it will not be saved at all."

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Comments on "Religion, the Id, and the Superego"

JACK BOOZER*

PROFESSOR Strunk has placed before us an interesting statement of the relation between religion, the id and the superego. Though he confesses that he is not completely convinced of the point of view expressed, he has gone to considerable trouble to state the case in a way that would persuade his readers and hearers. I am assuming, therefore, that he is persuaded himself.

The value of Professor Strunk's statement is in the elements of his point of view, not in the rather utopian and somewhat moralistic nature of the program as a whole. There are four elements which call for particular praise: (1) A problem in the area of psychology and psychotherapy is recognized with religious sensitivity. The dictates of the superego, from whatever source, are taken seriously. Whatever solution of the human problem is tried, it must be in keeping with the "right" and the "good." (2) It is recognized that the factors making up the superego must be internalized. Heteronomous laws, imposed by society or by God, do not help man particularly. Strunk is optimistic at the point of suggesting that one should be raised in an environment where the laws of society will be "natural" to him. (3) The family and early training are emphasized. (4) The superego must be strengthened. In a time when both will and intellect are weak, it is heartening to hear a psychologist urging the strengthening of the superego.

In spite of the positive nature of the elements

mentioned, a serious question must be raised as to the adequacy of Professor Strunk's over-all point of view. As I understand it, the major purpose of Professor Strunk's paper is to indicate a possible relationship between id and superego not usually found, i.e., that the superego should be so strong and all-pervading that the id forces are hardly influential in determining the behavior of man. Two other, yet subordinate, purposes are (1) to establish that this view of the superego and the id is rarely found in psychology, and (2) that religious history shows this to be an effective way of viewing the problem. Omitting subordinate purpose number one having to do with the rarity of this point of view in psychology, I wish to address the major purpose of the paper and subordinate purpose number two along the following lines: I, Definitions, II, Case of Tony Costello, III, The Theory, and IV, The Place of Religion.

I. Definitions

Religion. The definition of religion as "a pattern of partially unique cognitive-affective-conative factors perceived by the individual as being appropriate to solving life's problems" is too inclusive and too cultural. It does not suffice to distinguish religion from science or from philosophy. But more important, this definition misses the central theme in religion, the element of ultimate concern, ultimate demand, or ultimate commitment (the "holy," inclusive of the non-rational factor which Rudolf Otto has so clearly analyzed).

Id and Superego. Though I am not competent to raise a question about a psycholo-

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gist's definition of id and superego, I must raise a question about the defining of terms in such a way as to prefigure or bias the conclusion. For example, Mullahy is quoted as speaking of the id as "the great reservoir of the libido and of the destructive instinct." Yet in moving beyond Mullahy to state the working definition for his paper, Professor Strunk says: "We may consider the id as representing those forces which result in behavior considered negative and destructive by the majority of a civilized population."

The right of a person to define his terms in whatever way he wishes is certainly granted. Yet, in this particular instance, the deletion of the libido, with all of its pleasure-seeking, want-satisfying, instinctual tendencies, from the id, and the retention of only "those forces which result in behavior considered negative and destructive by a majority of a civilized population" in the id represent a major abridgment of Mullahy's definition, and render the conclusion of the investigation inevitable. If the id is altogether negative and destructive and if the superego is altogether restrictive and creative in the sense of "incorporating the moral standards of society as perceived by the ego," then there is no question but that the id ought to be radically controlled and the superego significantly strengthened.

II. *The Case of Tony Costello*

Without claiming in any way to be a psychologist, and simply for the purpose of discussion, let me suggest an alternative way of assessing the Costello case.

Strunk's contention is that if Tony "had developed a stronger and more effective superego in childhood, conflict would now be less." I assume that this means that if Tony had developed a stronger and more effective superego, he would not now be "sitting around in an apartment all day while his wife works." I suggest that a stronger superego would have made little difference in

Tony's case. He perhaps would have had more motivation to leave the apartment and get a job. But eventually the results would have been the same. A stronger superego would simply have made him more persistent in conforming to the customary pattern that a husband supports his wife. If this had happened, there would have been a social benefit, but the tension within Tony would still have been present. Religion, I would suggest, as well as religious psychotherapy, is interested in something more than "making Tony into a useful citizen" who supports his wife.

Professor Strunk suggests that if Tony had been asked why he had not turned to crime, he would have replied: "But it's wrong to steal or kill." Indeed Tony might have answered the question in this way, but this would not have explained the situation. He said also that it was wrong to lie, but he lied because he had to work. He did not turn to crime for the same reason that he did not leave the apartment and work: his fear, his stupidity-complex, his disunited self, the inability of his ego to handle the id and superego in a harmonious way.

III. *The Theory*

The Mowrer-Strunk thesis is that Freud is wrong, and that the alternative proposal is more in line with the Christian religion. Freud's theory that people become neurotic because of too much virtue, that the superego must become modified for healing to occur is rejected in favor of the approach of the Christian religion, that release of negative forces leads to further destruction and guilt and that only goodness leads to healing and to fullness of life. It is certainly true that one strain of biblical-Christian thought does emphasize that only goodness leads to freedom and to fullness of life.

Yet there is another point of view in biblical and Christian thought. This view is suggested in the apocalyptic idea that obedience

leads to a full life, not in this aeon, but in the aeon of the resurrection. More explicit expressions of the other motif are in the Second Isaiah and the sayings of Jesus as to the necessity that the Son of Man suffer. The goodness that leads to the full life must be seen alongside another kind of goodness which leads to sacrifice, humiliation, denial, persecution, and crucifixion. These seemingly incompatible motifs are usually reconciled by the concept of a fullness of reward in the heavenly existence of the resurrection, though much popular opinion about the resurrection reflects more a victory of the proverbial-wisdom point of view and the reduction of the tragic-joyful aspect of life to a kind of moralistic plateau than it reflects an authentic Christian understanding of the situation of man in history.

As far as the references to the Bible are concerned, several words are necessary. It is true that the covenant people are given a law, a series of "thou shalts" and "thou shalt nots." And with this law is the promise that obedience to the law by the people will bring the favor of God's leadership into a land flowing with milk and honey. It should be kept in mind, however, that in many of these accounts the law imposing an obligation upon the Hebrews is within the framework of the graceful act of God. Hence, "Since I, the Lord, am your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt . . . you must have no other gods beside me."¹ The dealing of God with his people on the basis of his favor and not man's merit does not cease with the Exodus. The law as the articulation (changing in history) of the Hebrew understanding of the demands of God continues to be seen within the framework of God's beneficent action in history. Total destruction, though deserved, will not occur. With the exception of Amos, the triumph of God in terms of the restoration of the people or of the saving of a remnant is affirmed. And even Amos must be modified by subsequent Jewish faith

so that his pessimism might be brought in line. One of the most moving accounts in the prophetic writings is the following statement by Hosea:

How can I give you up, O Ephraim!
How surrender you, O Israel!
How can I treat you like Admah!
How make you like Zeboim!
My mind turns against me;
My sympathies also grow hot.
I will not carry out my fierce anger;
Nor will I again destroy Ephraim;
For I am God and not man,
The holy one in the midst of you;
And I will not destroy.²

A second remark about the references to the Bible has to do with the problem of the prosperity of the unrighteous individual and of the ungodly nation. It is not that the Hebrew considered himself as being worthy of better treatment by God. It is rather that God prospers those who are more wicked than he. And it is not that Judah does not deserve destruction at the hands of Assyria. It is rather that God could use a nation more deserving of his wrath as a rod of his anger and a staff of his fury against Judah. This is to suggest that it is an oversimplification to say that the Old Testament teaches that if we are *not* better, we will be defeated or that if we *are* better we will be victorious. God acted against the Hebrews in a paradoxical way, against their opinions and expectations, forcing a repeated restatement of their conceptual understanding of God's purpose. The logic of the discipline of the righteous in Second Isaiah is quite different from the logic of the reward of the righteous in the book of Proverbs.

It is possible to view the saying of Jesus: "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall not commit adultery! But I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery . . .'" in quite another way. The meaning of this teaching is not that if one obeys and does not allow the idea of the act of adultery to remain in

his mind he will deserve God's favor. Rather this is a teaching of the radical demand of the Kingdom of God, and it is to be seen alongside the utterances of Jesus: "The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand, repent and believe in the Gospel,"³ and "It is your Father's good pleasure to give you the Kingdom."⁴ That is to say, the radical demand of purity in the Kingdom of God is also the offer of the Kingdom that is God's gift. It is not a rule for meriting God's favor but a statement of the expectations of God which in its own way condemns a man, superego and all, to the point that it becomes possible for him to repent.

The Mowrer-Strunk suggestion as to the solution of the problem is: "1. People need to be 'gooder'" or else, and 2. This can only be done by starting very early in life. Granted that whatever needs to be done should be begun early in life, a question must be raised about the proposition that people need to be better or else. People need to be better and more sober drivers of automobiles or else. People need to do better in working out the conflict between the East and the West or else. People in homes and families need to learn the meaning of love in a deeper sense or else. People must work or else. All of these "or elses" have to do with the extension into the future of certain stable orders of society and culture. And these statements are within the moralistic expectation that to make stronger efforts in these various regards will bring people closer to realizing a kind of stability in society.

As an understanding of religion or as a program for religion, however, this way of regarding the situation is inadequate. Luther is closer to the truth in the religious dimension when he speaks of man as *simul justus et peccator*. Man's understanding of goodness in a religious dimension is different from the goodness of moral struggle in the cultural dimension. The goodness of man in the Christian understanding is a goodness which is imparted to him by the forgiveness

of God which man accepts in faith. And if this goodness of God's grace which is accepted is not in proportion to a moral or cultural goodness, neither does it obviate the possibility of man's sin. Man is rather simultaneously a sinner yet a participant in the forgiveness of God.

IV. *The Place of Religion*

The point at which the opinion of a theologian is most relevant to the Strunk thesis is the assessing of the function of religion in the strengthening of the superego. Response at this point will be centered in three comments. (1) The moral-utopian nature of the Strunk program for religion is most clearly apparent in the following statement: "This dynamic pattern, or system, must be of such a nature that id forces hardly have a chance." The view of human personality implicit in this statement is overly optimistic in the face of the mainstream of biblical-Christian thought.

The Christian church has, of course, been of inestimable value in human culture in its orienting the superego toward the demands of God and toward the sanction of God as a reinforcement to cultural demands. A sort of "moral ideal" has been imparted to the young in the educational activities of the church. Unfortunately, however, the tendency to grade the curriculum to fit the child has given the young person an idea of the relationship between God and himself that is moralistic, legalistic, and to an extent secular. The "strengthen the conscience and repress the id" program tends to overlook the fact that if the id is not given expression, neither is the superego given expression. It is doubtful that the relegation of all destructive forces to the id and of all restrictive forces to the superego is helpful at this point. In any event, the unity of the ego involves a combination of id and superego forces. No program for the orderly and progressive bridling of the id is possible. If the id is an

integral part of the human person, the explosive force of the repressed id will increase with the degree of repression. This means that at the point of almost success, when only a last vestige of the id is unbridled by the superego, the whole effect of the superego may be thrown over by the concentrated power of the id. In theological language, this means that there is no orderly and progressive ascent to perfection or to godliness. Each stage along life's way is a stage which involves both id and superego forces. The higher man climbs, the lower he may fall, the more repressed the id, the more destructive and powerful are the forces of the id upon eruption.

Statements of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich are suggestive at this point.

The Christian analysis of life leads to conclusions which would seem morbidly pessimistic to moderns, still steeped as they are in their evolutionary optimism. The conclusion most abhorrent to the modern mood is that the possibilities of evil grow with the possibilities of good, and that human history is therefore not so much a chronicle of the progressive victory of the good over evil, of cosmos over chaos, as the story of an ever-increasing cosmos, creating ever-increasing possibilities of chaos. The idea hinted at in the words of Saint Paul, "I had not known lust, except the Law had said thou shalt not covet," the idea, namely, that when the moral ideal challenges the forces of sin, the challenge results not only in submission, but in a more conscious and deliberate opposition, is proved by the tragic facts of human history, however unpalatable it may be to generations which have tried to explain human history in simpler terms."

"Indeed, it is impossible *not* to transcend the moral conscience because it is impossible to unite a *sensitive* and a *good* conscience."

"The good, *transmoral* conscience consists in the acceptance of the bad, *moral* conscience, which is unavoidable wherever decisions are made and acts are performed."

(2) Certainly more coöperation between the biblical scholar, the anthropologist, the theologian, the psychologist, the religious educator, the historian, and the psychiatrist, is to be desired. This collaboration would probably result in much information that

would assist man in the handling of his problems.

There is a question, however, about the possibility of arriving at a "good or at least a cognitive-affective-conative system capable of handling all of man's problems." I suppose that the word which bothers me most in this statement is the word, "system." If by system is meant a set of conceptual propositions which may be followed to achieve a more successful meeting of problems, it seems to me that the system idea is, on the one hand, too rigid, and, on the other hand, not sufficiently timely to aid a person in the facing of his particular problems which in some sense are unique. I would suggest that it would be more desirable to try to achieve a "system" within a relationship, constantly feeding upon and correcting itself in the light of the relationship, than to hope to achieve a relationship within a system. What needs most to be internalized is not specific laws and customs and moral ideals. Man's primary need is rather for the internalization of an awareness of God, or the awareness of the meaning of holiness.

(3) It has already been indicated that the missing, yet essential, ingredient in Strunk's definition of religion is the transmoral and transcultural dimension of religion. If the *mysterium tremendum* of God is neglected, the inevitable result is a kind of ethical society whose chief emphasis is upon the strengthening of man's determination to do right, and this "right" is often identified with the cultural ideal, and this is not religion. It may be a sort of morality touched with emotion, but it is not religion. For a person in Tony's dilemma, "discipline thyself" is a rather bland prescription. Granting the possibility that Tony might have been educated from early in his youth in the "new program," his ultimate problems would be the same. A stronger conscience might have kept him in the category of a responsible citizen until later in his life. Indeed his problem

might ultimately have presented itself in another form. But the basic nature of the problem is the same. That is, whether a person will live his life within the realm of self-discipline, will face life with powers mustered from within the human person, or, on the other hand, he will accept the creative powers of God's grace, in spite of the fact that he has not successfully disciplined himself.

This will be recognized immediately as Paul's problem. It seems to me that Paul has given a more authentically biblical and Christian interpretation to the human situation than the Mowrer-Strunk analysis. The law must be given, the conscience must be strengthened, but both of these activities take place within the framework of a covenant of God's grace. The deeper issues of this covenant are not on the level of man's getting what he deserves, of his being better or else. Rather is it that at certain moments in life the mystery of God is felt in terms of the overwhelming offer of God's forgiveness and his love. The points of the renewal of man's total self along life's way are suggested more clearly by the law that is within grace, or the conscience that is within forgiveness, than by the suggested program of strengthening the conscience and mastering the id.

Perhaps it is man's nature to "do right." If so, let us be on with the "back-to-nature" program. Others would say that it is man's nature to do wrong. If so, let us be on with the "forward-to-God" program. I am inclined to say with Tillich and others that religion has to do with the overcoming of estrangement rather than with the meeting of a stranger, that man's nature is to love and glorify God, but that there is no direct path

of development toward the expression of this nature. Man arrives at an understanding of himself as God's creature only after repeated experiments with the idea that he is his own creator. Man has the ambiguous nature of insisting upon life on his own terms, and of acknowledging God who determines "the bounds of his habitation."

If the point of view expressed herein in criticism of the Mowrer-Strunk analysis is correct, the biblical-Christian injunction is more closely approximated in the statement, "Acknowledge thy God," than in the alternative statement, "Strengthen thy conscience." For there is more chance of a strengthened conscience in relation with the id forces (in a unified ego) within an awareness of the terrible wrath and fascinating grace of God than there is in the moralistic injunction, "strengthen thy conscience."

Let us coöperate in the strengthening of conscience, for much of man's present anguish is due to failure of nerve, of will, of moral determination. But let us strengthen the conscience within a community of acceptance, in the presence and actuality of a holy power, whose expectations are beyond our achievements and whose gifts are graciously bestowed before and beyond our deserving them.

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- ² Hosea 11:8, 9 (Smith-Goodspeed).
- ³ Mark 1:15 (Revised Standard Version).
- ⁴ Luke 12:32 (Revised Standard Version).
- ⁵ Niebuhr, R., *The Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, p. 92.
- ⁶ Tillich, Paul, *The Protestant Era*, p. 149.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

Recent Literature in Psychology and Religion

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A SHORT while ago Orlo Strunk, Jr., brought us up to date on the current status of the psychology of religion in his article in the *Journal of Bible and Religion*.¹ He showed how at the turn of the century the young science of psychology made a serious attempt to apply its newly discovered tools to the study of religious phenomena. Soon after the illustrious beginnings of men like William James, E. D. Starbuck, and George Albert Coe, the forces of theology, behavioral psychology, and psychoanalysis began to impinge upon this new discipline with the result that it became emaciated and undernourished. In fact, after analyzing a five-year sample of contemporary literature in the field, Strunk concluded that for all practical purposes the psychology of religion as initially understood by its pioneers was non-existent.

Even more recently James E. Dittes of Yale has made the statement that, unlike other fields of psychology, the earliest books in psychology of religion are still as helpful as the latest!² You can easily see how apprehensive I have become over being assigned to review recent literature in a field where (1) the ancient writings are as excellent as the modern and (2) there is doubt whether this field even exists!

Fortunately, my assignment was worded

"psychology *and* religion," rather than "psychology *of* religion." The following discussion is confined to what seem to be to me some of the most stimulating recent publications along the growing edge of these two fields. Most of the items appeared during the past year.

A good place to begin is with the consideration of Walter Houston Clark's new textbook, *The Psychology of Religion*.³ As dean of the Hartford School of Religious Education, Dr. Clark stands on excellent traditional ground for the present work. In 1899 Hartford became the first seminary to offer a course titled "Psychology of Religion." Those who are using this book with classes may be more intimately acquainted with it than I am. It is the most recent and comprehensive survey of the field and employs as chapter heads many of the customary categories of mysticism, prayer and worship.

Clark writes explicitly as an academic psychologist, and his work is heavily loaded with the quantitative tools of this discipline. He defines religion as almost exclusively an affair of the individual, an emphasis traceable to Gordon W. Allport under whom he wrote his dissertation. (This stress on the individual is likewise followed in the definition of the psychology of religion suggested by Dr. Strunk in his article on the current status of this field.)⁴ Following the lead of Schleiermacher who distinguished between personal and dogmatic religion, Clark differentiates between primary, secondary, and tertiary religious experience. Primary religious behavior, the most effective kind, is manifested only by a small minority, the religious *elite*, says Clark. Yet these, the mystics, the prophets, and the saints, exercise a pervasive

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influence in society all out of proportion to their numbers.

Clark has been mildly criticized for neglecting group processes and giving more attention to earlier authors than to later more sociologically and psychoanalytically-oriented authorities. In spite of a strong effort toward scientific objectivity, Dean Clark makes value judgments about religious maturity, suffering, and conversion without a definite statement of his own theological presuppositions. Nevertheless, opinion seems to be virtually unanimous that this book will be widely adopted and prove useful as an introduction to this field of study. The design of the book with study and teaching aids and its readable style contribute to the prospect of a long and fruitful career.

In contrast to the psychological method of Walter Clark is the theological method as employed by Carl Michalson in his book *Faith for Personal Crises*.⁵ The author considers seven crucial human situations (anxiety, guilt, doubt, vocation, marriage, suffering, and death) and affirms Christianity's resourcefulness for meeting them. He classifies typical reactions to these stresses as rebellion, recession, and resignation. While not intended as a systematic treatment of the psychology of religion, this work does an admirable job of relating saving faith to human need and its homiletical flavor will make it of use to the pastor.

Much present-day emphasis upon religion as comfort, happiness, and prudential goodness has grown out of an over-simplification of the relationship between psychology and religion. For this reason it is well to mention here what has been described as the most thorough and authentic current statement of the thesis that religion at its best is not equivalent to peace of mind. I refer of course to the brief but penetrating treatment of *Religion as Creative Insecurity*⁶ by Peter A. Bertocci. Without wasting any words the author both carries his point and at the same

time enriches the personal religious life of his readers.

The average college student is often perplexed at *What Psychology Says About Religion*.⁷ The Reflection Book of this title by Wayne E. Oates meets a real need for the college teacher who wants a brief and inexpensive aid in interpreting to students what contemporary psychologists have said about religion. This necessitates fracturing a few of the popular misconceptions of psychology as magic, clairvoyance, and "head-shrinking." Oates shows that psychology is both an art and a young science, a method of research and observation, and a many-sided body of knowledge. Especially helpful is the context which the author projects as the background for his discussion. Practically all young sciences, cosmology, astronomy, physics, geography, medicine, etc., were originally the domains of religious interpretations. In order to establish itself as an autonomous discipline the young science goes through a phase of rejecting religion. However, after it is established, its rejecting attitude toward religion is followed by a new phase of security and conciliation. "Then the danger is to throw judgment to the winds and make science and religion exactly the same thing although their presuppositions about life may be unexamined and really quite disparate from each other." College students will admire the author's intellectual honesty in seeking to avoid both over-simplification and over-generalization, an ideal extremely difficult to realize within the scope of 117 small pages.

Carl Gustav Jung's interest in religion was marked by the appearance of two volumes in 1958. In *Psychology and Religion: West and East*,⁸ Jung continues his pattern of interpreting all religion as symbols of the racial unconscious. This volume is a collection of his writings on both Christian and Eastern religions. Although the author's broad knowledge of comparative religious symbolism calls forth admiration, he inevitably

draws the criticism of devaluing biblical evidence. This is seen again in the second work, *The Undiscovered Self*,⁹ in which Jung maintains that he is not attacking Christianity but only our antiquated interpretations of it. Walter Clark has ventured the opinion that this book gives the readiest introduction and access to Jung's essential thought.

A secondary exposition of Jung's tenets with special reference to religion is that by Father Raymond Hostie, professor of Religious Sciences at the Jesuit Seminary in Louvain, Belgium. It will be interesting to compare his work, *Religion and the Psychology of Jung*,¹⁰ with the earlier Protestant counterpart by Hans Schaer, *Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology* (1950).¹¹ The end of the conversation with Jung and Christianity is not yet, for in April Association Press is to bring out *Jung and St. Paul*,¹² by David Cox, which is to be a comparison of the individuated man of Jung and the justified man of Paul.

Within the past two years at least three books have appeared which deal with religion and personality. The latest of these, *Human Nature Under God*,¹³ by Oren H. Baker, attempts to take the religion of Israel as a vast allegory of men's quest for and achievement of selfhood. "The Bible is the autobiography of the soul." Thus, Isaac, Jacob, and Esau personify the self-assertion of the individual through the acquisition of possessions; the Joseph stories typify the drive for power; Moses represents the formation of conscience; and the career of Paul is a demonstration of the mature selfhood which is the fruit of this long adventure of personality. The latter part of Dr. Baker's book is a systematic essay in anthropology. Despite a head-on collision with deeply ingrained prejudice against typology as a principle of interpretation, Dr. Baker has re-told the Old Testament story in an illuminating and relevant fashion.

Taking as the psychological background of

his study the theories of the four men, Freud, Lewin, Sullivan and Allport, Paul E. Johnson in *Personality and Religion*¹⁴ has integrated contemporary personality theory with religion in a constructive way. The struggles of persons with the two life processes of emerging self-consciousness and the needs for social relationship are seen through case studies of young persons. Religion finds its place in this personal struggle in the alternation between the solitude of inner meditation and the fellowship of service. A revised edition of Johnson's *Psychology of Religion* is to be released in June.

Whereas Johnson attempts to relate personality to many religions, Wayne E. Oates takes a specifically Christian standpoint in the third book under this category, *Religious Dimensions of Personality*.¹⁵ In his most comprehensive utterance thus far, Oates frankly employs the theological method in evaluating the major psychological theories of man's heredity, birth, desires, personality structure, and life goals. He enters the arena as an apologist both for the Christian view of man and for the best in psychology. The range and relevance of biblical religion for the serious study of personality is clearly demonstrated in this book which Albert Outler has called "an important contribution to a crucial field at an urgent time."

Several journal articles serve to illustrate a trend toward increasing study of the role of religion in personality development and psychotherapy. R. L. Laing, for example, has written in the *British Journal of Medical Psychology* on "An Examination of Tillich's Theory of Anxiety and Neurosis."¹⁶ Rabbi Robert L. Katz, in an article on "The Role of the Father," in *Mental Hygiene*¹⁷ calls attention to the considerable variance between the father's role in society as Freud knew it and in contemporary democratic society. After examining biblical literature for a clarification of religious views of the father's role, Rabbi Katz finds that although the Bible does reflect a patriarchal system, it also

portrays God as a loving and compassionate father. Citing Wellisch's comparative study, *Isaac and Oedipus*,¹⁸ the author concludes that in contrast to the classical oedipal theme of conflict with the father, the Bible is confident and optimistic about the parent-child relationship. In Abraham's love for Isaac he finds the essence of a kind of Messianic love which became the most dynamic moral power of Judaism and Christianity.

There have been several more empirical studies of the religious experiences of selected groups of people. In one, S. H. King and D. H. Funkenstein studied religious practice as related to cardio-vascular reactions under stress.¹⁹ In another, O. S. Walters, a psychiatrist, attempted to determine whether the early religious training of a group of fifty problem drinkers differed significantly from that of a control group.²⁰ He found that most of his alcoholic subjects continued to hold their childhood religious beliefs without essential change. However, he found no significant differences between alcoholics and control subjects in early religious activity and church affiliation. In fact, he concluded that proportionately more parents of alcoholics than parents of non-alcoholics were church members.

The relation of personality types to types of religious conversion has been re-surveyed recently by John P. Kildahl in a doctoral thesis at New York University.²¹ By means of psychological tests, Kildahl compared a group of persons who had sudden religious conversions with a group who had more gradual forms of experience. He concluded on the basis of statistical findings that the group whose experiences were of gradual growth seemed to be slightly more intelligent than those whose religious experience was more sudden and dramatic. Sudden converts also tended to be slightly more subject to mood swings, excitability, and fearfulness.

The operational area in which psychology and religion meet insofar as the church and its ministry is concerned is the field of

pastoral care. A number of very adequate books on specific pastoral tasks such as those by Clinebell,²² Jackson,²³ Miller,²⁴ and Kemp²⁵ have recently appeared. They typify the growing tendency to appropriate psychological insight for the total enterprise of the church.

Perhaps the most creative contribution to the literature of pastoral care during the past year was Seward Hiltner's *Preface to Pastoral Theology*,²⁶ the first fresh attempt to provide a systematic practical or pastoral theology in fifty years. Hiltner maintains that pastoral theology is a formal branch of theology just as important as biblical, doctrinal, or historical theology. He has helpfully clarified the pastoral task both as an attitude and as a function.

Hiltner foresees a future for pastoral theology that may be far more significant than its past, as a result of the mutual enrichment of psychology and religion. The common reality in these two fields is always the person. Hence, any reformulated pastoral theology must be grounded in Jesus Christ as historical event and continuing saving person in the lives of men. At the same time, its form and details are to be wrought out in the study of actual and concrete human experience, especially where ultimate issues are at stake.

Thus, as Anton Boisen showed us a quarter century ago, in studying "living human documents" we are not merely studying psychology or psychiatry, but also theology. Only by such a method can we intelligently relate our shepherding work to the eternal verities of the faith.

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Theology and the Theatre

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OF the major literary genres, drama is historically the most closely related to the church. Its history in the English-speaking world is in part the history of the church and it has always seemed to offer the church an attractive medium for the exposition of its concerns. In fourteenth century miracle plays or denominational television productions, the church has sought an alliance with the dramatic arts. Because of its commitments, however, the church has always insisted that the alliance be on its own terms.

Even in the miracle plays, the interests of theologian and thespian were not wholly compatible. Seeking to add interest to the presentation, directors took zestful license with sacred subjects. Comic figures dominated traditional scenes or choirboys, lashed to beams, provided all too realistic a heavenly host. Exasperated, the church gave up its attempt to control the medium, expelling players and plays from its precincts. Thus church and stage went separate ways, one professedly the temple of the holy, the other gladly the hall of the profane.

Long before the celebrated attack of Jeremy Collier,¹ church and stage had cause to regard one another with mutual distrust. Since then churchmen have continued to express fear of the "corrupting influence" of the stage. Men of the theatre have resented the constricting influence of dogma as well as clerical charges of immorality. Seldom has one sought to understand the other. In the last several decades, however, a decline in the

more extreme forms of hostility has been evident. Certainly the church has demonstrated less fear of the theatre. In England the religious festival plays and the Religious Drama Society may herald a new era of understanding. In our country the Department of Worship and the Arts of the National Council of the Churches of Christ has published a bibliography, *Plays for the Church*, including not only the standard "church plays" of Fred Eastman, Amy Loomis, and R. H. Ward, but such Broadway successes as *Death of a Salesman*, *Billy Budd*, *The Lark*, and *Our Town*. The inclusion of Bertold Brecht reveals the editors' willingness to include plays exploring controversial subjects. To their credit, they refused to include plays paying enthusiastic tribute to the work of the church but of markedly inferior literary quality.

For its part the theatre has given elaborate and sometimes skillful productions of the plays of Fry, Greene, Eliot, Anderson, and others who treat seriously the claims of Christianity. The myrmidons of the theatre's outer courts, the critics, have even deserted the legitimate stages to visit, and review enthusiastically, productions at Union Seminary and in New York churches. An article in *Theatre Arts* (February, 1958) proclaimed with evident surprise, "Church and Stage Find Common Ground."

Although plays exploring religious dimensions were performed on Broadway during the early part of this century (e.g., *Green Pastures*, *The Field God*, *Saint Joan*), since World War II such plays have been produced more frequently. The success in varying degrees of *The Cocktail Party*, *The Dark Is Light Enough*, and *The Potting Shed* has

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been a comforting spectacle to churchmen interested in the theatre. All might indeed be sweetness and light had not Archibald MacLeish's *J.B.* intruded on the scene with troublesome audacity.

The pre-publication reviews caused a flurry of excitement. Churchmen were hopeful, perhaps happy that a well known poet had gotten a jump on Hollywood script writers. Theatrical people were curious as to how the author might transform the massive dialogue of the Old Testament to the demands of the contemporary stage. A number of factors conspired to obscure fundamental problems: (1) Many churchmen have become convinced that the theatre often speaks with clarity and authenticity. (2) A number of contemporary dramatists have taken the claims of the church seriously. (3) "Religion" is fast moving merchandise on the American scene. To many it seemed apparent that *J.B.* offered a chance to "get in some good, solid stuff." When the text appeared, it was widely read and much acclaimed. Some readers noted that Mr. MacLeish ignored the question of the revelation in the person of Jesus and its relevance to the problem of the play. Others complained that Zophar was not a fair example of contemporary clergy. For many Christians, however, the sum of the matter was that the play needed but a few touches to become explicitly a Christian play—and that seemed very desirable indeed. Then came the Broadway production in December, 1958, a rash of favorable and unfavorable reviews, the touring company a year later, and still the debate over its merit and meaning continues.

The controversy over *J.B.* ought to bring into clear focus the distinctions between the proper realm of the dramatist writing for the contemporary stage and the proper realm of the theologian—distinctions obfuscated by some playwrights and some critics. Within the church the theologian begins by assuming God, citing his personal experience and that

of others whom he trusts. In various ways he may seek to convince the audience of the rightness of his assumptions; but frequently he addresses only those who accept the same assumption. The dramatist on the other hand need not be familiar with the observations of Fromm, Kluckhohn, or Mills to know that although many members of his audience may profess belief in God, by and large they conduct their business and pursue their pleasure without accepting the consequences of that profession. His experience teaches him that his audience is a random selection of an heterogeneous society. Even if the dramatist has developed a coherent personal philosophy or faith, there is no cause for him to inflict that view upon an audience. If the serious dramatist has a duty, it is to provoke the audience to self-criticism. Whenever a writer offers solutions other than dramatic ones, he intrudes on the proper realm of the philosopher, economist, politician or theologian.

In all the hue and cry over a disturbingly fragmented society, one ought not to seek coalescence where it is undesirable. If the dramatist becomes promulgator, he necessarily sacrifices the range, even in part the integrity, of his criticism. The chaos wrought by Marxist writers and critics seeking to reduce art to a formula is now a case history. To view the theatre as an open forum in which conflicting world views must vie with one another for supremacy is to misconceive the function of the theatre in our culture.

The dramatist begins with an event, relating characters to the event, revealing the causes of action, developing the interplay of his characters. The event exists only in the action of the play and comes to pass only in the will of its creator. Given then, that the play is but an artifact, that the characters exist only as they are brought to life night after night by the skill of the actor, the playing of the play is but a miming of human activity. If the mime has meaning, it achieves

it only through its distinction from reality—the perspective in which it is placed by its creator. If the dramatist seeks to minister to the needs of his audience, he will almost surely destroy this tenuous relationship between artifact and reality.

These appallingly sweeping generalizations are given some substance in the work of two dramatists who have written successfully for the legitimate stage and the church, T. S. Eliot and Christopher Fry. Both writers have been fully aware of the necessity of distinguishing between work written in their public capacity as playwrights and in their private lives as men committed to the Christian faith. The generalizations are also given substance in the work of Graham Greene and Archibald McLeish who have failed to distinguish between their public and private roles.

A comparison of *Murder in the Cathedral* with *The Cocktail Party* reveals the distinctions Mr. Eliot makes. *Murder in the Cathedral*, written for the festival at Canterbury Cathedral, radically departs from the conventions of the modern stage, defying dictums Eliot himself laid down years before:

A speech in a play should never appear to be intended to move us (the audience) as it might conceivably move other characters in the play, for it is essential that we should preserve our position of spectators, and observe always from the outside though with complete understanding.²

Thomas, however, preaches directly to the audience. At the conclusion of the play the knights, too, address the assembled congregation. In "Poetry and Drama" Eliot in part explains his defiance of his own dictums: "the use of platform prose is intended of course to have a special effect: to shock the audience out of their complacency."³ Why is Eliot so concerned with the audience? The answer lies in the relationship between Thomas and the Chorus.

The charwomen first appear moving reluctantly toward their destiny, a destiny they

fear because it jolts them out of their petty concerns, bringing them to stand upon the doom of the world.

Archbishop, secure and assured of your fate, unaffrayed among the shades, do you realize what you ask, do you realize what it means
To the small folk drawn into the pattern of fate, the small folk who live among small things. . . .
O Thomas, Archbishop, leave us, leave us.⁴

The looming moment of peril terrifies them. They sense that "The earth is heaving to parturition of issue of hell."⁵

In Part II the Chorus has a glimpse of the meaning of martyrdom and of its own role as witness. Before Thomas dies, the women consent to the destiny which he calls "your share of the eternal burden, / The perpetual glory."⁶ Their witness is part of the wheel of destiny which, in the imagery of the play, is the pattern of God.

The wheel is the design, its still point the moment of illumination or realization. For Thomas this moment comes with his martyrdom when he can say:

You argue by results, as this world does,
To settle if an act be good or bad.
You defer to the fact. For every life and every act
Consequence of good and evil can be shown.
And as in time results of many deeds are blended
So good and evil in the end become confounded.
It is not in time that my death shall be known;
It is out of time that my decision is taken
If you call that decision
To which my whole being gives entire consent.
I give my life
To the Law of God above the Law of Man.⁷

At another time, speaking of the Chorus, Thomas clarifies the wheel image:

They know and do not know, what it is to act or suffer.
They know and do not know, that acting is suffering
And suffering is action. Neither does the actor suffer
Nor the patient act. But both are fixed
In an eternal action, an eternal patience
To which all must consent that it may be willed
And which all must suffer that they may will it,

That the pattern may subsist, for the pattern is the action
And the suffering, that the wheel may turn and still
Be forever still.⁸

At last the Chorus too can consent to the action which transcends time. They can begin to understand and accept the redemption by blood, acknowledging themselves as "type of the common man,"

Who fear the blessing of God, the loneliness of the night of God, the surrender required, the deprivation inflicted;

Who fear the injustice of man less than the justice of God;

Who fear the hand at the window, the fire in the thatch, the fist in the tavern, the push into the canal,

Less than we fear the love of God.

We acknowledge our trespass, our weakness, our fault; we acknowledge

That the sin of the world is upon our heads. . . .
Blessed Thomas, pray for us.⁹

Clearly Eliot intends to make the viewer a vicarious participant in the action of *Murder in the Cathedral* through the Chorus. His purpose is unabashedly didactic. He goes beyond the representation of an event to explain it and set it in the framework of the Christian faith. Then the knights jostle the audience into deeper awareness of their inevitable involvement. To one not committed to the theological premises of the play, *Murder in the Cathedral* is only a pageant of immense proportions. To one so committed, it may be almost overwhelming in its impact.

Writing for the legitimate stage, Eliot deliberately turns away from the explicit Christian language and symbolism which informs and sustains *Murder in the Cathedral*. He chooses as his settings a family reunion, a cocktail party, the London house of a financier, and a rest home where an older statesman retires upon the advice of his physician. The settings are less important, however, than the manner in which Eliot advances the action. Apparently he takes delight in deliberately mystifying his audi-

ence. Perhaps his directive comes from the lines of Shelley quoted by Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly in *The Cocktail Party*:

Ere Babylon was dust
The Magus Zoroaster, my dead child,
Met his own image walking in the garden.
That apparition, sole of men, he saw.
For know there are two worlds of life and death:
One that which thou beholdest; but the other
Is underneath the grave, where do inhabit
The shadows of all forms that think and live
Till death unite them and they part no more.¹⁰

Only those who have eyes to see and ears to hear may detect those realms beyond the physical at which much of the significance of the plays is created. Those delighted with sophisticated comedy may revel in *The Cocktail Party* or even *The Confidential Clerk*. Those intent upon "hearing Mr. Eliot out" must be baffled and frustrated by the plays. Only when the plays are studied as poetry and seen in relationship to one another can one penetrate into the Christian mysteries out of which they evolve. As Sir Henry remarks: "such experience can only be hinted at / In myths and images."¹¹

In *The Cocktail Party*, Eliot's subject matter is certainly subject to Christian interpretation. Celia, shocked into awareness of her essential aloneness, embarrassedly admits that she is troubled by a sense of sin and the need to atone. Ultimately the "design" is fulfilled when Celia is crucified near an ant-hill. Yet Eliot accomplishes this action through the offices of a mysteriously informed psychoanalyst whose two aids are a garrulous, nose-y party-goer and a world traveler with culinary interests. In public they appear to be very much at home in the frantically casual world of the cocktail party; in private they engage in mysterious libations. Sir Henry speaks the last words of Christ on the cross, but also the last words of the Buddha, both phrases serving as integral portions of the conversations in which he is involved.

The consequence of the action is the Chamberlayne's recognition and acceptance of their appointed burden—a cocktail party and the "good life":

... contented with the morning that separates
And with the evening that brings together
For casual talk before the fire
Two people who know they do not understand each
other,
Breeding children whom they do not understand
And who will never understand them.¹²

Neither Edward, Lavina, nor Peter Quilpe is able to comprehend the apparent "waste" of Celia's life or even to follow up the partial glimpse Edward has:

But if this was right—if this was right for Celia—
There must be something else that is terribly
wrong,
And the rest of us are somehow involved in the
wrong.
I should only speak for myself. I'm sure that I
am.¹³

Like the Chorus of *Murder in the Cathedral*, the guests of the party are compelled to bear witness to the sacrifice, but they cannot penetrate to the mystery of its need. Even their affirmation is that of resignation.

Eliot's success in keeping the action of the play moving swiftly while working at a deeper level with matters of greater significance was summed up by a New York reviewer who reported: "It never preaches; it leaves a member of the audience, no matter what his faith, to do the preaching to himself while he is watching a sophisticated comedy."¹⁴ The danger of the method, however, is that some viewers find Christ figures and Mary figures lurking behind every chair in every Eliot play.

In Eliot's latest play, *The Elder Statesman*, similar strata of action are evident. At the surface the action reveals Lord Claverton (born Richard Ferry) confronted at the moment of retirement with the facts of a past he has hidden from himself. He has annihilated "self" in becoming an actor with but one role, the elder statesman. His es-

tranged son and two persons whom he has treated shabbily years earlier destroy the image in which he has taken refuge and which he has used to keep his daughter near him. At the play's end, Lord Claverton learns to accept his naked self and is able to free his daughter to find her own life. At this level the play lacks the wit and swiftness which makes *The Cocktail Party* a popular play.

In an important passage, Lord Claverton explains to Monica and her fiancé the changes wrought in him:

You think that I'm sickening, when I'm just recovering!

It's hard to make other people realize
The magnitude of things that appear to them petty.
It's harder to confess the sin that no one believes in
Than the crime that everyone can appreciate.
For the crime is in relation to the law
And the sin is in relation to the sinner.
What has made the difference in the last five
minutes

Is not the heinousness of my misdeeds
But the fact of my confession. And to you, Monica
To you, of all people.¹⁵

Like Thomas Becket, Lord Claverton will not seek escape. When Charles asks, "How long, Lord Claverton, / Will you stay here and endure this persecution?" Lord Claverton replies:

To the end. The place and time of liberation
Are, I think, determined. Let us say no more about
it.¹⁶

In *The Elder Statesman* the reference is vague, but to one familiar with the other plays, the suggestion of the pattern of Goethe is evident.

Toward the end of the play, Lord Claverton leaves Monica and Charles alone on stage. Charles observes: "It's as if he had passed through some door unseen by us. And had turned and was looking back at us. With a glance of farewell." The concluding lines seem mysterious but adequate to the ending of the obvious stratum. At the analogic level they are more significant.

Charles: Oh my dear,
I love you to the limits of speech and beyond.
It's strange that words are so inadequate.
Yet, like the asthmatic struggle for breath,
So the lover must struggle for words.

Monica: I've loved you from the beginning of the world.
Before you and I were born, the love was always there
That brought us together.
Oh Father, Father!
I could speak to you now.

Charles: Let me go and find him.

Monica: We will go to him together. He is close at hand,
Though he has gone too far to return to us.
He is under the beech tree. It is quiet and cold there.
In becoming no one, he has become himself.
He is only my father now, and Michael's.
And I am happy. Isn't it strange, Charles,
To be happy at this moment?

Charles: It is not at all strange.
The dead has poured out a blessing on the living.

Monica: Age and decrepitude can have no terrors for me,
Loss and vicissitude cannot appal me,
Not even death can dismay or amaze me
Fixed in the certainty of love unchanging.
I feel utterly secure
In you; I am a part of you. Now take me to my father.¹⁷

Thus the play concludes with ambiguity of Empsonian proportions. Is Monica addressing her father or the Father of fathers? Monica's declaration can be construed as referring only to Lord Claverton, but the impression that her lines by inference treat the relationship of man to God seems almost inescapable.

Three points need to be noted: (1) Lord Claverton discovers the meaning of life in death. Through the death of the pretence his hope of life is resurrected though he die under the beech tree. (2) Monica has loved a false image (The Lord), an image which has

prevented her complete surrender to Charles. With the destruction of the image she is free to love both Charles and her true father. (3) Monica and Charles are caught up in a relationship—"the love was always there that brought us together"—quite uncharacteristic of earlier distinctly human relationships described by Eliot.

The distinction between the method of *Murder in the Cathedral* and *The Elder Statesman* is evident. In the former the religious significance is insisted upon: apart from such understanding the play is incomprehensible. But in the latter play, in *The Family Reunion*, *The Confidential Clerk*, and *The Cocktail Party*, the action proceeds on a level which does not demand a religious interpretation. The viewer is observer and is kept at arm's length from the heart of the play. He must question the validity of the religious interpretation even as it occurs to him. For many viewers the plays are pleasurable for quite different reasons.

Like Eliot, Christopher Fry also distinguishes between the audiences available to him in the theatre and in the church. For the church Mr. Fry has written *The Boy With a Cart*, *Sleep of Prisoners*, and *Thor, With Angels*. On the legitimate stage he has produced *The Lady's Not For Burning* and *The Dark Is Light Enough*. *The Firstborn*, too, has been produced on Broadway, but only for a short run in connection with Israel's tenth anniversary. A comparison of *Sleep of Prisoners* with *The Dark Is Light Enough* reveals the distinction Fry makes in method and dramatic assumptions according to his audience.

In *Sleep of Prisoners* four soldiers are imprisoned in a church. David King and Peter Able represent different ends of the human spectrum. One is assertive, compulsive, dedicated, finding relief in action. The other is uncommitted, querulous, taking refuge behind a veneer of indifference. Between these extremes Timothy Meadows and Jo-

seph Adams seek to resolve the counter tensions of such different responses to life. The petty bickerings of David and Peter lead to anger and violence before the prisoners bunk down for the night. In their dreams they are caught up into the archetypal events of the Old Testament. Timothy Meadows experiences the agony of the creator, witnessing the death struggle between Cain and Abel. David King undergoes the anguish of the father tormented by the rebellious Absalom. Peter Able follows a stern Abraham up the mountain to be sacrificed unwillingly, for reasons beyond his knowledge. In the final dream Joseph Adams, joined by David and Peter in the fiery furnace of Babylon, is at last confronted by the comforting angel who announces:

Thank God our time is now when wrong
Comes up to face us everywhere,
Never to leave us till we take
The longest stride of soul men ever took.
Affairs are now soul size.
The enterprise
Is exploration into God.¹⁸

The strength of *Sleep of Prisoners* is its recontextualizing of basic human conflicts, the struggle between ruler and subject, between son and father, between fury and suffering, between action and contemplation. The weakness of the play dramatically is that which may most appeal to the Christian communicant: it sermonizes. Fry is not content to expound the problems, even in biblical imagery. He introduces a *deus ex machina* to exhort his prisoners in the audience with a flaming passage which is exclusively emotive.

In *The Dark Is Light Enough*,¹⁹ produced on the legitimate stage, Fry again explores the multiple conflicts of life, but gone are the biblical images and the explicit exhortations. Another group of prisoners—imprisoned again by the flux of war—confront the nature of their relationship to time and to mankind. Like Peter Able, Richard Gettner moves from denial to acceptance of life and

its "destiny" for him. The death of the Countess Rosmarin is necessary to accomplish the miracle of Richard's rebirth. In spite of the thematic similarities between the two plays, however, they are very unlike. Fry reveals Gettner's conversion without insisting on its religious significance. For many in the audience, the play has no religious context whatever.

Both Eliot and Fry strive to avoid either stock responses to stale religious imagery or the estrangement of an audience because of dissimilar theological assumptions. Graham Greene, on the other hand, does not even hesitate to introduce the miraculous. By confusing the role of the playwright with that of the evangel, he loses the advantage of either. He seems neither to increase the perception of the believer nor to convert the unbeliever. *The Living Room* and *The Potting Shed* seem oddly peripheral to the stage and the church.

The most interesting study of the relationship between religious belief and the stage is provided by *J.B.* That so many viewers and readers can arrive at such diverse opinions of its religious significance is in itself something of a reflection upon the play. If we are to determine the nature of our disagreements—disagreements exceeding those arising from variations in taste and creed—we must inquire into their source. (The strictures which follow in no way detract from the theatrical power of *J.B.* Whether or not the verse is thin or the vulgarity is stagey or the dramatic conditions are confused, *J.B.* has impact on an audience and its future for revivals seems assured.)

An initial source of confusion lies in what one means when referring to *J.B.* Does he mean the Broadway production or the printed text? In the *Christian Century* debate between members of Union Seminary's faculty, Dr. Van Dusen, in defending the play, noted his preference for the Yale pro-

duction which followed the printed text.²⁰ Such a preference is easily explained. On Broadway Elia Kazan produced with Boris Aronson's sets a vivid, compelling theatrical piece, but he was not content to interpret the original text. Rather, he succeeded in convincing the author that major changes were necessary. The correspondence between Mr. MacLeish and Mr. Kazan is a fascinating study of the metamorphosis of a play.²¹

The printed text is clearly subject to multiple interpretations. One of the plausible interpretations is distinctly theistic. The stricken J.B., encountering the Voice of God, throws aside his own early smugness, the unctious, sanctimonious portrait of God limned by Zuss and the nihilism of Nickles. He finally discovers an affirming love which opens on a richer understanding of the way of God with man. J.B.'s willingness to affirm life by loving might plausibly be associated with the redemptive love of Hosea or Deutero-Isaiah. Where else can J.B. begin if he is to live again but by forgiving Sara's trespass? The writer of I John declares: "He who does not love his brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not seen." J.B. has *seen* Sara, her love, her desertion of him, her return. No other problem exists for him until he has accepted her.

The basis for this interpretation in large part depends on the acceptance of the Distant Voice as a directing force in the play. If the Voice spoke only the lines assigned to God in Job, it might be dismissed as the voice of tradition. But guffawing, snickering, prompting the action, the Voice—not Zuss—speaks to J.B. If it spoke only to J.B. it might be dismissed as a psychological phenomenon, but Jolly Adams insists: "Under the wind there was a word."²²

The concluding lines of the play, spoken by Sara in the printed text, follow J.B.'s discovery that God "does not love. He/ Is." Then Sara can say:

Blow on the coal of the heart
The candles in churches are out.
The lights have gone out in the sky.
Blow on the coal of the heart
And we'll see by and by. . . .²³

From the affirmation that God is (a line omitted from the Broadway production), from the presence of the Distant Voice, the quality of the love affirmed by J.B. and Sara, and the hope of *seeing*, a valid argument can be made that the protagonists, while finding no answer to the problem of universal injustice, come to an understanding of life centered in their conviction that God *is* and that man may know him only through love.

An article by Mr. MacLeish on Job supports such an interpretation:

The justification of the universe is not our blind acceptance of God's inexplicable will, nor our trust in God's love, his dark and incomprehensible love, for us, but our human love, notwithstanding anything, for him.

Acceptance—even Dante's acceptance—of God's will is not enough. Love—love of life, love of the world, love of God, love in spite of everything, is the answer, the only possible answer, to our ancient human cry against injustice.²⁴

Even a layman might point out inconsistencies in the theology of the statement, yet the passage has something of the compelling quality of a statement of faith where one advisedly hesitates to act as Inquisitor. Surely it gives the appearance of using religious language in a religious context.

If, having read and studied the play and some of MacLeish's many statements about it (e.g., "The God of Job seems closer to this generation than he has to any other in centuries"²⁵), one then goes to see the play, he must, if he is at all perceptive, encounter shock upon shock. Kazan, a brilliant director, has wrought a new play out of the printed text—a play which admittedly may be the logical conclusion of certain implications glossed over in the interpretation just posed. By forcing Mr. MacLeish to develop a co-

herent stage piece, Mr. Kazan elicited a clarification of themes. (One might almost wonder if he did not impose his own explicit views upon the obscurantism of the printed text.) Thus in J.B.'s recognition scene, prepared for the Broadway production, Mr. Zuss is kept on stage after Nickles' defeat to suffer a sound rebuff himself, a rebuff which seems equally addressed to the Distant Voice. Declaring that he will no longer duck his head to thunder, J.B. asserts that he will "sweat it out alone."

In another innovation for the Broadway production, Mr. MacLeish takes a curious liberty with the text of Job. J.B. repeats, slowly, giving signs of a new perception, God's utterance inferring man's finiteness: "Deck thyself now with majesty and excellency; and array thyself with glory and beauty. . . . Then will I also confess unto thee that thine own right hand can save thee." Suddenly it occurs to J.B. that he need not be humbled by the challenge, that indeed he can answer it. His own right hand can save him! In this rather perverse reading of the lines, J.B. discovers a hidden promise that if a man believe in himself, he can deliver himself.

The other significant revision for the Broadway production comes at the conclusion. Sara steps aside, delivering the final lines of the play to J.B., who in effect rejects the meaning of history, the significance of biblical revelation, the possibility of any authentic revelation. J.B. declares man's solitary stance in a silent, senseless universe. *Man is*, and that is the answer.

A plausible conclusion about the theme of the printed text is thus untenable in the light of the stage version. The printed text from one viewpoint may be considered an exploration of *agape*. The stage J.B. utters a pseudo-Promethean exclamation that man will prevail over an absurd universe.²⁶ The transformation of the play may be the result of an irresistible Kazan meeting a mov-

able MacLeish. Mr. MacLeish notes that Dante's "In his will is our peace" is not enough for modern man. Mr. Kazan, however, goes somewhat further: "When T. S. Eliot says that these are the greatest words ever uttered, I want to spit." Under Mr. Kazan's tutelage, J.B. becomes a spitter.²⁷

Mr. MacLeish's original problem was that of any dramatist confronting universal problems in the theatre. Philip Wheelwright has noted the need of the poet for sustaining myths:

As man desires not only novelty but also a security of connection with the stable and unchanging, so the imagination operates not only creatively but interpretively—not only by fusing or recontextualizing old ideas in such a way as to generate new ones but also by grasping the particular idea and the transient image in relation to something more universal and perduring. The former is the metaphoric way of imagining. . . . The latter may be called the archetypal, or (where picture-thinking is stressed) emblematic. The two strategies are natural complements in poetic discourse, the one giving liveliness and freshness, the other depth and significance.²⁸

In justifying what he calls his "trespass upon a monument," Mr. MacLeish speaks of his need for Job: "When you are dealing with questions too large for you, which, nevertheless, will not leave you alone, you are obliged to house them somewhere—and an old wall helps."²⁹ But in using Job, which is an integral part of two living religious traditions, Mr. MacLeish stumbles into the confusion consequent upon diverse understanding of its use. Such confusion does not ensue upon the use of the myths of Greece, for there is comparative unanimity in our cultural attitude toward them. No contemporary audience believes in the reality of the Promethean struggle in the way many members of the same audience believe in the encounter between God and Job. Mr. Eliot and Mr. Fry avoid this confusion in their plays for the theatre by abstaining from explicit dependence upon the materials of our

religious traditions. Only when writing for the church where a general agreement can be expected do they make much use of sacred matter.

When a playwright becomes as dependent upon a biblical text as Mr. MacLeish is upon Job, he may be thought to be raising "the most difficult of religious questions, the justification of the ways of God to man," as one critic has complained.³⁰ Quite likely Mr. MacLeish did not intend to ask the question, but thought in stating it to dismiss it. But can anyone say with certainty? Our confusion is not that attendant upon the successful use of ambiguity, but that resulting from an unwise use of walls which dwarf the modest structure built in its shadow. When J.B. answers the Distant Voice with the words of Job, the damage to the coherence of the play is irreparable. The Distant Voice is simultaneously a force pervading the universe and nothing at all. No play can fully recover from such confusion.

The printed text of *J.B.* represents one of the dangers implicit in the use of religious language and imagery on the stage: confusion resulting from either the writer's own uncertainty or the reader's personal identification with the materials. Perhaps *J.B.* is an interesting extension of Mr. MacLeish's philosophy beyond that of his early poem, "The End of the World," where another circus tent is swept away to reveal only appalling darkness. However, a play must stand by the coherence of its structure and context and *J.B.*'s legs are unsteady.

When Mr. Kazan effects the author's severance from the Judeo-Christian belief in the reality of God, the play gains in consistency, but trespasses in yet another way. Mr. Kazan's statement to the cast that *J.B.* is not a thesis play—"It doesn't prove a point about either God or Man. What it does is illuminate an experience, an inner experience of living today."³¹—is either wishful thinking or willful misrepresenta-

tion. When at the play's conclusion the actor playing J.B. turns his mascaraed eyes upon the audience and rings out: "We are and that is all our answer," he is addressing the audience, not Sara. The illusion of the play is destroyed, and to what purpose? Mr. Kazan wrote before the play opened: "I believe that the staging should be basically Shakespearean. It should acknowledge the presence of the audience and by this the relevance of what is being said to the audience's *present* concerns. Further, it should in its sweep envelop the audience. . . . I think the play should be staged so it says 'Will you, the audience, be able to take it?'"³² The stage is no more suited for the promulgation of *J.B.*'s assertions than for the assertions of the church. Surely it is not unfair to expect from a non-believer as much discrimination in the use of religious materials as from a believer. Lagerkvist, Kazantzakis, and Faulkner, among others, have solved the problem in the novel by recontextualizing the material. If dramatists are to use the matter of our religious heritage with clarity and power, they, too, must find a solution.

Arthur Miller, discussing his interest in social plays has written:

The preoccupation of the Greek drama with ultimate law, with the Grand Design, so to speak, was an expression of a basic assumption of the people, who could not yet conceive, luckily, that any man could long prosper unless his polis prospered. The individual was at one with his society: his conflicts with it were, in our terms, like family conflicts, the opposing sides of which nevertheless shared a mutuality of feeling and responsibility. Thus the drama written for them, while for us it appears wholly religious, was religious in a more than mystical way.³³

Until, if ever we do, we arrive at a society largely agreed on basic assumptions about life, we cannot expect nor should we desire our religious institutions and theatres to share the same interests. The dramatist at his best may seek to clarify some of the ques-

tions springing from man's involvement here and now. The theologian will venture answers to those questions. The church must declare its belief in the redemptive power of God working in history. The theatre best fills its social function as critic, goad, and *provocateur*.

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- ¹⁵ T. S. Eliot, *The Elder Statesman* (New York, 1959), p. 110.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.
- ¹⁸ Christopher Fry, *Sleep of Prisoners* (New York, 1951), pp. 48-49.
- ¹⁹ Christopher Fry, *The Dark Is Light Enough* (New York, 1954).
- ²⁰ Henry Pitt Van Dusen, "Third Thoughts on *J.B.*," *The Christian Century* (January 28, 1959), pp. 106-107.
- ²¹ "The Staging of a Play," *Esquire* (May, 1959), pp. 144-158. The text of the Broadway production is published in *Theatre Arts* (February, 1960), pp. 34-64.
- ²² Archibald MacLeish, *J.B.* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958), p. 131.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 153.
- ²⁴ Archibald MacLeish, "The Book of *Job*," *The Christian Century* (April 8, 1959), p. 421.
- ²⁵ Archibald MacLeish, "About a Trespass on a Monument," *New York Times* (December 7, 1958).
- ²⁶ "Prevail" and "absurd" are advisedly chosen. Mr. MacLeish's *J.B.* seems to impinge on the worlds of William Faulkner and Albert Camus. Carl Jung's *Answer to Job* may also have been influential in the formulation of the play.
- ²⁷ "The Staging of a Play," *op. cit.*, p. 148.
- ²⁸ Philip Wheelwright, *The Burning Fountain* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1954), p. 123.
- ²⁹ "Trespass on a Monument," *op. cit.*
- ³⁰ Tom Driver, "Notable, Regrettable," *The Christian Century* (January 7, 1959), p. 21.
- ³¹ "The Staging of a Play," *op. cit.*, p. 152.
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 146.
- ³³ Arthur Miller, "On Social Plays," *A View From the Bridge* (New York, 1955), p. 2.

Research Abstracts

THE OLD TESTAMENT (1958-59)

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These abstracts are a continuation of those to be found in JBR 26 (1958), 44-49. The former abstracts should be consulted for descriptions of some continuing works. Periodicals for the last quarter of 1957 and periodicals and books for the calendar years 1958-1959 are covered in these abstracts. Four objectives have been kept in mind: 1) to make known available bibliographical aids, 2) to supply information concerning important material to which access is not easy, 3) to help the college teacher become aware of technical research in the field of OT studies, 4) and to inform the college teacher of suitable resources for classroom use or for student reading.

Bibliography

A number of continuing sources for bibliography were mentioned in the previous OT abstract [JBR 26 (1958), 44]. In addition, the following are worthy of notice:

Hyatt, J. Ph., and Morris, R. P., "A Bibliography of Millar Burrows' Works," VT 9 (1959), 423-432.

"Old Testament Commentaries," ET 71 (Oct. 1959), 4-7. Six of England's finest OT scholars drew up this double list: A. for Hebraists and B. for the general reader. Supplementary notes list alternates and better German volumes. Covers all OT books and answers the perennial question: which commentaries are best?

Religious and Theological Abstracts. P. O. Box 928, Youngstown 1, Ohio. \$7.50 a year. Vol. 1 (1958) began with abstracts from 31 Journals: Vol. 2 (1959) ended with the use of 100. The abstracts cover the entire field of religion, and a substantial number of OT articles are covered. Some difficulty had been encountered in abstracting some major European journals, but beginning in 1960 these will be included in the coverage. Each entry is usually a generous paragraph in length and the periodical has rapidly become a most valuable tool.

Rowley, Harold H., ed., *Eleven Years of Bible*

Bibliography. Indian Hills, Col.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. Reprints of the British Society for Old Testament Study *Book Lists* for the years 1946-1956 with index added. Each title is summarized and evaluated.

Sprondel, Gottfried, "Bibliographie Hugo Gressmann," ZAW 69 (1957), 211-228.

Collections

During this period a number of excellent collections of diverse types have appeared. The most important of these are listed below. Limitations of space prohibit further detail.

"Festgabe für Walter Baumgartner zum 70 Geburtstag." *Theologische Zeitschrift*, 13, Heft 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1957) constitutes an attractive series of OT studies in honor of Baumgartner, including among others "Jakob-Esau-Edom" (Maag), "Von Stand und Aufgabe der Moseforschung" (Keller), "Samuel und die Entstehung des Israelitischen Königtums" (Wildberger), "Quelques remarques sur les faux prophètes" (Jacob), "'Leben' und 'Tod' im Buche des Propheten" (Zimmerli), "Von Symbol zum Typos. Ein Beitrag zur Sacharja-Exegese" (Eichrodt).

Hempel, Johannes, and Rost, Leonard, eds., *Von Ugarit Nach Qumran* [Beihefte zur ZAW, 77 (1958)]. A Festschrift presented to Otto Eissfeldt by his friends and students including contributions of Albright, Daube, Driver, Galling, et al. Covers a very broad field, although tradition criticism seems to predominate. Several of these are mentioned under other headings below.

Hooke, S. H., *Myth, Ritual and Kingship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958. A collection of essays to show the developments since the publication of *Myth and Ritual* in 1933, including among others, early Hebrew myths (Widengren), Hebrew kingship (Johnson), ritual and Hebrew prophecy (Rowley).

Humbert, Paul, *Opuscules d'un Hébraïsant* (Memoires de l'Université de Neuchâtel, tome 26). Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de l'Université, 1959. The

collected minor works of a great Hebraist written in a clear style, including among others a bold suggestion for attaching the close of Ps. 103 to the beginning of Ps. 104; several excellent discussions of Gen. 1; and an analysis of the literary skill of the author of Ruth.

Kapelrud, Arvid S., ed., *Interpretationes ad Vetus Testamentum Pertinentes Sigmundo Mowinckel Septagenario Missae*. Oslo: Forlaget Land Og Kirke, 1955. This distinguished festschrift has not previously been mentioned in these abstracts, but by its merit it should be here noted, even if belatedly. The English articles include Albright, "Notes on Psalms 68 and 134"; Hvidberg, "The Masseba and the Holy Seed"; Johnson, "HESED and HASID"; Kapelrud, "The King and Fertility"; North, "The Interpretation of Deutero-Isaiah"; Pedersen, "The Fall of Man."

Mélanges bibliques dédiés en honneur de André Robert (Travaux de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, 4). Paris: Bloud and Gay, 1957. 31 of the 57 papers of this distinguished collection are on OT subjects. Among them are "The Refrain 'And God saw *ki tób*'" (Albright), "Problems of Interpretation in the Heptateuch" (Driver), "David und Israel" (Noth), "Sur quelques rubriques des Psaumes" (Tournay), etc.

Noth, Martin, *Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament* (Theologische Bücherei, Band 6). München: Chr. Kaiser, 1957. A reprinting of *Die Gesetze im Pentateuch* along with seven briefer and not easily available essays. These are fully summarized by G. R. Driver in review in *Jour. Theol. Stud.* 10 (1959), 356-359.

Pettazoni, R., ed., *The Sacral Kingship* (Contributions to the central theme of the VIIIth International Conference for the History of Religions (Rome, April 1955). Leiden: Brill, 1959. A broad collection containing the following OT papers: "Das erste Buch des Psalters, Eine Thronsbesteigungsfestliturgie" (Bič); "Les apports du Psaume cx a l'idéologie royale israéliite" (Coppens); "King David and the sons of Saul" (Kapelrud); "General oriental and specific Israelite elements in the Israelite conception of the sacral kingdom" (Mowinckel).

von Rad, Gerhard, *Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament* (Theologische Bücherei, Band 8). München: Chr. Kaiser, 1958. A reprinting of 15 studies, many of which are out of print and which includes *Das Formgeschichtliche Problem des Hexateuch*.

Reid, Mary Esson, *The Bible Read As Literature*. Cleveland: Howard Allen, Inc., 1959. A series of reprinted studies and works of literature on the Bible, divided into "The Scholar's Bible" (con-

tributions by the Lakes, Wright, Rowley, etc.) and "The General Reader's Bible" (Milton, Goethe, Mann, Gordis, etc.), as well as C. S. Lewis, "The Literary Impact of the Authorized Version." A book off the beaten track and well worth knowing.

Vetus Testamentum, Vol. 9 (1959), No. 4. This number is a well deserved tribute to Millar Burrows and includes among others, "Some remarks on the Song of Moses in Deuteronomy 32" (Albright), "The form and structure of the covenantal formulations" (Muilenburg), "The Omrides of Jezreel" (Napier), as well as a bibliography of Burrows' writings.

Introduction

Anderson, George W., *A Critical Introduction to the Old Testament* (Studies in Theology). London: Duckworth, 1959. A brief (260 pp.), balanced, thoroughly up to date introduction giving fruits of recent work in literary and form criticism with proper attention and evaluation given to cultic and/or Scandinavian scholarship.

Robert, A. and Feuillet, A., eds., *Introduction a la Bible*, Tome 1. Tournai, Belgium: Desclee, 1957. A full (880 pp.) Roman Catholic introduction to the reading of the Bible including principles of interpretation, history of the canon, as well as the material of introduction proper. Ten authors contribute, most notably: Cazelles (Torah), Gelin (latter prophets) and Auvray (Psalms).

Heaton, E. W., *The Old Testament Prophets*. Penguin Books, 1958. A revision of the author's earlier *His Servants the Prophets*; interesting and reliable for the classroom.

Henshaw, T., *The Latter Prophets*. New York: Macmillan, 1958. \$6.75 (Eng. price, 30/). A good summary of the subject in 341 pp. Well done, but ignores for the most part the *Inter. Bib.* and has some minor errors of fact.

Kelly, Balmer H., ed., *The Layman's Bible Commentary*, vol. 1. *Introduction to the Bible*. Richmond: John Knox, 1959. The material in this series is genuinely a "layman's" commentary. Of the articles in vol. 1, however, "The Message of the Bible" by Arnold B. Rhodes is excellently organized, of considerable length, and filled with Bible citations. For the teacher who is not a Bible specialist, this is a valuable tool in building a course. Again for the non-Bible specialist, "How to Study the Bible" by Donald G. Miller may prove to be of great value. Balmer H. Kelly gives the "History of the People of God" in simple terms but includes at the end of each section "The Meaning of the Story." (The individual volumes in the commentary proper apparently will vary in value.

Vol. 14, *Hosea-Jonah* (Myers), suffers from the limitations of space and will be of little value to the college student. Vol. 2, *Genesis* (Fritsch), has fuller detail; while not adequate for the classroom, it has values for Bible study groups.)

McKenzie, John L., "Myth in the Old Testament," CBQ 21 (1959), 265-282. Basically a summary and synthesis of varying definitions of myth and the ways in which the OT can be regarded as employing myth or "mythopoeic thought." Copious quotations from numerous authors.

Tournay, R., "Recherches sur la chronologie des Psaumes," RB 65 (1958), 321-357; 66 (1959), 161-190. A careful and detailed study of the Psalms in Na 1, Ex 15, Ps 20-21, which views them, and probably the Prayer of Hab and Ps 61, as products of the reign of Josiah.

Commentary and Exegesis

Das Alte Testament Deutsch. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1958-1959. This German series accenting theological exegesis has received three distinguished contributions: Martin Noth, *Das Zweite Buch Mose* and Walter Eichrodt, *Der Prophet Hesekiel, Kap. 1-18*. [In addition mention should be made of Eichrodt's brief "Zum Problem des Menschensohnes" (*Evan. Theol.* 1959, Heft 1-2, 1-3) in which he argues that the epithet is employed to stress the gulf between the glory of Yahweh and the smallness of man.] More controversial are the contributions of Ringgren and Weiser in *Das Hohe Lied, Klagelieder, das Buch Esther*, particularly in respect to Esther.

Bourke, J., "Le jour de Yahwe dans Joel," RB 66 (1959), 5-31, 191-212. A detailed examination of the book of Joel which arrives at a conclusion of unity of authorship but composite of occasions. From the prophets is the theme of the day of Yahweh and attack by a distant army; from D is the combination of curse and blessing; from post-exilic period is universalism. Joel is seen as possessing a unique sense of the numinous.

Eaton, J. H., "Origins of the Book of Isaiah," VT 9 (1959), 138-157. A somewhat controversial handling of the problem by regarding the book as the product of the historical Isaiah plus the additions of his disciples, who become a school which endures to the time of Ezra. This accounts for the common themes which run throughout the canonical book in passages which are of obviously different dates.

Emerton, J. A., "The Origin of the Son of Man Imagery," JTS 9 (1958), 225-242. "There are good grounds for believing that the enthronement of the Son of man by an aged deity goes back to

Canaanite myth and ritual, and that behind the figure of the Son of man lies Yahweh, and ultimately Baal." This thesis is accompanied by an extensive summary of current literature as well as by independent conjectures.

Gottwald, Norman K., "Immanuel as the Prophet's Son," VT 8 (1958), 36-47. Argues largely on the basis of the unity of chs. 6-8 as a book of signs involving the prophet and other sons, that Immanuel is also Is. son. Major objections are countered.

Interpretation 13 (1959), No. 1. An issue devoted for the most part to the book of Numbers. A bibliography by E. E. Flack. A study by Walter Harrelson on the theology of the book of Numbers, "Guidance in the Wilderness," which is in many ways an over-all summary of Pentateuchal theology. Includes structure of book, summary of Pent. theology, the book as one of guidance and testing, theologizing in census lists, prophetic and priestly shapings of tradition, Balaam cycle and reign of David, the over-all faintheartedness of Israel and faithfulness of Yahweh, concluding with suggestion that perhaps Moses' death "uncorrupted by ways of Canaan" is an act of grace rather than judgment.

Interpretation 13 (1959), No. 3 is devoted in large part to Amos. A good survey of recent scholarship revealing a trend back to the covenant theology of older scholarship, but at the same time the great amount of new data currently available (James L. Mays). The essay on the theology of Amos (Carl G. Howie) is somewhat pedestrian. An excellent expository sermon by Wilhelm Vischer (5:2-6, 14, 15). The same issue also contains an excellent essay by Elmer G. Homrighausen, "Protestantism and the Bible."

Kallen, Horace M., *The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1918 and 1959. A reprint of a dramatic arrangement of the ARV text of Job with an extended essay in which the author finds Hellenic parallels. While the thesis is controversial, the treatment is sensitive although classically rather than biblically oriented.

Lindblom, J., *A Study on the Immanuel Section in Isaiah vii. 1-ix. 6* (*Scripta Minora Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Literarum Ludensis* 1957-1958, no. 4). Lund: Gleerup, 1958. Regards Is. 7:1-9:6 as a comparative unit, although it is not arranged in chronological order, in which Isaiah believes Judah has nothing to fear from Israel and Syria, but because of her apostasy, Judah has everything to fear from Babylon.

Marsh, John, *Amos and Micah* (Torch Commentaries). New York: Macmillan and London: S.C.M., 1959. The OT volumes of this series con-

tinue to accumulate. They are aimed at the average educated reader, stress theological values more than literary-critical conclusions, with a tendency to read the NT into the OT.

Morgenstern, Julian, "The Message of Deutero Isaiah in its Sequential Unfolding," *HUCA* 1958, 1-67; 1959, 1-102. Represents the results of a continuing seminar beginning in 1939. The article "Jerusalem—485 B.C." proposed 485 as date of one of greatest Jewish catastrophes of biblical period. These studies hold that Is. 34-35, 49-55, 56-66, constitute a prophetic anthology from 520 B.C. to well into the 4th century B.C. which are best interpreted from the perspective of 485.

Noth, Martin, ed., *Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament*. Verlag Neukirchener Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins Neukirchen Kreis Moers. This commentary is fulfilling all which was expected of it. To date, 18 fascicles have appeared including Lam (Kraus); Ezek (Zimmerli); Hos (Wolff); Ps (Kraus). The scope can be recognized in the fact that 9 fasc. for a total of 720 pp. have reached Ps 105. Ample space is given for textual comment and exegesis, and more limited space for exposition. The Psalms commentary is considerably enriched by a generous number of quotations from Calvin and Luther.

Rowley, H. H., "The Book of Job and its Meaning," Offprint of the *Bull. of the Jn. Rylands Libr.*, 41 (1958), 167-207. A characteristic Rowley survey of what has been proposed concerning this book concerning which the author makes somewhat more conservative conclusions than in his other studies. Valuable for the literature cited along with summaries of the same.

Simpson, C. A., *Composition of the Book of Judges*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958. A continuation into Judges of the author's *The Early Traditions of Israel* (1948) and which is to be followed by a similar analysis of Samuel and Kings. The method is that of literary-critical analysis and the discussion reveals both the strengths and the weaknesses of the approach.

Studies on the Book of Genesis (Oudtestamentische Studien, Deel 12). Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958. These Dutch essays in English, French and German do not contain dramatic new insights, but they are carefully worked out, clearly expressed, and fully documented. "God in Genesis" (Gemser) is a compilation of passages revealing the various attitudes toward God. "Some remarks to the tale of Noah's drunkenness" (Hoftijzer) suggests that the flood story has been harmonized with an agricultural tale at a time when Israel was overpowered by another nation and lost control of Canaan. "Kol basar in der priesterlichen Fluterzählung" identifies the

references as to mankind, mankind and animals taken together, or animals alone in each specific passage. Selms, "The Canaanites in the Book of Genesis" concludes that unlike the rest of the Pentateuch, here the Canaanites appear in a friendly light which facts he attributes to the original tradition. Ridderbos, "Genesis I.1 und 2," surveys what has been said in the area, laying particular stress on the struggle between Yahweh and the dark deep. Trigt, "La signification de la lutte de Jacob pres du Yabboq," goes beyond Gunkel laying stress on how the grace of God is here revealed and regarding the story as another example of Israel's theologizing of history.

Terrien, Samuel, *Job: Poet of Existence*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958. T's critical conclusions are found in the *Inter. Bib.*, vol. 3. Here he works through the book utilizing both contemporary psychology and the resources of literature in order to illuminate Job for the general reader.

Towers, John Robert, "The Red Sea," *JNES* 18 (1959), 150-153. An argument that "Sea of Reeds" in Egyptian sources is a celestial "Sea of Reeds" as a place of purification. Hence, that "Sea of Reeds" in Ex 15:4 *et al.* is not a proper noun but is originally metaphorical.

Weiser, Artur, "Das Deboralied," *ZAW* 71 (1959), 67-97. A detailed form-critical and tradition-historical analysis of the Song of Deborah.

Old Testament Interpretation

During the past few years, a surprisingly large literature on biblical interpretation has made its appearance. This ranges all the way from popular handbooks for laymen to scholarly symposia. The most important of these are listed below.

"Problems in Biblical Hermeneutics," *JBL* 77 (1958), 18-26. A sequence of three papers read at the 1957 meeting of the Soc. Bib. Lit. and Exegesis. James Muilenburg, "Preface to Hermeneutics," argues that after the preliminary historical and literary disciplines, the exegete must come to grips with the problems of the dynamics of biblical history and answer the question: "Who is Israel?" J. Coert Rylaarsdam, "The Problem of Faith and History," describes the major changes in theological outlook and the resulting changes in biblical scholarship; and also describes how the current theological outlook has been profoundly conditioned by the results of scientific biblical scholarship of the past century. Krister Stendhal queries whether hermeneutics is an appropriate subject for the biblical scholar and that it might better be assigned to the theologian, and then goes on to give "implied

cations of form-criticism and tradition-criticism for biblical interpretation."

The discussion was furthered by an article of G. E. Wright [JBL 77 (1958), 39-51], "Archaeology and Old Testament Studies" in which he appraises the accomplishments and limitations of archaeology and literary criticism. While doing this he continues the current debate between the tradition history school of Alt and Noth with the followers of Albright [cf. John Bright, *Early Israel In Recent History Writing* (Stud. in Bib. Theol. 19, 1956)] saying: "this attempt [of Alt and Noth] to reconstruct, or rather nihilistically to reduce, the history of early Israel solely by the use of an internal form-critical and subjective tradition-history methodology" which "is so artificial and subjective as to be unconvincing." The last of this debate has not been heard.

Subsequent issues saw two continuations of the discussion of interpretation. John L. McKenzie [JBL 77 (1958), 197-204], "Problems of Hermeneutics in Roman Catholic Exegesis," described the scars of modernism and the pioneer work of La Grange culminating in the *Divinio Afflante Spiritu* of 1943. This has given Rom. Cath. scholarship much common ground with Protestants. Three tasks confront the Rom. Cath. exegete: 1) Data of the biblical world. 2) Biblical theology. 3) Popularization. The second article was by Nels F. S. Ferré, "Notes by a Theologian on Biblical Exegesis" [JBL 78 (1959), 105-114] in which he pointed out limitations of biblical scholarship and that theology spoke from a larger context of interpretation.

The September 1957 meeting of The Catholic Biblical Association of America likewise gave prominent attention to the problem of hermeneutics, and many of their papers have appeared in the excellent *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*.

Roderick A. F. MacKenzie's presidential address, "Some Problems in the Field of Inspiration" [CBQ 20 (1958), 1-8], lays down the ground rules. J. Terrence Forestell, "The Limitation of Inerrancy" (9-18), summarizes the recent work of Benoit who uses the principle of the "analogous nature of inspiration," and articulates an approach which gives the exegete considerable freedom. Robert H. Krumholtz, "Instrumentality and the 'Sensus Plenior'" [CBQ 20 (1958), 200-205], written to show "how God could have given His inspired words a 'sensus plenior' providing, of course, that he should have later on revealed this additional meaning to man."

Francis J. Schroeder works with the problem of interpreting more primitive materials in the OT by utilizing the principles of "Père Lagrange:

Record and Teaching in Inspiration" [CBQ 20 (1958), 206-217].

In CBQ 21 (1959), 115-135, Richard G. Philbin examines "Some Modern Protestant Attitudes towards Hermeneutics" including much of the literature in this section, but going far beyond and concluding by commenting on the paradox that Prot. interpretation with its form criticism logically leads to historical defeatism, a conclusion which does not seem to occur to the form critics.

Interpretation, 12 (1958), No. 3. Usually the journal *Interpretation* devotes each issue to a special topic (the issues on Numbers and Amos have been noted above). Brevard S. Childs, "Prophecy and Fulfillment," traces the attitudes of the church toward fulfilled prophecies, accenting particularly current trends (especially Vischer and von Rad vs. Bultmann), includes a brief word study of *mala'* (Heb, "to be full"), and concludes that fulfillment is found not in rationalistic correspondence but in the achievement of wholeness; this is found in Jesus. H. W. Wolff, "The Old Testament in Controversy" (281-291), seeks a bridge from scholar's exegesis to preacher's proclamation. He sets forth a method of contemporary typology and gives an example of the approach by using Gen 15:1-6. The article has two-fold importance: 1. It illustrates in full detail a prevailing mode of German preparation for preaching; and 2. It introduces to American readers for the first time in English a distinguished younger German scholar. Scott McCormick, "The Bible as Record and Medium" (291-308), quotes from a large variety of current literature on bib. inter. and the unity of the Bible concluding that the Record is what God *has* done and the Medium is what God *is* doing.

Three popularly written histories of interpretation:

Blackman, E. C., *Biblical Interpretation*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959.

Steinmann, Jean, *Biblical Criticism* (20th Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism, 63). New York: Hawthorn Books, 1958.

Wood, James D., *The Interpretation of the Bible* (Studies in Theology), London: Duckworth, 1958.

The Steinmann book is a superb example of *multo in parvo* tracing the history of biblical inter. with flawless clarity and selecting the peaks for description as well as giving a description of the present state of Rom. Cath. interpretation. Written so that he who runs may read.

Blackman and Wood alike trace the history of biblical inter. concluding with prescriptions on how the Bible should be interpreted by scholarship and

within the church. The Blackman volume is the simpler in style and content, and somewhat more conservative in its theological stress. The Wood volume is more solid. In style, the summaries come before the discussion. The text is largely a series of quotations from various interpreters, making it a valuable source book for the student. The Bible is regarded in origin and preservation as the book of the church, and is, therefore, to be interpreted accordingly.

Childs, Brevard S., "Jonah: A Study in Old Testament Hermeneutics." *SJT* 11 (1958), 53-61. Important as are general matters of introduction, they are secondary to the real purposes of the biblical authors. E.g., in Jonah, the point is not found in a moralism about the destiny of Israel, but in seeing "God's word in action," so that Israel recognizes itself as "the people chosen by God, miraculously saved from death . . . to proclaim the message of salvation to the heathen. The message of Jonah is God's Word in action judging this disobedience and challenging them. . . ."

Driver, G. R., "Presidential Address" in *Vetus Testamentum*, Suppl. IV (Volume du Congrès, Strasbourg, 1956), 1-7. Leiden: Brill, 1957. A survey of developments in OT studies in recent years from a philological point of view which poses the question: "How much theology rests on mistranslation?"

Arthur Samuel Peake, 1865-1929: *Essays in Commemoration*. London: Epworth, 1958. A well deserved tribute to a great OT scholar composed of biographical reminiscences as well as excerpts from some of his best known writings, including two selections on biblical criticism and one on the teaching of Jeremiah.

Reid, J. K. S., *The Authority of Scripture*. New York: Harper, 1958. "Any true view of Scripture must hold that there is both a divine and a human element in it. . . . The imperfection of the Bible is to be located in the human element and not in the divine element, in the human recording of revelation and not in the revelation itself." Traces the revival of biblical theology in a historical treatment and includes his own conclusion.

Reid, J. K. S., "The Bible and Modern Religions: XII. Roman Catholicism and the Bible," *Inter*. 13 (1959), 71-86. Describes the remarkable shift of attitude on the part of Rom. Cath. church since 1943 which brings Prot. and Rom. Cath. inter. much closer together. Conversely, lists trends which constitute a source of division. In *Inter*. 13 (1959), 316-332, Elmer G. Homrighausen, "The Bible and Modern Religions: XIII. Protestantism and the Bible," traces the Bible of the Reformers, the 19th century, fundamentalism and modernism, and the

current return to theological approaches, along with current crucial issues which require solutions.

Texts and Versions

L'Ancien Testament, Tomes 1, 2, with translation and notes by Edouard Dhorme, J. Koenig, F. Michaeli, J. Hadot, A. Guillaumont. Librairie Gallimard (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade), 1956, 1959. A new translation accompanied by copious notes (the 2 vols. contain 2168 pp.) which are excellent, completely up to date, and have a striking freshness of approach.

Cross, Frank M., Jr., *The Ancient Library of Qumran*. New York: Doubleday, 1958. Cf. ch. 4: "The Old Testament at Qumran." Q. shows the antiquity of the MT type of text, and that by the time of Q. the three major forms of the text that have come down to us today (MT, LXX, Samaritan) are well developed. The hypothesis is advanced that MT tradition may ultimately originate in Bab.; more certainly that Sam. is Pal. and LXX is Egyptian. Cf. also his article in *Inter. Bib.* XII, 645-668 where similar ideas are advanced in somewhat more simple form.

Kenyon, F. G., *Our Bible and the Ancient Manuscripts* (rev. by A. W. Adams). New York: Harpers, 1958. This new edition of a work which originally appeared in 1895 has received extensive changes in its text and added numerous illustrations. Although one could have wished for even more updating of the text, the work is still a very handy reference work for the college student.

Koehler, L. and W. Baumgartner, *Supplementum ad Lexicon Veteris Testamenti Libros*. Leiden: Brill, 1958. This work is exactly described in its title and contains German-Hebrew and German-Aramaic vocabularies, lists of technical terms, as well as additions and corrections.

Lisowsky, Gerhard, *Konkordanz zum Hebräischen Alten Testament*. Stuttgart: Privileg. Württ. Bibelanstalt, 1958. Based on *Bib. Hebr.* (3rd ed., ed. Kahle); Ger., Eng., Lat. equivalents. Printed in an attractive manuscript script. At ca. \$15.00 a much better buy than Mandelkern.

Pfeiffer, Robert H., and Pollard, William G., *The Hebrew Iliad: The History of the Rise of Israel under Saul and David*. New York: Harpers, 1957. The title as well as general and chapter introductions are by Pollard and are not distinguished, but the plain eloquent translation by Pfeiffer of the early source of Samuel justifies the book.

Skehan, Patrick W., "The Period of the Biblical Texts from Khirbet Qumran," *CBQ* 19 (1957), 435-439. Cf. also Cross entry above. Three traditions are represented. 1. Samaritan recension. 2.

LXX type: not all books have one. To date, Ex, Num, Dt, Jos, Sam. Chron used an edition of Samuel closer to LXX than present surviving MT recension. 3. 80% of MSS are in MT tradition.

Würthwein, Ernst, *The Text of the Old Testament*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957. Subtitled "An Introduction to Kittel-Kahle's *Biblia Hebraica*," covers subjects such as script and writing materials; the MT including pointing, the Masora, etc.; ancient versions; the methods of textual criticism; and concludes with 41 plates.

Old Testament Life and Culture

Scott, R. B. Y., "Weights and Measures in the Bible," *BA* 22 (1959), 22-40. A detailed account of these common but troublesome biblical expressions, including linear measures, measures of area, measures of capacity and weights.

de Vaux, R., *Les Institutions de l'Ancien Testament*. I. *Le Nomadisme et ses survivances, Institutions Familiales, Institutions Civiles*. Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1958. Written in lucid French for the general reader, this is the work of a man with unexcelled knowledge of Palestine and contains much material elsewhere unavailable. 1. Nomadism and its survivals, e.g., hospitality and asylum, tribal solidarity, blood revenge, etc. 2. The family from birth to death. 3. Civil institutions, e.g., citizenship, slavery, state, king, administration of justice, etc. The first of two vols.

Wright, George Ernest (text) and Soulen, Henry J. (pictures), "Bringing Old Testament Times to Life," *Nat'l Geographic Mag.*, 112 (1957), 833-864. The text is clear, the pictures are good illustratively in recreating the biblical life, e.g., a scene overlooking Hazor, the encampment at Sinai, David and Nathan, etc.

History

Bright, John, *A History of Israel*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959. This is now the best history of Israel. B. has taken full cognition of developments of recent archaeology and scholarship. His account is more balanced than Noth, notably in his fuller detail throughout and his placement of the beginnings and formative period within the context of the entire history of Israel. There is abundant documentation.

Glueck, Nelson, *Rivers in the Desert: A History of the Negev*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1959. A combination of geography, archaeology and biblical history in which the background of the Bible is revealed with striking clarity. Special emphasis is placed on the period of Abraham (dated by G. at ca. 1900 B.C.), the

wilderness wanderings, David's years as an outlaw and Solomon's copper mines. To those not familiar with Glueck's work, the chapters on the Nabateans and the Byzantines will come as an amazing revelation. [Supplemented by Glueck article in *BA* 22 (1959), no. 4 with text and pictures, as well as appraisal of Glueck's work by G. E. Wright and a brief defense of the use of archaeology in OT interpretation, also by Wright.]

Gottwald, Norman K., *A Light to the Nations*. New York: Harpers, 1959. Designed primarily as a text for college courses in OT, it presents an integrated account of Israel's history, literature and faith, accompanied by excellent indices, glossary, appendix of ancient near eastern texts. About the same length as Anderson's *Understanding the O.T.*, a little simpler in level of presentation, much less stress on theology (although it is there; sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly), and much more stress on both history and the historical method.

Gray, Mary P., "The Hābirū Problem in the Light of the Source Material Available at Present," *HUCA* 29 (1958), 135-202. A well-balanced discussion of the entire problem setting forth the data involved, analyzing the biblical references with full bibliography.

Hort, Greta, "The Plagues of Egypt," *ZAW* 69 (1957), 84-103; 70 (1958) 48-59. Written in English by a geologist and microbiologist, brings fresh evidence for the historically accurate factual detail to be found in the Ex. narratives. Somewhat naive in biblical scholarship, but fascinating and apparently entirely reliable in data set forth.

Join-Lambert, Michel, *Jerusalem*. New York: Putnam's, 1958. The first in a series "Ancient Cities and Temples." The text is a somewhat simply told history of Jerusalem from its beginnings to the 12th cent. A.D. Numerous plates show photographs of the city, details of shrines, archaeological views, and medieval drawings of the city. The second volume in this series (Albert Champdor: *Babylon*) has a similar text, but its photographs, which include a number in color, are considerably better reproduced.

Noth, Martin, *The History of Israel*. (Translated from the second edition of *Geschichte Israels*) New York: Harpers, 1958. Particularly important for being Noth's own account of Israel's origins, the amphictyony, and its replacement by the monarchy. 223 pp. bring the reader to the Divided Kingdom; 228 pp. more, to 135 A.D. While this latter lacks the detail of the first section, it is admirably done.

Pavlovsky, V., "Die Chronologie der Tätigkeit Esdras," *Biblica* 38 (1957), 275-305, 428-456. Excellent bibliography and survey of positions. Ezra's

mission is later than Neh. first acts, and is probably under Neh. second visit. Neh. returns in 428; Ezra works in 428. The history of Ezra and Neh. is reconstructed in the light of this chronology.

Thomas, D., Winton, ed., *Documents from Old Testament Times*. Edinburgh: Nelson, 1958. Fresh translations (some carefully abridged) of ancient near eastern texts [Most of which are in Pritchard, *Anc. Near East. Texts* in fuller form], provided with copious notes and which are rendered, unlike the Pritchard volume, in clear idiomatic English. The index with ca. 1000 biblical citations shows use to which book may be put. (To this should be compared J. B. Pritchard, ed., *The Ancient Near East. An Anthology of Texts and Pictures*, an abridgement of the two larger volumes, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* and *The Ancient Near East in Pictures*, although even the abridged edition is over twice as expensive as the Thomas volume. Consideration should also be given to Pritchard's clear and lucid *Archaeology and the Old Testament* (1958). All of Pritchard's titles are published by Princeton Univ. Press.]

Vergote, J., *Joseph en Egypte* (Orientalia et Biblica Lovaniensia, III). Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1959. Almost a running commentary on the Joseph narrative, showing how recent Egyptian archaeology modifies our translation and understanding of the biblical account.

Wiseman, D. J., *Illustrations from Biblical Archaeology*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959. Succinct sketch of OT history, accompanied by excellent plates illustrating the event or evidence.

Religion and Theology

Jacob, Edmond, *Theology of the Old Testament*. New York: Harpers, 1958 (original French ed., 1955).

Knight, George A. F., *A Christian Theology of the Old Testament*. Richmond: John Knox, 1959.

Koehler, Ludwig, *Old Testament Theology*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1957 (German 1st ed. appeared in 1935; Eng. transl. is from 3rd rev. Ger. ed., 1953).

Vriezen, Th. C., *An Outline of Old Testament Theology*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.

These four theologies have appeared in English in rapid succession, and we are promised English versions of Eichrodt and von Rad in the near future. Koehler seems the least satisfactory of the above. He employs a somewhat dated systematic sequence. The work is very brief (259 pp.). One half is devoted to God; the remainder to man, judgment and salvation. The entire discussion is subdivided into 57 units.

Jacob's presentation seems the most balanced to this writer, although a little more Christological than he would prefer. The discussion centers around God as "the living God" and is divided into the aspects of God, the actions of God, and the opposition to and final triumph of God.

Vriezen and Knight alike view OT theology as a branch of Christian theology. To a certain degree this leads to a warping of OT categories, but both are very capable works. Vriezen integrates his material around the themes of God, man, the intercourse of God and man, the intercourse of man and man (ethics) and eschatology.

Knight's scheme is that of God, God and creation, God and Israel, and the zeal of the Lord (i.e. history and its consummation). Knight's book is perhaps written in the simplest style of these four, but he is very sensitive to the connotations of the OT which lie beneath the surface.

When such a brief period as that under review produces four books of this calibre, OT theology has come into its own.

von Rad, Gerhard, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Band I. Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1957. In many ways the theological counterpart of Noth's *Geschichte Israels* which uses a similar approach of *Traditionsforschung*. The subject of OT theology can only be Israel's own witness or confession. After an overall survey, von Rad doubles back to discuss in detail the theology of the Hexateuch, the Exodus, the Sinai theophany, the wandering, the role of Moses, the receiving of the land, and concludes with a discussion of messianic thought and Israel's response to Yahweh. This volume is scheduled for early translation.

Albright, W. F., "The High Place in Ancient Palestine," in *Vetus Testamentum*, Suppl. Vol. IV (Volume du Congrès, Strasbourg, 1956), 242-258. A study of *bamah* to show that the word not only designates a pagan sanctuary, but also a funerary installation. Is 53:9 is translated as "His grave was put with the wicked, and his funerary installation with demons" and Is 6:13 as "Like the terebinth goddess and the oak of Asherah, Cast out with the stelae of the high place."

von Allmen, Jean Jaques, *A Companion to the Bible*. New York: Oxford, 1958. A theological word book to the Bible which adopts the approach and many of the conclusions of the much larger Kittel *Wörterbuch*. On the whole less extreme than the Richardson-edited *A Theological Word Book of the Bible* and more theologically oriented.

Barr, James, "The Meaning of 'Mythology' in Relation to the Old Testament," VT 9 (1959), 1-10. Calls attention to the looseness with which myth is spoken of by OT scholarship. Myth in-

volves a wholeness of outlook; it is not symbolic knowledge, and at its centre has a doctrine of correspondences. In Israel the correspondence pattern is largely broken, but the element of totality remains. OT also departs from normal myth by prominence of history and accent on double aspect of action and word.

Bible Key Words, vols. 1, 2. New York: Harpers, 1951, 1958. Gradually the articles of the Kittel *Wörterbuch* are making their way into English and the OT student cannot ignore them. Vol. 1 contains articles on "Love," "the Church," "Sin," and "Righteousness"; vol. 2 on "Apostleship," "Gnosis," "Basileia," and "Lord." (A ninth article, the "Servant of God," appeared in the *Stud. in Bib. Theol.* series in 1957.)

Davidson, Robert, "Some Aspects of the Old Testament Contribution to the Pattern of Christian Ethics," *SJT* 12 (1959), 373-387. The author notes with surprise the neglect of the OT in consideration of Christian ethics, and conversely how little has been written on OT ethics. OT demands ethical obedience in order to accord with the now-known quality of God, i.e., his holiness. Righteousness and salvation are indissolubly mixed. Further, the moral directive must find concrete expression in community life, i.e. a covenant ethic.

Haran, M., "The Ark and the Cherubim: Their Symbolic Significance in Biblical Ritual," *IEJ* 9 (1959), 30-38, 89-94. An argument which takes into account other interpretations and which surveys the archaeological evidence arriving at the conclusion that in the temple the cherubim constitute the throne of God and the ark his footstool. Comparisons are made and implications developed.

Hentschke, Richard, *Die Stellung der Vorexilischen Schriftpropheten zum Kultus* (Beihefte zur ZAW, 75). Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1957. A sharp critique of positions such as those of Schmidt, Mowinckel, and the Uppsala "school," which sees Israel's cult as original from the beginning and free from the seasonal myth, etc. The pre-exilic prophets attacked both the Canaanization of the cult and its degeneration into a form of magic. Largely a negative approach. Cf. Rowley's more conservative viewpoint, *JSS* 1 (1956), 338-360.

Herbert, A. S., *Worship in Ancient Israel* (Ecumenical Studies in Worship, 5). Richmond: John Knox, 1959. A brief, clear, detailed account of the subject, including the basis of Israel's worship; its vocabulary of worship; the media of worship in terms of cultic acts, ritual recitals, cultic objects, persons, and occasions; concluding with the aim and fulfillment of worship.

Kraus, H. J., *The People of God in the Old Testament* (World Christian Books). New York: As-

sociation Press, 1958. A simply written, but provocative interpretation of the OT in terms of the doctrine of election. Most important as the first work to appear in English of one of the ablest German scholars.

Mowinckel, Sigmund, *The Old Testament as Word of God*. Nashville: Abingdon, 1959. This is minor Mowinckel, but because of the paucity of his work available in English it takes on greater importance. It is a brief defense of the OT as an indispensable part of the history of salvation which both prepares for and witnesses to the NT.

Neher, Andre, *Moses and the Vocation of the Jewish People* (Men of Wisdom Books, 7). New York: Harpers, 1959. Like Buber's *Moses*, this book partakes more of the nature of a meditation than a historical account. Simply expressed, it is a brief retelling with comments of the career of Moses and the vocation and faith of the Jewish people discovered through Moses. This is the first translation into English of a work by Neher, a French Jewish biblical scholar who employs an unconventional approach. (Cf. *Amos: Contribution à l'Etude du Prophetisme* (1950), *L'Essence du Prophetisme* (1955)) The book is copiously illustrated.

North, C. R., "The Essence of Idolatry" in *Von Ugarit nach Qumran* [Beihefte zur ZAW, 77 1958], 151-160. "1. Idolatry is the worship of the creature instead of the Creator. . . . 2. Idolatry is the worship of what in modern terms we should call process, the 'life-force'. . . . They [idols] are personifications of natura! process."

von Rad, Gerhard, "The Origin of the Concept of the Day of Yahweh," *JSS* 4 (1959), 97-108. While first used as such by Amos, goes back into the thought patterns of Deuteronomy and Judges. Originates in the "heilige Krieg" in which God appears personally, as in a theophany. For prophets by no means eschatological, for just as there had been days of Yahweh in the past (the Conquest, *et al.*), so there would be similar days. Prophets give it a greater dimension, even a cosmic one.

Raymond, Philippe, *L'Eau, sa vie, et sa signification dans l'Ancien Testament* (Supplement to Vetus Testamentum, Vol. VI). Leiden: Brill, 1958. An exhaustive study of all references and allusions to water in the OT, both literal and symbolical.

Rowley, H. H., "Mose und der Monotheismus," *ZAW* 69 (1957), 1-21. As usual, a fully footnoted study of a major problem (in German) which reaches the conclusion that much of the controversy is essentially semantic.

Speiser, E. A., "The Biblical Idea of History in Its Common Near Eastern Setting," *IEJ* 6 (1957), 201-216. Comments that reflections on history were

more frequent than one supposes in the 2nd millennium B.C. Brief epitome of Babylonian linkage with gods as expressed in ziggurats and elsewhere; Egyptian resignation; and contrasting Hebrew description of history as a quest. Principles of Israel's historiography date back to patriarchs.

Stern, Harold S., "The Knowledge of Good and Evil," VT 8 (1958), 405-418. A brief critique of other approaches and then an argument that with the fruit came a knowledge of evil containing three elements: knowledge, choice and sex. Most important of these is the knowledge of possibilities, in which man is seen as always responsible for actions (Pedersen) and that freedom requires knowledge of alternatives. As result of foregoing, phrase also comes to mean the age when person has sufficient knowledge for decisions. The implications for OT theology are then developed.

Stuhlmüller, Carroll, "The Theology of Creation in Second Isaiah," CBQ 21 (1959), 429-467. A discussion of the chief influences on the poet which he continues to develop, e.g., God's redemptive acts, and of his positive contributions, e.g., *bara'*, creative power of God's word, etc.

Tilson, Everett, *Segregation and the Bible*. Nashville: Abingdon, 1958. A timely, readable and reliable application of the biblical evidence bearing on the contemporary problem, with particular attention paid to the problems caused by a doctrine of election and the claims of love.

Torrance, T. F., "The Origins of Baptism," SJT 11 (1958), 138-171. Although written with a NT bias, a handy synthesis of OT elements involved in Jewish proselyte baptism. Ezek 16 is interpreted rabbinically as proselyte baptism. This baptism involves: 1. Circumcision which is related to the Promise and is a covenant cut into the flesh. 2. The sprinkling of sin-offering water, a double rite which reconsecrates and which removes sin. 3. An ablution in water, ultimately of Israel origins.

Tresmontant, Claude, *Le doctrine morale des prophetes d'Israel*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1958. Currently T is exercising a great influence on French students, Catholic and Protestant alike, and hence his work is of importance. For him the prophets deal largely with collective guilt; only rarely with individual. Sin is social, but holiness is personal. "Adam" refers to human species, and hence original sin is the inheritance of the race. From here T goes on to discuss OT metaphysics and the way in which the NT appropriates the Old.

de Vaux, R., "Les sacrifices de porcs en Palestine et dans l'Ancien Orient," in *Von Ugarit nach Qumran* [Beihefte zur ZAW, 77 (1958)]. The author assembles a considerable body of evidence to associate the sacrifice of the pig with the worship of chthonian deities dating back into the 2nd millennium B.C. Hence the biblical ban.

General

During the past two years much material has been appearing in the areas of comparative and/or sociology of religion. Particularly noteworthy are the works of Mircea Eliade, e.g., *Cosmos and History*. New York: Harper Torchbook, 1958 (original publication, 1954), *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958), and *The Sacred and Profane* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959).

Similarly, in the area of comparative ancient and ancient Near Eastern religion have been appearing the works of E. O. James, e.g., *The Cult of the Mother Goddess* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), *Myth and Ritual in the Ancient Near East* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1958), *The Nature and Function of Priesthood* (New York: Vanguard, 1955), and *Pre-Historic Religion* (New York: Praeger, 1957).

These contain much parallel material to the OT, as well as drawing frequently from the OT itself, and ought not to be overlooked.

Abbreviations

BA	<i>Biblical Archaeologist</i>
CBQ	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
ET	<i>Expository Times</i>
HUCA	<i>Hebrew Union College Annual</i>
IEJ	<i>Israel Exploration Journal</i>
Inter.	<i>Interpretation</i>
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JBR	<i>Journal of Bible and Religion</i>
JNES	<i>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</i>
JSS	<i>Journal of Semitic Studies</i>
JTS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
RB	<i>Revue Biblique</i>
SJT	<i>Scottish Journal of Theology</i>
VT	<i>Vetus Testamentum</i>
ZAW	<i>Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft</i>

Book Reviews

THE LONGER VIEW

Strength of Men and Nations. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. viii + 248 pages. \$3.50.

In the tensions of our times it is good to be led by a great thinker to an analysis of the ultimate as well as the immediate issues in international relations. Despair is a prevalent mood. Fear and self-centeredness inspire narrow, nationalistic goals. In contrast to these responses, Dr. William E. Hocking, Alford Professor of Philosophy Emeritus of Harvard, opens new doorways in his *Strength of Men and Nations*. This book combines with felicity the wisdom of eighty-six years of perceptive participation in world events and the flexibility of a philosophic mind which is ready to explore new avenues of international communication.

Dr. Hocking here deals unflinchingly with the present seeming impasse between Russian communism and Western capitalism—or “imperialism”—as it is more frequently styled in contemporary communist thought. There is no comfort in his factual analysis for those who are unwilling to criticize their past history and presuppositions. No governments and no people have been above reproach in international relations. Many of the charges of deception in treaties, of suppression of colonial peoples, of aggrandisement through unfair trade agreements, are all too true. There are no “lily-white” nations who have a right to claim great moral superiority. Such claims and the uncompromising attitudes which rest upon them are unfruitful as well as untrue. A new approach is vitally needed.

Too much of contemporary philosophy has dealt only with minute analysis of abstractions, what Hocking calls “tiddling its

thumbs over the analysis of words and sentences” while it “shrinks from the tasks of meeting the factual world head-on, the fact-world for whose threat to man’s destiny every language has unambiguous words—‘life’ and ‘death’” (p. 211). He finds a more valuable key in the concrete study of individual persons, and he believes that one can move forward toward international survival most surely by coming to understand the elemental likenesses of men, whether Russian or Chinese or American or German. These likenesses, discovered by the individual in his solitude, are recognized as universal human desires and convictions about the nature of the good life. If all men wish these same things, and if they can keep open the lines of communication so that they can recognize these desires in one another, there can be hope for the future of civilizations. These fundamental desires confirm rather than contradict one another. They are basic moral requirements—“the community of truth, of hope, of freedom, of regard—embedded in the situation, not as extraneous commands or tables of the law, but as factors of the elemental human existence” (p. 194).

Deeply understood, the present conflict is over methods of achieving these universal values. The communist is convinced that his system is the best method and that it is threatened by the noncommunist world. The democracies exactly reverse the picture and build their diplomacy to combat the envisioned threat. Hocking sees glimmerings of a different attitude in the more recent acknowledgment by both camps that coexistence is possible. His plea is that we of the West change our strategy from policies of fear, expressed in encirclement and the armament race, to the “creative risk” of trusting in the underlying universal longing for the

good life and the belief that our trust will be met with a responding trust. We have too long leaned on threats of retaliation and the only response has been a building up of opposing threats. The "balance of power" has led to terrible wars, not to the enduring peace that its sponsors prophesied.

This creative risk rests on a central certitude that "beneath every diversity of taste, sentiment, conscience, purpose, there is the universal will-to-live, the will-to-power, some version of humanity, some horror of inflicting arbitrary suffering and wholesale death" (p. 188). To accept this certitude is to change the whole approach to other nations by "an act of deliberate risk, refusing any longer to shelter one's national purpose behind the continued threat of mass annihilation, an act . . . whose initial stages would involve an announced abandonment of the pursuit of an infinitely retreating security" (pp. 188f.). Such a risk can be taken only by a great nation, acting from a position of strength.

Professor Hocking does not ignore the criticisms of his program. It is not easy to trust powers that have repeatedly resorted to brute force to suppress revolt of subject peoples. He recognizes the "inner reproach of seeming . . . to forget the cause of persons wronged, whether alive or dead: persons who have fought or are still fighting the good fight" (p. 203). But he questions whether the present building of armaments and other "deterrents" is not freezing these injustices rather than developing a climate where they can be corrected. Constant threat of nuclear war eases no tensions. And if war were to come, the tragedy for mankind would be unthinkable.

Venture one must. The present calls for heroic bridge-building, but Hocking has a sturdy faith, resting on firm philosophical foundations, that there are no unbridgeable gulfs between men and nations. Fear and the search for mere security are unworthy motives. The sincere offering of trust in the

common humanity and ideals of *all* men might break the vicious circle and win an answering trust and coöperation. This book vividly presents it as a venture worthy of strong men and nations.

JANNETTE E. NEWHALL

Boston University

THE TRANSCENDENTALISTS

The Transcendentalist Ministers: Church Reform in the New England Renaissance. By WILLIAM R. HUTCHISON. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. xvii + 240 pages. \$4.50.

Underline "ministers" and "church" in the title. This careful study, in other words, treats Transcendentalism not as a careless romantic rapture or a mid-summer madness but as a persisting force in America's institutional religion. Rejecting the traditional opposing of the Transcendental "heretic" to the Unitarian "reactionary," the author describes—with commendable clarity—New England's peculiar *via media* in the years from 1830 to 1860.

Unitarianism, having successfully waged its battle against orthodoxy and the judiciary, found no time in which to consolidate its position. From within the ranks, self-appointed commanders arose to attack those very walls which seemed to offer the only protection in sight. One cannot be surprised therefore to find an injured defensiveness, an embittered counterattack or an ill-considered retreat on the part of concerned Unitarians. Following Emerson's devastating Harvard Divinity School address in 1838, the University's Andrew Norton condemned Transcendentalism for its ignorance, its buffoonery and its "contempt for good taste," while his colleague, Henry Ware, observed that "in general, a doctrine of Divine Impersonality robs morality of its sanctions and makes true piety impossible." The struggle of Unitarianism to maintain its own integrity and of Transcendentalism to maintain its own rele-

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PRESS

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Over one-half of the members of the original Transcendental group were clergymen, and most of these had a ministry of significant duration. Not by inertia but by intent did Parker, Brownson, Hedge, Clarke, Channing, and others work within the frame of organized Christianity. In a movement which had an understandable tendency to become sophisticated and remote, there was a deliberate effort, at times almost a frenzied effort, to bring the priest ever closer to the people—or to bring the people wholly into the priesthood. While the more conservative Unitarians, reacting against the "excessive radicalism and irreverence of some who have nominally stood within our circle," moved in the direction of a creedal commitment to "the Divine origin, the Divine authority, and the Divine sanctions of the religion of Jesus Christ," the Transcendentalist ministers, on the other hand, endeavored to be as inclusive as possible. And, it turned out, they were more inclusive than was possible.

The broad tolerance, the "imbecile eclecticism" (Brownson), the cosmic uncertainty could take fanciful turns. William Henry Channing, nephew of the more famous Unitarian stalwart, after experimenting with several pastoral charges and Brook Farm, organized a church in Boston which included "eleven Unitarians, three Orthodox Congregationalists, one Presbyterian, one Baptist, one Methodist, one Roman Catholic, three Universalists, two Rationalists, one Come-Outer, one Jew, one Swedenborgian, one Transcendentalist, and two Skeptics." The group could agree on a "Universal Unity," but on little more. Bread, water, and fruit were used in the service of communion, symbolizing Wisdom, Love and Joy, while behind a cross made of evergreen and violets there was an empty chair signifying "the unseen Presence." This, to be sure, is Experimental Religion—but not in the sense in which the Puritans had understood the phrase. Such pathetic groping for meaning-

ful form was in the next century to become virtually a national pastime.

Unitarianism, despite its name, was (as Mr. Hutchison notes) more of a protest against Calvinism's doctrine of man than its doctrine of God. And it was on the doctrine of man that the Unitarians themselves were forced to draw the line between the lecture hall and the church, the way of man and the way of God. How much self-reliance, after all, did human nature possess? How much, in truth, did man live by the grace of God? Was the Christian church anything more than "a body of men and women assembling for the purposes of worship and religious instruction"—as Parker had defined it? The labyrinthine career of Orestes Brownson documents the disillusionment with a "Religion of Humanity" which turns out to be both "unphilosophical and anti-religious." Man "cannot lift himself," Brownson wrote in 1842, "but must be lifted, by placing him in communion with a higher, and elevating object." Diligent attention to social reform for a time obscured the gap between rationalism and revelation, but the breach could not be long ignored. The defenders of revealed Christianity within the Unitarian fold held their line until the 1880's when that Emersonianism which had earlier been rejected as "neither good divinity nor good sense" was granted its present place of honor.

Here is a chapter in the long, entangled history of freedom and authority in religion, a chapter easily overlooked, a chapter well worth the reading.

EDWIN S. GAUSTAD

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CHRISTIANITY AND RACE

The Racial Problem in Christian Perspective. By KYLE HASELDEN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 222 pages. \$3.50.

This is a stimulating presentation of the courageous conclusions of competent schol-

arship. Written by a South Carolinian white minister of a West Virginia church, the book reflects a perspective as wide as the world and as deep as the Christian faith. Its pages demonstrate that a local church pastor can engage seriously enough in scholarly study to deserve an invitation to deliver the Rauschenbusch Lectures. It is a further and deserved tribute that the author should since have been called to the managing editorship of the *Christian Century*.

While the author asserts that an already voluminous literature makes it difficult to say something new on race, he succeeds not only in introducing novel emphases into his compilation, but also in tracing fresh relationships and in finding new meaning in well chosen material. Among the subjects particularly well treated are the effectiveness of programs aimed at discrimination (including the role of law), the ethics of segregation, the significance of stereotyping as "the symbolic denial of the Negro's right to be," the unique contribution of the Christian faith, and non-racial factors related to the separation of Negro and white churches.

On matters of race, there might again be applied to the church the judgment of Martin Luther, "The countenance of the church is the countenance of a sinner." Haselden shows that even in earlier unsegregated days, the Negro was subordinated within the church, and religion was used "to pacify the Negro in his role of secondary citizenship." There are fire and brimstone in chapter titles which describe the modern church as "mother of racial patterns," "purveyor of arrant sedatives," and "teacher of immoral moralities." Such strong words are well deserved when the existing church is compared with the purposes of her Lord. It is unfortunate, however, that in comparing social institutions, the record of leadership given by the church to social reform has not here been more adequately presented. It is surely also significant that, in spite of the sociological limitations so well presented in

this book, the church has both in word and example so frequently pioneered in interracial fellowship and justice.

Since a reviewer has some obligation not only to evaluate a book but also to contribute to the discussion of its subject, two other objections may be noted. These are minor and in no way detract from a high evaluation of the scholarly standards and practical usefulness of Haselden's work.

The author stumbles when he tries to make a place for both "natural love which prefers and has the right to prefer its own kind" and "Christian love which has nothing to do with likes and dislikes." On this basis he asserts that in personal friendship, for example, "preference is supreme." But Christian love also provides a norm for preference. While there is an area within which preference may be exercised, the Christian has no right to make preferential choices which are irrational or immoral. Excluding persons from fellowship on the basis of irrelevant data, such as race or national origin, is both irrational and immoral. This consideration is of greater importance because it becomes a refutation of some current proposals for "voluntary segregation." This is another point at which the gospel cuts deeper than constitutional law or court decisions.

On the other hand, on the subject of the roots of prejudice, the differences between social science and theology are not as great as Haselden sometimes suggests. His thesis is that the social scientist sees prejudice as acquired rather than as inherent in human nature, but that the theologian finds the roots of prejudice in "the innate, inevitable, yet sinful self-centeredness of the human soul." It is correct to say that theology adds a dimension to the understanding of the self which psychologist and sociologist do not pretend to incorporate. Prejudice does have deeper roots than are often charted, and it is related to man's acceptance or denial of the grace of God.

Yet the social scientist, as Haselden ad-

mits, does recognize deeper psychological roots than social custom. The gap is further narrowed by those theologians who make human freedom and divine grace more determinative than Haselden does. It is hard to see how man's self-centeredness can be both "inevitable" and "sinful," if sin carries any connotation of personal responsibility. If one takes man's "capacity for love" as seriously as his "proclivity for hatred," then not only race prejudice but also self-centeredness become less continuously inevitable. The contribution of the theologian to the sociologist then tends to become supplementary rather than contradictory. On matters of race we have enough fights on our hands without unnecessarily taking on the social scientists.

HARVEY SEIFERT

Southern California School of Theology

CATHOLIC CHURCH AS SEEN BY OTHERS

The Riddle of Roman Catholicism. By JAROSLAV PELIKAN. New York: Abingdon Press, 1959. 272 pages. \$4.00.

Dr. Pelikan addresses himself to Protestants who are uninformed about the Roman Catholic Church and therefore puzzled or even apprehensive. The title is not as unflattering to Catholicism as it appears to be; the Catholic Church is complex and presents many sides, and Dr. Pelikan asks for many Protestants, "What is it that holds this complex of opposites together?" In answer Dr. Pelikan first surveys the historical process by which Christianity became Catholic, Catholicism became Roman, and Roman Catholicism through and after the Reformation became the modern Roman Catholic Church. Dr. Pelikan then attempts to identify "the genius of Roman Catholicism" in some of its characteristic doctrines and practices: its conception of authority, its relations with the state, its sacramental system, its Mariology, its Thomistic system of philosophy and the-

ology, its modern liturgical movement. Finally, Dr. Pelikan outlines what he believes is the only reasonable approach which a Protestant can take to Roman Catholicism, a theological approach. The approach is made by recognizing certain areas of community between Protestantism and Catholicism, other areas where greater unity appears to be possible and probable, what the relations of the separated churches with each other ought to be, and some challenges which Roman Catholicism presents to Protestantism.

The Catholic reviewer finds the book sympathetic and understanding. It is also remarkably accurate in its presentation of Catholicism, which, as Dr. Pelikan remarks more than once, is too complex to be described in simple terms. He puts the key of the history of the Church and of the genius of Catholicism in the combination of identity and universality; the Church, remaining always what she is, accommodates herself to the world. Dr. Pelikan is ready to admit that Catholicism has been more successful in combining these opposites than Protestantism has been. Where he believes Catholicism has failed is in retaining its universal appeal to the modern mind. Here he includes church-state relations, the labor movement, cultural and intellectual activities, recent theological developments. In these Dr. Pelikan feels that Catholicism has protected its identity at the cost of its universality.

The reviewer confesses to an occasional feeling of dissatisfaction in matters of detail where accuracy of fact is preserved but perspective is missing. One must recognize, I think, that there will always be such distortions of perspective in Protestant presentations of Catholicism; they come neither from malice nor from ignorance, but simply from lack of experience of a living reality which persistently refuses to let itself be confined within the rigidity of a systematic theory. We are grateful to Dr. Pelikan for an erudite, fair, and objective presentation of

Catholicism. But the question raises itself whether it is possible even for an erudite, fair, and objective scholar to present the reality of Catholicism from without. I hesitate to mention this doubt, since it may suggest that there is something gnostic about Catholicism, and I mean to suggest no such thing. Nevertheless, Catholic theologians themselves include the Church among the "mysteries" of faith, which means that it always escapes comprehension. Catholics themselves do not pretend to understand the Church; they feel that the vitality of the Church in the last analysis lies beyond any explanation of her history and organization. Dr. Pelikan was very near this aspect of Catholic belief when he entitled his book "The Riddle of Roman Catholicism." A Catholic theologian would have entitled his book "The Mystery of Roman Catholicism," and he would not mean the same thing. A riddle can be solved.

In all fairness, it has been impossible for many Catholic writers to present the mystery with success. I have read many works on Catholicism which were written with loyalty and devotion, and I have laid them down with the feeling that they failed to do any more than give a superficial description. Like Dr. Pelikan, they sought understanding in the external history of the Church, in the nature and development of her hierarchical organization, in the official statements of her belief found in such manuals as Denzinger. Like Dr. Pelikan, they succeeded only in describing the phenomenon. Now a phenomenological analysis has value, and great value; by a phenomenological analysis one learns that there is a difference between the Grand Canyon and the Chicago Drainage Canal, although both might be generically defined as large ditches. Dr. Pelikan's book will have served both Catholicism and Protestantism well if his readers are assured that Catholicism is not exactly the Chicago Drainage Canal of Christendom. I would not expect him to present it as the Grand

Canyon either; but Catholics think that Catholicism, like the Grand Canyon, has to be experienced to be believed.

Here I would put the essential question which Dr. Pelikan does not answer, and the fundamental challenge which lies at the base of the challenges of Catholicism to Protestantism which he lists: What do Catholics think of Catholicism, and why do they accept it? He describes a church which he cannot accept; does he describe a church which Catholics can and do accept? I praise the candor with which he affirms that Protestantism cannot repeat the slogans of the Reformation; each generation must declare why it is not Catholic, and to do this it must meet the Catholic Church of the twentieth century, not the sixteenth. The Catholic Church of this century still elicits loyalty and devotion from otherwise normal men and women, and the student of this church ought to ask himself why and how this happens. My contemporaries, both Catholic and Protestant, have distorted the whole picture by an anxious interest in the claims of the Church; the average Catholic lives serenely in the assurance that the Church was not founded to claim but to give. One who wishes to understand Catholicism must ascertain what the Church gives her members.

I believe that Protestant scholarship could render a service to the dialogue which is so widely demanded by studying those men and women whom Catholicism proposes as its best representatives. For historical and theological reasons Protestant scholars have shown little interest in the saints except for a few favorites like Francis of Assisi. Catholics are escaping from traditional hagiography; we know that the saints were men and women of real greatness, but people of their time, often with astounding limitations. The Catholic Church believes that in such men and women her life runs at its greatest richness and fullness. Whether one accepts this or not, does not the failure of scholars like Dr. Pelikan to include this in their study of

Catholicism shut off one channel, perhaps the clearest channel, through which they might experience the living reality of Catholicism?

JOHN L. MCKENZIE, S.J.

West Baden College

American Catholics: A Protestant-Jewish View. Edited by PHILIP SCHARPER (Stringfellow Barr, Robert McAfee Brown, Arthur Cohen, Rabbi Arthur Gilbert, Martin Marty, Allyn Robinson, Gustave Weigel). New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959. viii + 235 pages. \$3.75.

A reviewer of this book who is himself a Catholic finds little he can add to the postscript contributed by Father Weigel; and it is a pleasure to associate myself with Weigel's profession of gratitude to the contributors. They have accepted an invitation to a difficult task and have carried out the task with distinction. They have spoken with gentleness and courtesy, with honesty and fairness; and they have spoken from a fund of accurate information. I would enter a mild dissent from Weigel on only one point, and perhaps it is not a real dissent. He observes that most of the contributors have to some extent unconsciously described Catholics as Protestants would like to see them. I received the impression that the contributors were remarkably successful in avoiding this trap.

This speculum of American Catholics is intended for Catholics, and I hope it reaches them. It may be too much to hope that a single book can initiate a new era in Protestant-Catholic relationships; but the contributors to this book show that a new era is possible. All agree that the "dialogue" is necessary; a chief cause of the contemporary tension is lack of mutual acquaintance, from which arise doubt and suspicion. None of us is so ambitious as to expect to see the tension disappear entirely. The contributors are aware that it is of primary and vital importance

for Catholics and Protestants to know the theological differences which divide them; and they know also that no good is served by denying or minimizing these differences. An accurate knowledge of theological differences permits community to arise in those areas where no theological difference is involved. No one questions that a religion is more effective the more totally it permeates the life and thinking of its communicants; but this does not imply a perpetual and total conflict between members of different confessions.

Space does not permit me to pay separate tributes to the separate contributors, although they deserve it; but I must mention the specific contribution of each. Stringfellow Barr discusses the Catholic and intellectualism. Martin Marty traces the historical background of contemporary Catholic-Protestant relations. Robert McAfee Brown sets forth the theological differences. Arthur Cohen deals with the theological differences between Judaism and Christianity, and specifically with Catholicism. Rabbi Gilbert explains sensitive contemporary issues in civic and community affairs. Allyn Robinson faces similar problems from the Protestant point of view.

Some themes recur in the separate contributions and represent areas in which the dialogue is more necessary. The most prominent theme is the theme of Catholic power, although every one of the contributors explicitly or implicitly repudiates the bogey of the "monolithic power structure"; I mean rather the prevailing uncertainty concerning just what authority means in the Church and how far it extends or is thought to extend both within the Church and outside it. Another theme is that of real or imagined Catholic arrogance and aloofness, as Dr. Robinson calls it. This will come as a surprise to very many Catholics, who would describe their feelings rather as timidity and a fear of rejection. Another theme, treated at length by Stringfellow Barr but mentioned by several others and, in the opinion of this re-

viewer, of great importance, is the Catholic attitude towards freedom of scholarship. These are basic, and a better mutual understanding of them would lessen the existing tension. Other contemporary issues which seem more acute, such as the birth control question, are only symptoms of these deeper misunderstandings.

It would be ungracious, as Weigel points out, to find fault with the contributors for doing what they have been asked to do. This reviewer has no trouble in admitting that they have with rare exceptions touched upon issues where the speech and action of Catholics have been less than perfect. Where we think that even these unprejudiced men have not understood us, it is our duty to remove the misunderstanding in the best and quickest way: by the presentation of the truth as we see it.

While I have remarked that the book is addressed to Catholics, I am sure that its contributors had Protestant readers in mind. They have a message for them also. Their criticism of some primitive forms of prejudice is as pointed as one can desire. They know, and I wish we could all learn, that ignorance and prejudice are neither Catholic nor Protestant by definition; they are simply human, and they are found where there are people. Such leadership as the contributors to this book give is our best assurance that ignorance and prejudice will not prevail. Catholics will be false to all that their Church believes and teaches if they respond to this leadership with less kindness and understanding.

I beg leave to correct one small inaccuracy. *La Civiltà Cattolica* is twice called the official publication of the Italian Jesuits. *La Civiltà* is no more official than *America* in the United States. They are both journals of opinion which include among their most dedicated critics many members of the Society of Jesus.

JOHN L. MCKENZIE, S.J.

West Baden College

REVELATION AND REASON

Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy. By RICHARD KRONER. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959. 269 pages. \$6.00.

Is it possible to be a Christian philosopher without being a theologian in disguise? Does Christian philosophy possess independent significance within the witnessing domain of faith? He who takes seriously the thought of Richard Kroner can very well answer yes, yet without calling into question the historical character of Christian faith as has happened with Paul Tillich.

This middle volume in Kroner's planned trilogy on the relation of speculation and revelation in the history of philosophy is a brilliant interpretive summary of the rise and fall of Christian philosophy from its inception through Nicholas of Cusa. Here is a definitive work, matching profundity and insight with clarity and vigor.

The dependence of modern philosophy upon the Christian understanding of man, history, and time is never adequately recognized until Christian speculation is contrasted with Greek philosophy and its limitations. This contrast, already emphasized in Kroner's initial volume, is made plain in the first two transitional chapters of the study under review. The remaining chapters chronicle successive attempts by Christian thinkers to grapple with the unsolved problem of ancient speculation, the uniting of ultimate reality with temporal actuality.

Professor Kroner does not claim too much for anyone, including himself. He fully acknowledges that only religious revelation can connect the Eternal and the temporal. The predicament of the Christian philosophers was to be "ever in danger of distorting the fundamentals of their faith when they attained the speculative goal of their labor, or of slackening in their endeavor to gain a full and penetrating speculative insight due

to their loyalty to the impenetrable mystery of their faith." The primary value of Kroner's work is found in the way he effectively balances a full acknowledgment that this dilemma is not finally resolvable with careful appraisals of the ways in which the different Christian philosophers succeeded or failed in providing proximate answers.

In Augustine we encounter a thinker who lived with the dilemma most creatively. Of all the figures considered by Kroner, Augustine comes off best. The prospective reader who is not an Augustinian will have to be on strong guard if he is to escape conversion before the compelling exposition of Augustine in the chapter on "The Primacy of Faith"—note the identity of title with the author's Gifford Lectures—and elsewhere in the study. Unlike some of his modern followers, Augustine tolerated neither contradictions nor paradoxes. He could come to effective grips with our dilemma because the philosopher and the seeker were firmly united in the one person. In the last resort, there is no other way to meet the dilemma. Here was a "personal charisma, never reached again in the history of Christian philosophy."

Anselm consciously avoided the "negative theology" of Pseudo-Dionysius and Erigena and sought to rescue Christian philosophy through defending the validity of ontological thinking. As Karl Barth has shown, Anselm's "argument" for God rests upon faith rather than speculation, although Anselm went astray when he defined the biblical God in logical and ontological fashion.

The author's discussion of Aquinas is not marked by the irenic spirit he displays everywhere else. But how could it be? In permitting the Athenian to conquer, Aquinas made "short work of the very foundation of Christian philosophy, namely, the conviction that God cannot be known as an object of sense perception or of any other 'natural knowledge,' but only by revelation." Perhaps the lesson of Aquinas within the context of our

problem is that it is one thing to admit the inevitable inconsistencies in marrying speculation and revelation and it is quite something else to seek to bring about the union through selling one partner out to the other. It is hard to know whether to be amused or deeply troubled by Jaroslav Pelikan's conclusion in *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism* that Thomism represents "a dialogue with philosophy" and that "the recovery of tradition by Protestant theology . . . makes it necessary that Protestant theologians recognize the appeal of Thomism as a synthesis of the Christian tradition."

Professor Kroner's study concludes with his own observations concerning the development of Western thought. The most sobering and challenging observation is this: The "schism between Christian (Protestant) and secular (scientific) thought threatened to tear up the inner unity of culture and even that of every individual man. . . . Somehow man has to find his peace by constructing a cultural structure in which both thought and faith, the secular and the sacred, the human and the divine, are reconciled to each other. The failure to bring about this peace of mind might be regarded as an ominous symptom for the survival of what has been called 'modern times,' if in the last hour some remedy is not discovered." It would be presumptuous to speak positively to this question here. I may make reference, however, to the fact that much recent theology has unwittingly sanctioned and perhaps even fostered the view so prevalent in intellectual and literary circles that religion is irrational. It has done this by insisting that faith has nothing to do with philosophy. In contradiction to this view, I believe that Christian philosophy makes a much more creative and positive contribution to the philosophic task, and therefore to human life, than a non-religious philosophy does. This is because faith provides us with an ultimate coherence.

To move from the significant to the rela-

tively inconsequential, I noted just one error in typography (page 224).

A. ROY ECKARDT

Lehigh University

ARCHAEOLOGY

Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judaea. By J. T. MILIK. Translated by J. Strugnell. Studies in Biblical Theology No. 26. Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1959. 160 pages, 25 illustrations. \$2.50.

This is one of the most useful summaries and discussions of the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Qumran community. Although available in English translation first in 1959, the French original was published in 1957. 1947 is accepted as the date of the first discovery, rather than 1945 as in Muhammad al-Di'b's story published by Brownlee in JNES in 1957. Accordingly the "ten years" in the title refer to the period 1947-1957. This allows the story of the discoveries told in chapter I to extend through the finding of Cave XI in 1956.

Chapter II on the Qumran Library is especially valuable, although the preface notes criticism of it from non-academic sources. In the copying of the manuscripts the scribes are described as squatting before long narrow tables (at any rate not sitting on the table as suggested by Metzger in RQ in 1959), but as the fragments are set up in the Palestine Archaeological Museum they appear clearly to provide a bench and knee room under the curving edge of the table. The Teacher of Righteousness is suggested as the author of the Rule of the Community and of the Thanksgiving Hymns. The copper scrolls are still held to contain only folklore, which makes it difficult to understand why the record was inscribed on such unusual and durable material.

Along with the manuscripts, major attention is directed to the Qumran settlement and

the organization of the Essene community. The Wicked Priest is held to have been Jonathan, rather than Simon as Cross holds. The Barthélemy-Jaubert reconstruction of the Qumran calendar is confirmed, that of Morgenstern rejected, but the Jaubert theory of the date of the Last Supper is not accepted. The Essene superintendent is like the *episkopos* of the early Church. Caution is necessary on similarities with Christian baptism since it is not known if there were baptismal rites at Qumran distinct from the daily ablutions. The sacred meal employed bread and *sweet* wine, and this was probably used by the Jerusalem Christians, too. A trace of the Qumran doctrine of two Messiahs may be found in Luke where Jesus is Son of David through Joseph (1:32; 3:23-31) but also Son of Aaron because Mary is kinswoman to Elizabeth (1:36), one of the daughters of Aaron (1:5).

Milik concludes: "Although Essenism bore in itself more than one element that one way or another fertilized the soil from which Christianity was to spring, it is nevertheless evident that the latter religion represents something completely new which can only be adequately explained by the person of Jesus himself."

Typographically, Hebrew is misspelled on page 130.

JACK FINEGAN

Pacific School of Religion

Illustrations from Biblical Archaeology. By D. J. WISEMAN. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1958. 112 pages. \$3.50.

D. J. Wiseman is Assistant Keeper of the Department of Western Asiatic Antiquities in the British Museum, and in 1956 published the *Chronicles of Chaldaean Kings (626-556 B.C.)* which made available a previously unknown portion of the Babylonian Chronicle which provides a contemporary record of the first fall of Jerusalem to Nebuchadnezzar and supplies the exact date of that pivotal event,

March 16, 597 B.C. The author writes very modestly in the present book, and does not claim exhaustive treatment of his subject, nevertheless has packed into his compact text a very great deal of succinctly stated information. Since the primary sources of the biblical archaeologist are now twenty-five thousand sites and a million written documents (Wiseman's statistics), the book is really a marvel of concentration and economy of statement. The author not only uses archaeology to paint a picture of Bible times in general but also finds in its findings some specific confirmations of biblical history, and he concludes with Frederick Kenyon that the progress of this research moves toward establishing the essential trustworthiness of the biblical narrative. The major emphasis of the book is upon more than one hundred photographs of archaeological objects, each carefully annotated. Some pictures are published for the first time, all are relevant, and most are well reproduced, although that of the Parthenon (Fig. 94), for example, scarcely does justice to the monument. A considerable selection of coins is also valuable. The provenance of the Tirhakah statue in Fig. 58 is given as Karnak in the legend, as Kawa in the text, the latter surely being correct. The date of Nero in the legend of Fig. 80 is surely wrong.

JACK FINEGAN

Pacific School of Religion

THE BIBLE

The Nature of the Bible. By RAYMOND ABBA. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958. 332 pages. \$4.50.

This is a comprehensive treatment of the Bible from the point of view of its religious and theological values, not a textbook for an elementary college survey, but it would be excellent for students or general readers familiar with the rudiments of the factual and critical study of the Bible.

The author has made full use of the best

recognized results of both historical and literary criticism, seeing these disciplines as tools for an accurate understanding of the biblical writings. Indeed he knows that it is impossible to understand the Bible without an honest, fearless criticism. Such critical study, however, is not an end in itself; the true goal of all biblical studies is to go beyond the preliminary studies of whatever type to an understanding of the ideas, themes, the message of the Bible.

This message of the Bible has been stated in literary materials of various kinds. One encounters both prose and poetry; books of law, history, prophecy, prayers, hymns, oracles, sermons, wisdom sayings, parables, and allegories of many kinds. The biblical authors also knew how to write fiction; some of the best parts of the Bible have to be recognized as fiction before they can be properly understood. Moreover, the Bible contains much folklore, materials which survived from the memories of earlier times. Legend is intermingled with serious historical writing, reflections of now obsolete scientific ideas; and one of the favorite literary forms is myth, a term now coming into its own as a dignified form of biblical literature. It is also evident that the biblical writers have in numerous cases borrowed from older cultures, incorporating into their own writings materials for which they had a deep appreciation.

In all of these materials, it is not a question of the absolute origin of any story, saying, or teaching, but whether it is true, and what use the author makes of it. The reader of the Bible must know all of these things; he must take them in his stride, and then go on to the real meaning of the Bible, not deterred by historical, scientific, or other types of errors. The Bible is a human book reflecting the same errors we find in human beings generally. We have to learn all of these things in order to free ourselves from slavery to a fetish, and to discover that the real value of the Bible is the faith by which

its people lived. We learn that this faith is not to be equated with philosophy, science, or facts of history; it is something which can never be proved as a mathematics problem can be solved. Faith does not bring that kind of certainty; it must always be aware that reason has a right to question, and does question, its intuitions. That faith involves uncertainty as well as certainty, but it has the power to absorb and transcend its doubt, and to affirm the certainty that gives meaning to life.

The chapter titles are: What Is the Bible?; The Interpretation of the Bible; Revelation through History; Myth, Legend and History; Miracles; The Old Testament and the New; Differing Levels of Truth; the Word of God. The book is well written, enlightened, reverent, reassuring.

S. VERNON McCASLAND

University of Virginia

The Old Testament as Word of God. By SIGMUND MOWINCKEL. New York—Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. 144 pages. \$2.75.

Ever since the publication of his *Psalmstudien* (1921-22), Sigmund Mowinckel has been one of the brightest stars in the firmament of Old Testament studies. Owing to the language barrier, however, many of his writings have been accessible only to a limited scholarly circle. Thanks to the Abingdon Press, which not long ago released Mowinckel's *He That Cometh* in an American edition, it is now possible for the English-speaking world to become more directly acquainted with this distinguished Norwegian scholar.

The present book, translated by Reider B. Bjornard, represents some popular lectures given in 1938. Sensing that lay people needed help "not only to view the Old Testament as history but also to grasp the dimension of revelation in that history," Mowinckel proceeded to discuss "the ele-

EDINBURGH

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and The World Council of Churches

... is the subject of the symposium in the summer issue of *Religion In Life*. This symposium is in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the great World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, in 1910, which gave birth successively to the International Missionary Council, the Faith and Order Movement, and the Life and Work movement, the last two of which culminated in the organization of the World Council of Churches.

The lead article, *Reflections on Edinburgh, 1910*, is by J. H. Oldham, now in his late eighties, the only survivor of those who led the Edinburgh Conference of 1910. The discussion by William Richey Hogg, *Edinburgh, 1910—Ecumenical Keystone*, shows the place of that conference in a century of remarkable conferences from 1870 on.

Among contributors to this issue are: Theodore O. Wedel, Archbishop Iakovos, Howard H. Brinton, Stephen Neill, and others.

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mentary things" of Israel's spiritual heritage.

Running through the fifty brief sections is the thesis that in order to deal with the Bible seriously one must grapple with a central paradox: "the Scriptures as fully human word and fully divine word." Mowinckel begins by acknowledging that the Old Testament cannot be harmonized with modern knowledge, that it contains many sub-Christian elements, and that it lacks the homogeneity often imputed to inspired scripture. How, then, can such a manifestly human book be Word of God? "The presupposition for the existence of the problem and for the possibility of its solution," he says, "is that one start from a *Christian standpoint*" (p. 21), rather than from a position which doubts or denies revelation. Believing "God has broken vertically into history" in Jesus Christ (p. 67), the Christian sees in the Old Testament the history of revelation and salvation leading up to that crucial event.

These lectures were given at a time when the Nazis were preaching Aryan supremacy. In such a time Mowinckel boldly attacked the pride involved in such a doctrine and insisted that the Christian faith fulfills "the main line of history" which leads through the Old Testament. To be sure, there is a difference between revelation in the Old Testament and revelation in the New; therefore, it is wrong to "cheat" by smuggling into Israel's scriptures Christian meanings which were never intended. In the Bible as a whole, as within the Old Testament itself, we find "a history that proceeds through *conscious break* and *conscious connection*" (p. 31). Nevertheless, equal stress must be given to the dynamic and organic relation between the Testaments. The Old Testament discloses a "linear movement" which leads toward a goal; and "history's course is the way to Christ" (p. 49). Although Mowinckel stresses that faith is the ability to discern God's creative work in history, he qualifies, if not contradicts, this premise by saying that even a secular historian must admit that

orthodox rabbinic Judaism was a blind-alley and that the "legitimate tendencies" of Old Testament religion led to Christianity (pp. 55-56).

One of Mowinckel's dominant concerns is to show that there is no conflict between science and faith. The task of the scientific historian is to get at "real history," at the "naked facts," and to understand natural continuity "from the angle of cause and effect." The theologian, however, discerns "a supramundane meaning in history" and believes that the historical links are in the plan of God. Viewed in this higher dimension, the Old Testament is not just the record of an organic stream of evolution but the history of revelation. The form of revelation, of course, must not be confused with its content. The form was conditioned by cultural circumstances, by the degree of surrender to God, and by man's "imperfect receiving apparatus." But God has chosen even lowly means to tell us about our relation to Him, which is the heart of the scriptural witness. What one finds in the Old Testament is the teaching of divine judgment and mercy, of sin and grace which impels toward Christ. Thus Mowinckel affirms the soundness of Luther's principle: *Was Christum treibet*.

Even the most appreciative reader will raise numerous questions along the way. Does historical study demonstrate that the Old Testament leads to Christ? Does scientific inquiry get at "real history" while faith moves in a supramundane dimension? How does the principle of "conscious break and conscious connection" apply to Christianity's relation to other world religions? It is unfair, however, to ask of this book questions which we might not have been prepared to ask in 1938. The issues raised here are still timely. Indeed, many American readers, reversing Paul's language, will say that the author has not fed his audience with milk but with solid food.

BERNHARD W. ANDERSON

The Theological School, Drew University

The Bible Speaks. By ROBERT DAVIDSON. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959. 258 pages. \$3.95.

The author of this handy little volume is Lecturer in Biblical Study at the University of Aberdeen. He has provided what the jacket calls "A Guide to the Thought of the Bible and to an Understanding of Its Major Themes." The statement is an excellent indication of the nature of its contents.

The book is an addition to the ever-growing body of literature of biblical theology. It is a good introduction to that subject, if somewhat of an elementary nature. If one is just beginning to read in that area, this volume would be an excellent choice to start with, but for the specialist it would perhaps be of less value.

He raises a basic question: "If the Bible spoke clearly to men about God and about themselves, does it still?" The main thesis of the author is an affirmative answer to the question. It is developed with skill and understanding, grounded in deep insight into the history and nature of the Scriptures—in two main parts, of five chapters on each of the two Testaments.

In the first part the author is chiefly concerned with the Creation Story, the Exodus, the holiness of God, and the chosen people on the basis of the Sinai covenant, through all of which God speaks and acts. It is a sound and penetrating treatment, well illustrated with biblical materials and makes good reading, especially for the immature reader.

The second part is in much the same vein, with a greater degree of interest for the Christian reader. God was in Christ as Messiah and revealer to Jew and non-Jew alike. It was God's way of reconciling the world to himself, a new covenant relationship superseding the old, demonstrated in the reality of Jesus' earthly career. It all resulted in a newly chosen people of God, the church emerging from the resurrection faith,

with more or less prophetic faith in a victorious age to come.

There is much timely and thought-provoking comment throughout the book, suggesting that it might have much homiletic value to those interested in its use for that purpose in such troubled times as these.

CHARLES F. NESBITT

Wofford College

Introduction to the Bible. By Five Authors. Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press; London: SCM Press and Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1959. 171 pages. \$2.00; 4 or more copies, any assortment of titles, \$1.75 each.

This small volume is the first in a projected 25-volume series, the *Layman's Bible Commentary*. The writers and their topics are: Kenneth J. Foreman: What Is the Bible?; Balmer H. Kelly: The History of the People of God; Arnold B. Rhodes: The Message of the Bible; Bruce M. Metzger: How We Got the Bible; Donald G. Miller: How to Study the Bible. The point of view is moderately conservative. To most of the authors the Bible is the "Book of the Acts of God," and *Heilsgeschichte* is prominent throughout.

The first essay endeavors to anticipate the principal questions which the layman may ask concerning the Bible as a whole. There is a frank facing of what may be to some laymen sensitive questions and problems. Such questions are discussed as: Is the biblical history like any other history? What is meant by revelation and inspiration with reference to the Bible? In what sense can we call the Bible the Word of God? Or does it only *contain* the Word of God, or *convey* it? How can it *become* the Word of God to a reader? Is the Bible inerrant? On the whole this first essay fulfils its proper function of putting the thoughtful layman into a receptive attitude for the succeeding volumes.

The contents of the second essay are schematized, each period falling into three

parts: setting, story, meaning. "By 'meaning' is meant the important insights and ideas found in the happenings themselves" through which "can be traced the one ongoing purpose of God." The Patriarchal Age is important because it introduces the men "with whom God began to deal in a special way . . . and through whom he was to work out his purpose for all."

In the Exodus story the author appears to accept literally the "events": the miraculous "signs of Moses"; . . . "in a single night the first-born of the houses of Egypt were killed, and the Hebrews, their houses miraculously passed over . . . rose up and fled from the land"; . . . "at an arm of the Red Sea . . . the water was opened for them . . . and it closed to destroy the pursuers." "God had acted for them." This, the only place where such literalism appears, might have been avoided as it is, for example, in the succeeding story of the Covenant. Six additional topics in the OT and the important Intertestament Period are treated. In the latter, "one of the great epochs of all history . . . the major themes of Judaism became fixed in the form they hold in NT times." The NT Period continues the uniformly good though necessarily brief coverage.

As might be expected the central essay on the "Message of the Bible" is couched entirely in terms of *Heilsgeschichte*. It is by far the longest of the essays (52 pages of the 171).

It opens with the early preaching of the Apostles "which unites the two Testaments as it focuses upon Jesus' own preaching, person and work." This essay is also schematized by a diagram of an hourglass, the upper section labelled "B.C.," the lower "A.D." Alongside are nine headings: Creation, Adam and Eve, Abraham-Israel, Remnant, The One—Jesus Christ, Apostles, Church, Mankind, the New Creation. Connecting arcs are drawn between 1 and 9, 2 and 8, etc. Says the author, "The correspondence between the events B.C. and A.D.

are not accidental" for reasons which are stated. This diagram presents the outline of the essay, followed point by point. The longest section is that on Abraham-Israel, occupying one-third of the essay.

The conclusion: "The story of salvation in the Bible . . . speaks of privilege and responsibility. . . . Some writers did not know what other writers were writing or had written. Yet together their various contributions tell one story."

The account of the transmission and of successive translations of the Bible is told in the next essay. A clear, terse style makes this the shortest of the five, yet room is found for an informative discussion of the making of ancient books as well as for many interesting observations on textual matters. The essay ends with a plea for periodic revisions to be made in the light of advancing knowledge from many sources and as new Hebrew and Greek texts become available, in order to give us "a yet more faithful rendering of the Word of God in the words of men."

The final essay forms a fitting close to the volume by offering suggestions of methods of study to yield intelligent and fruitful interpretations. The author warns against bibliolatry, proof-text method, eisegesis, unwillingness to consider ethical implications, etc. "A faulty use of the Bible is as bad as no use at all."

Taken as a whole, the writers have in most cases successfully condensed a great quantity of material into a small compass.

Four volumes of the commentaries are already available and the remaining ones are to be issued at the rate of four each year.

JOHN W. FLIGHT

Haverford College

You Shall Be My People. The Books of Covenant and Law. By EDWIN M. GOOD. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959. 96 pages. \$1.50.

The Westminster Guides to the Bible were stimulated by a desire to do for lay

biblical study what the Laymen's Theological Library did for theological study. Professor Good's book is the second volume of the series and covers the books of the Pentateuch. He divides his work into three major discussions. The first, a discussion of the Exodus experience, reflects much of the language and ideas of the theme, "God acting in history," and in its description and dating of the written sources follows the oral traditionalists. The Exodus experience is used to illustrate God's invitation to Israel and Israel's affirmative response. The patriarchal narratives, embodying God's promise to Israel, are then considered and followed by a discussion of the mythology of the early chapters of Genesis. A large portion of the latter treatment is an essay on sin. Since the book is written for laymen, it does not try to present material that would be new or challenging to biblical scholars, but this does not mean that the contents are always "orthodox." The author, for example, dates the entry of the Joseph tribes into Egypt between 1400 and 1360 and Isaac is placed in the twelfth century.

The book is valuable because it presents in a brief volume a balanced outline of the Pentateuch interpreted in the light of current biblical scholarship. The Pentateuch is seen as a compilation of memories which richly express God's approach to Israel and her response of faith. This emphasis on the significant religious value of the Pentateuch provides a good background for a frank handling of such difficult questions as the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, parallel narratives and genealogies, and the historicity of most of Genesis. The description of the documentary hypothesis is particularly clear and well done and the reader is made aware of many of the trends of current biblical study. Since laymen too often make a caricature of the dichotomy between the Old Testament and the New Testament, it is beneficial to point out, as Mr. Good does,

the early appearance of the concepts of love and universalism in the Old Testament.

Laymen might appreciate a clearer rationale for inverting the order of the treatment of the Pentateuchal sections and, perhaps, such an explanation might be more difficult than using the biblical order. Laymen might also need more help (or be relieved entirely of the task) in following the intricacies of such problems as the development of the Abraham tradition, although the chart on page 72 is helpful at this point. It would also seem advisable to include a bibliography in such a series as this. Readers who have been motivated to undertake biblical study of this caliber may want some direction for further reading.

Most of the difficult questions are handled with clarity and frankness, but some materials, brought in to support the theological thesis of the book, raise questions that do not receive treatment. For example, the stubborn Pharaoh of the exodus is cited to support the thesis that "it is the nature of men to cling to what they think belongs to them" and, thereby, "delay God's plan." But the biblical statement that *God* hardened Pharaoh's heart and the subsequent theological difficulties that it implies for the theologian are not discussed.

The book does not try to popularize with charts and pictures and will attract primarily individuals seriously interested in understanding the Bible. It would be an excellent book for a Bible study group.

ROBERT T. ANDERSON

Michigan State University

The Cruel God. Job's Search for the Meaning of Suffering. By MARGARET B. CROOK. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. xv + 222 pages. \$3.50.

From 1921 to her retirement in 1954 Miss Crook taught in the Department of Religion and Biblical Literature at Smith College. In the fall of 1954 she served as Visiting Lec-

turer in Old Testament at Manchester College, Oxford; and this volume on Job (which still retains the style of the platform) is based upon the lectures which she delivered at that time.

The Cruel God would be classed as a commentary, since it provides a translation of the book together with a running interpretation. But the translation is done with extraordinary freshness and grace, and the interpretation possesses two special features. In the first place, the Book of Job is itself treated as a series of lectures, delivered by a Wise Man, who was also a Poet, to something like an advanced seminar in a Hebrew school for literary studies. The supposition that his students pressed him on various points, and that time elapsed between the lectures, makes an attractive explanation of breaks in the structure of the thought. The friends (in each of whom Miss Crook finds distinctive individuality) are thought to be modelled on older teachers of wisdom known to the Poet.

In the second place, Miss Crook has drawn upon her specialized knowledge of Near Eastern texts and civilization to place the Book of Job against a cosmopolitan background, and she introduces parallels from this wider field, as well as from older Hebrew literature, to illumine what is in the Poet's mind. Thus, for example, while she concludes that the heavenly Witness in 16:19 can only be God himself, she finds in the passage a reminiscence of a Babylonian ritual for the New Year, in which the goddess Beltiya, the consort of Bel-Marduk, was "the Witness for all those . . . who came before Marduk to ask assurance of justice." The significance of Job's tears in 16:20, as a sign of his innocence, is to be explained by reference to the same ritual, and to the tears shed by the king. Again, while the Poet's description of Job's "descent into an abyss of misery" in 19:3-22, and his subsequent surge of confidence in 19:25-26, rests back more immediately upon

Psalm 18, there is also an echo here of Ishtar's descent to the nether world.

Miss Crook finds the clue to the teaching of the book in 40:7-14, which she believes was the author's first version of God's speech out of the storm (followed immediately by Job's retraction in 42:2-6) and which is amplified in the other addresses he composed later. In his speeches Job has asserted his own innocence and complained of God's cruelty and indifference to the sufferings of the righteous. God's reply raises the question of whether Job then believes that he could do a better job of running the universe than God is doing; is he prepared to assume God's responsibilities? Confronted with this challenge, and with the disclosure of God's majesty, power, and eternity ("But now you have revealed Yourself to me" is the translation of 42:5b), Job is made aware of the "difference between a human being and the Divine Being." In "stunned humility" he abandons the effort to press against God a case which had been based upon the uncritical acceptance of the retribution dogma. "Instead Job acknowledges that the limitless Power of God cannot be charted and held within the confines of human theory" (p. 143).

Miss Crook leaves the question of the provenance of the book until the commentary has been completed. Surveying the evidence, she reaches the conclusion that Babylon in the earlier half of the fifth century (perhaps about the time of Malachi and the closing chapters of Isaiah) is the most probable setting for the author; while the Elihu speeches she divides between two later Wise Men, an Elder Elihu contemporary with Ezra and a Younger Elihu writing around 350 B.C. Among the reasons for setting the date are the Poet's indebtedness to Jeremiah, his stance as a critic of the Deuteronomistic retribution dogma (which must be allowed time to take hold before the Poet can write against it), and the fact that the tone of the book would fit in with the period of disil-

lusionment which occurred when the thrilling promises of Second Isaiah failed to be accomplished. Among the reasons for fastening upon Babylon are that it was the most likely place in this period for the various streams of Near Eastern culture to flow together, the fact that the author never mentions Jerusalem, and his frequent casual references to clay and dust; for "in Babylon everything was of clay" (p. 177).

The Cruel God is full of fresh suggestions and conjectures, both in the translation and the commentary, some of which will no doubt commend themselves to other scholars and others be rejected. The merits of the book are such that it should promptly be given a place on lists of collateral reading for introductory courses in the Old Testament. The beginning student will find in it not only the material on Job already indicated, presented in lively form, but information on a host of related subjects, such as the difference between prophecy and wisdom, Jeremiah, and the form of Hebrew poetry (Appendix One). The last two chapters, in which the Elihu speeches and the textual problems confronting the translator are discussed, provide a supremely lucid account of what happened to the Book of Job—and by implication to other Old Testament books—after it left the hands of the original author. *The Cruel God* is an excellent job.

MARY FRANCES THELEN

Randolph-Macon Woman's College

The Life and Times of Herod the Great. By STEWART PEROWNE. New York-Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1956. 187 pages. \$5.50.

The Later Herods. By STEWART PEROWNE. New York-Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958. xvi + 216 pages. \$6.50.

One of my most exciting experiences in Jerusalem in 1953 was a moonlight walk through the walled city under the direction of Stewart Perowne at which time he shared

detailed knowledge of the history of this ancient city, pointing out the many evidences of that history which still remain. Mr. Perowne knows well and loves deeply the land in which the dramatic life of Herod and his contemporaries was played out.

It is out of that intimate knowledge of this land, coupled with a careful examination of the literary sources, that Mr. Perowne has written a fascinating book of an exciting and often poorly known and greatly misunderstood character. Herod and his times come vividly to life under his pen and the result is a book equally of value to both scholar and layman. Herod the Great was one of the most passionate builders of all time and Perowne has more than done justice to this aspect of Herod's activities. There is only one way to obtain an adequate knowledge of ancient buildings: visit their ruins and study carefully what remains. This the author has done, and with a keen eye, controlled imagination, and facile pen, he describes those buildings in such a way that the reader finds himself standing, as it were, in the very courtyard where Herod himself once stood.

The book is an appreciative treatment of Herod as the following words suggest:

That Herod was not all monster will, it is hoped, have been evident from the foregoing narrative . . . the man who could become the friend of Antony and of Augustus and, perhaps most important, of Agrippa cannot have been an empty or unmeritorious man. . . . All this argues ability, and outstanding ability. That Herod possessed it, was proved by his administrative vigour; his famine relief measures, for instance, to this day have never been equalled in the Levant (p. 176).

At the same time Perowne is not unaware of Herod's defects and after a brief discussion of his lack of spiritual sensitivity, the book closes with these words: "Herod's tragedy was not that he saw the vanity of the dream, but that he never beheld the glory of the vision" (p. 180).

In *The Later Herods*, a sequel to *The Life and Times of Herod the Great*, Mr.

Perowne continues the account of this troubled period in Palestinian history. The subtitle, "The Political Background of the New Testament," suggests something of the purpose of the book and the value it may have for the reader. Here is found the vast array of Jewish and Roman rulers, some strong, some weak, who tried, albeit without conspicuous success, to maintain the vital political and religious balance between the Caesar of Rome and the God of Israel. "The ultimate interest of the Herods is that they lived in the era that brought the problem [of the balance of duty towards God and State] to its first world crisis, and that, whatever their shortcomings, their follies or their failures, the best of them did try to discover a *modus vivendi*, a compromise, not of principle but of practice, whereby it should be possible for men to 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's'" (p. 192).

Whether one will agree with Perowne's judgment of Herod the Great and his successors or not, one will without doubt gain new insights into these men and their times through a reading of these pages and a study of the many well-reproduced pictures and several chronological charts in these books.

H. NEIL RICHARDSON

Boston University

The Gospel According to St. Luke. By A. R. C. LEANEY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. xii + 300 pages. \$4.00.

This is the third in the series of Harper-Black Commentaries to appear, the preceding being C. S. C. Williams, Acts, and C. K. Barrett, Romans. A. R. C. Leaney is lecturer in theology at Nottingham University. The volume on Luke contains an Introduction (75 pp.), consisting of discussions of: a) the author, date, occasion, etc., b) the sources, c) the theology; and d) special notes; a fresh translation and notes *seriatim* comprise the remainder.

The author promises in the Preface "to assess the character and value of Luke both as a theologian and historian, endeavouring both to give an account for university students and others of the present stage of the debate, and to make some contribution to it" (p. ix). He lives up to his promise, if at all, only in the Introduction; the commentary proper is, for the most part, a series of *ad hoc* comments on the translation in which he only occasionally treats Luke either as historian or theologian. Apart from the Introduction, he seldom assesses sections as wholes, treats inter-Synoptic relationships, or relates specific content to the Lukan perspective. These observations do not necessarily imply criticism of the commentary proper, except insofar as performance does not match promise, and insofar as performance does not satisfy the requisites of a commentary. With regard to the former, only the author is to blame; with regard to the latter, perhaps the editor and publishers are responsible. Since a critique of the function and format of the series is beyond the scope of this review, the latter must be left an open question. One can say, however, that while the author offers many interesting suggestions, the work is too fragmentary to be used as a reference tool by scholars and students.

One notes with satisfaction the author's acquaintance with the recent relevant works of H. Conzelmann (*Die Mitte der Zeit*, 1st ed., 1954) and R. Morgenthauer (*Die lukanische Geschichtschreibung als Zeugnis*, 1948), but one looks in vain for some notice of R. Bultmann or E. Dinkler, both of whom have given some attention to the Lukan perspective, to say nothing of Bultmann's *Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition*; equally striking is the omission of O. Cullmann (*Christ and Time; Christology of the New Testament*) who sets the Lukan viewpoint at the center of New Testament theology.

In his Introduction, Leaney offers a brief discussion of authorship, etc., in which he does not insist on Luke, the companion of

Paul, as author, but he does not seem to take account of the work of E. Haenchen, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (¹⁰1956; ¹¹1957; ¹²1959), who has shown that this bit of tradition is very doubtful, to say the least. While he concludes that the facts are consistent with the author being a companion of Paul (p. 4), he is not misled with regard to the author's historiography: he is not a "scientific" historian; "He (Luke) writes as one for whom Christ alone makes history intelligible" (p. 9). There follows an extensive analysis of the sources: Leaney rejects Farrer's rejection of Q, regards the Proto-Luke hypothesis as unsound, finds two sources in the infancy narratives, and sees Luke and the Fourth Gospel as dependent upon a common tradition for the resurrection narratives. It is here that he contributes most to the discussion.

The treatment of the theology of Luke (pp. 34-37) leaves something to be desired. The theme of Luke is the reign of Christ which, although it is obscured by modern concentration on Luke's apologetic, is boldly set forth: "Luke . . . sets Jesus not on the throne of Israel only, but also on the throne of the universe" (p. 34). The Son of Man image is merged with that of the Messiah-King, and the resulting figure, since he has already entered his glory *via* death and resurrection and occasionally manifests his glory from on high (as earlier from his ministry), is not to be expected to come in glory at the end of the age. Aside from the question as to whether the King-motif is adequate to Luke's theology, not to mention the *kerygma*, one wishes the author had elaborated other aspects of the Lukan view, pulling together material from his notes, etc. into a systematic discussion. As it is, much of the Introduction strikes the reader as random selections from the author's files.

In view of the drastic selectivity that was necessary in the commentary—the comments are very brief in proportion to the length of the text (e.g. 6:1-19 = two and one-half

pages of commentary)—the author has by and large chosen wisely, given his *modus operandi*. He has made some use of the Qumran materials, but he seems to have overlooked important parallels to Lk. 2:14 (as noted by C. H. Hunzinger, ZNW 44 [1952/53], 85-90; J. A. Fitzmyer, ThSt 19 [1958], 225-27; etc.), though he interprets the genitive correctly, i.e. as a subjective genitive. The Gospel of Thomas became available too late to be utilized.

Upon a backward glance, the reviewer notes that he may well not have done justice to the scholarly quality of this work; there is a mixed desire to commend for the advance over older commentaries and to scold for failing to carry through. The author has deliberately abandoned the older technical-philological-historical format for a more theological orientation, which is in line with current trends in New Testament studies; on the other hand, he has made the shift only half-heartedly and inconsistently. One need only look at R. Bultmann's commentary on John or E. Haenchen's on Acts to see the difference: the latter are fully historical-critical, but also thoroughly theological. To conclude, our author's work on Luke marks the transition, but does not make it.

ROBERT W. FUNK

Drew University

The Gospel According to Luke. The Layman's Bible Commentary, Vol. 18. By DONALD G. MILLER. Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1959. 175 pages. \$2.00.

If this volume is any indication of the quality expected in the rest of the twenty-five volumes of the Layman's Bible Commentary, it will be an excellent set indeed. It is reasonably priced, handy in size. The editor/author has a rather lucid style, a delight for a layman's after-dinner evening reading. It is equally scholarly and homiletical; informative and evangelical. There is an

excellent presentation of the major results of two centuries of Bible scholarship. The intelligent layman, the academy instructor, and the college teacher will find this compact commentary a fund of information and inspiration. Although no Scripture is quoted, with one's devotional Bible at one's elbow the devout layman can easily read, meditate, and pray with this commentary in hand.

A presentation of the outline followed in his treatment of the content of the book will indicate the approach of the editor/author. The outline presents the message of the Gospel of Luke, not a biography of Jesus. This is as it should be. Therefore the volume opens with a discussion of Luke's Preface (1:1-4), wherein he indicates the sources of his information. The first major portion (Lk. 1:5-2:40) is entitled *The Coming of Messiah: Fulfillment of Promise*. This covers the details of the divine promise and the birth of Jesus as understood by the early church in terms of fulfilled prophecy. *The Nature of Jesus' Messiahship: The Suffering Servant* opens with Luke's presentation of the youthful Jesus in the Temple at Twelve. Jesus' divine sonship and servant mission is indicated in the portion covered by 2:41-4:30. The Messiah's ministry is divided into three areas of mission: Galilee (Lk. 4:31-9:50), En Route to Jerusalem (Lk. 9:51-19:27), and in Jerusalem (Lk. 19:28-24:53). From the point of view of Jesus' biography these groupings are too large. Yet as Dr. Miller sees Luke's Basic Message, the three portions of material are seen as *Response to the Servant* (Lk. 4:31-9:50), *The Kingdom of the Servant* (Lk. 9:51-19:27), and *Death and Resurrection of the Servant* (Lk. 19:28-24:53).

Such a treatment of Luke's content/message indicates a serious attempt to present the Gospel message as it was proclaimed by those with whom Luke associated (Paul, Timothy, Titus) or by those in the Ephesus (?) area where Luke-Acts first appeared. In a day when Ecumenical Conferences have

been made a serious study of the combination message of Luke-Acts by youth and adult groups within the Church, this is an excellent resource volume. It will aid the interested and intelligent layman or laywoman to know what the pastor, delegate, college student, and teen-ager is talking about.

This reviewer eagerly commends this set of commentaries for opening up the field of Bible Study to intelligent youth and adults.

IRA JAY MARTIN, 3RD

Berea College

The Christology of the New Testament. By OSCAR CULLMANN. Translated by Shirley C. Guthrie and Charles A. M. Hall from *Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1957). Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959. xv + 342 pages. \$6.50.

Several factors in the world of New Testament scholarship have made our time propitious for the writing of such a work as this. The Dead Sea Scrolls have given us a body of exciting material. The rigid notions which scholars formerly held with respect to Judaism in the early New Testament period are breaking up. Above all, New Testament students are no longer disposed resolutely to ignore every reconstruction of New Testament thought which seeks to find interrelationships among ideas.

Professor Cullmann brings to his task a well-known interest in the mutual influences of ideas upon one another. And he couples the interest to a point of view which is decisive for his whole work in Christology, an outlook which is expressed as follows: "Christology is the doctrine of an 'event,' not the doctrine of natures" (p. 9). In applying this principle he develops a mode of procedure. First, he examines the titles which refer to the earthly work of Jesus. Then, he considers those which cover the future work. Thirdly, he studies the names which give conceptual expression to the

present work of Jesus. Finally, he moves to the class of titles which expresses the pre-existence of Jesus.

As he presents the material on each major Christological title, the author first inquires into the background. Then he turns to a consideration of the problems of the sense in which Jesus applied a particular designation to himself. It is clear that in this section of his discussion Professor Cullmann departs from a general attitude of our day, that the study of the historical Jesus is impossible because of the interpenetration of bare historical materials by the faith of the church. Yet Professor Cullmann is not directly related to the awakened interest of Bultmannian circles in the problem of recovering Jesus' message. Following the discussion of Jesus' self-consciousness appears a discussion of Christological ideas among the New Testament writers. Often, the author also brings in material from non-canonical Christian writers.

The Christology of the New Testament is a work of critical scholarship; therefore, it will displease many conservative scholars. But there are sections which will not be acceptable to other readers, as the author knows. According to the author, Jesus thought of himself as returning to earth after his death, was conscious of being sent to fulfil the task of forgiving sins, and it is conceivable that he accepted the notion that he was an ideal priest after the model of Melchizedek. Further, it is maintained that the Synoptics establish the fact that Jesus thought of himself in terms of a concept which combined the heavenly Son of Man and the Suffering Servant. The grounding of the Christological thought of the early Christian Church in the teachings of Jesus about himself will rouse considerable controversy. Of course, the root of the difficulty lies in the Synoptic materials themselves. Such a passage as the Gethsemane incident does not impress one at the first reading as consistent with the passages which Dr. Cull-

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DeWOLF**

Boston University

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mann finds determinative, even if we suppose that the self-consciousness of Jesus is discoverable. For some a further problem, theological in nature, is posed in accepting Cullmann's discussion of Jesus' thought about himself; namely, is it possible to hold that Jesus was human, to conceive of his existence as a flesh and blood life, and to think at the same time of his self-consciousness in the terms the author believes come from Jesus himself? I wish that the book had dealt with such a theological problem.

It would be a great mistake, however, to set the book aside because of the areas in which readers will disagree. The work can force us to reexamine the material in the New Testament. Even those who differ at points will admit considerable justice to the author's claim that previous treatments have erred in examining concepts as though they existed in atomistic isolation. His study of the concept of Christ as High Priest gives a new depth to the understanding of the Christological thinking of Hebrews. His extensive discussion of the idea of the Son of Man creates the possibility of a much less esoteric and more important concept than many previous reviews of the title.

As we have come to expect from previous volumes, we find extensive bibliographical references which help the reader who may be somewhat unfamiliar with the course of Continental discussions. We are also provided with theses which are alternative to those of Bultmann. Consequently, one can emerge with new understandings of both New Testament scholars by noting the underlying dialogue between Cullmann and Bultmann.

The author supplies reflections on Christology which bear on our contemporary task of Christological formulations. Thus he has not limited himself to a narrow conception of the task of describing the Christology of the New Testament as though such thinking belonged to the past alone. Professor Cullmann involves himself in the discourse of our times as well. Of course, it is right that

his work should first be read as a whole; without such a reading one cannot note his grappling with the interplay of revelation and salvation in the Christology of the New Testament. The values in this work are such, however, that after the first reading, the book will be used not only as a reference work but it will also in its several parts stimulate re-investigation of the New Testament and it will act to produce richer reflection on our part on the meaning of the New Testament for today.

ROBERT M. MONTGOMERY

Ohio Wesleyan University

The Letters to the Galatians and Ephesians.

By WILLIAM BARCLAY. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959. xviii + 219 pages. \$2.50.

This is another volume in "The Daily Study Bible Series" which has poured forth from the pen of William Barclay. Designed for the layman, this series of popular commentaries combines sound scholarship with readable style. The author, who is lecturer in Hellenistic Greek at Glasgow, writes with facility; and, before long, he will no doubt have completed his treatment of the entire New Testament.

The current volume treats Galatians and Ephesians—the latter, however, at much greater length. Introductory material is presented on both epistles, but the introduction to Galatians is much too brief; the complex problems of date, place of writing, and recipients are totally ignored, although it is evident that the author adopts the "South Galatian" theory (p. 42). These omissions are particularly glaring in the light of Barclay's insistence in the general introduction to the letters of Paul that the epistles must be understood against the background of their original setting.

The introduction to Ephesians is much more satisfactory. The crucial questions of authorship and recipients are dealt with at

some length; Barclay concludes that Paul is the author, and the epistle was originally an encyclical to the Asian churches. His argument for authenticity rests mainly on the dubious assumption that no one except the Apostle could have written so great an epistle. Indeed, Barclay has a particular fondness for this document which he considers "the Queen of the Epistles" (p. 83).

The commentary proper is based on the clear and accurate translations of the author himself. Perhaps the strongest feature of his exegetical work is Barclay's extensive presentation of Greek word studies. This is not surprising in view of his two previous publications in this area (*A New Testament Wordbook*, SCM, 1955; *More New Testament Words*, SCM, 1958). In the commentary, Barclay displays the meaning of New Testament terms in their own context under the colorful light of Hellenistic usage. He is carried away at times by the especially vivid uses of some words to the neglect of their normal meanings; and, on occasion, his presentation of a term is actually misleading, as seen, for example, in his suggestion that the meaning of *hamartia* is "failure to hit the target of life" (p. 111)—a translation which hardly provides an adequate appraisal of "Paul's" serious view of sin.

Another strength of Barclay's work, particularly in view of his audience, is his concern for relevance. Throughout the commentaries abundant illustrative material is included. This material ranges all the way from excellent poetic selections to inclusions of a few trite illustrations, such as the all too well-known story of the workman who insisted that he was "helping Sir Christopher Wren to build St. Paul's Cathedral" (p. 42). But no one will read this book without being aware of the practical application of the biblical epistles. In fact, one of its major values will be its suitability for use in guiding daily meditation and personal piety.

Bible scholars, of course, will not be satisfied with everything found in Barclay's

commentaries. Their major weakness is a failure to trace adequately the main development of thought throughout the epistles. This is more evident in the work on Galatians than on Ephesians, where a genuine attempt is made to delineate main points as well as sub-points in the various sections of the epistles. It must be acknowledged also that within the smaller sections of the commentary excellent outlines of the thought of the epistles are to be found. However, a real penetration of exegesis is lacking; Barclay jumps too readily from word studies to practical application, so that thorough analysis of sentences and structures of thought are scarcely to be found. Similar is the author's tendency to generalize: "The ancient world was haunted by a sense of sin" (p. 94); "The basic sin of the ancient world was contempt" (p. 143).

All of this simply indicates that "The Daily Study Bible Series" is primarily written for laymen. Some ministers are saying that these commentaries are the most helpful guides to the understanding of the New Testament that they have found to recommend to their people. This may very well be true, and it is also probable that they will serve well the needs of undergraduate classes and Bible study groups. Moreover, in view of the scarcity of good critical commentaries on some New Testament books, and the lack of technical exegetical facility among some of the clergy, these books may even prove useful to the preacher and teacher.

WILLIAM BAIRD

The College of the Bible

Sex and Love in the Bible. By WILLIAM GRAHAM COLE. New York: Association Press, 1959. xvi + 448 pages. \$6.50.

The literature on Sex and Love is so numerous that it would be impossible for even the specialists to keep abreast with recent publications. Everyone who thinks he

has something to say on the problem of Sex and Love writes a book, or makes pronouncements. The Lambeth Conference of Anglican Bishops, which met in 1958, issued a report on "The Family in Contemporary Society." The World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council called an international consultative conference on the population explosion and responsible parenthood. Then we have the Kinsey reports. Hollywood is making full use (or abuse) of Sex. The author of the book under review thought that it would be a good idea to present the biblical aspect on this important subject.

The book consists of twelve chapters. These chapters are replete with facts about the attitudes and practices of the ancient world, with special consideration of the Hebrew-Christian point of view. The first two chapters deal with divine and human love in the Old Testament. The author adduces many examples to show that the Hebrew word for love, *ahab*, is used to describe both human and divine love. Since the Hebrew was not fettered by abstract ideas, he employed anthropomorphic language, but without confusing the divine with the human. He used it analogously. There are numerous examples to show that romantic love among the Hebrews was not an unknown quantity. The story of Jacob, who was willing to work fourteen years in order to get the girl of his heart, David and Bathsheba, etc., the Song of Songs, are classical examples of romantic love.

Chapters three and four deal with divine and human love in the New Testament. Here divine love is conceived of as disinterested love—*agape* rather than either *eros* or *philia*. This love is peculiar to God alone. It is spontaneous love. It goes out to everyone, since it is its very nature to love. Man, as conceived in the New Testament, cannot by nature love either God or his neighbour. Only *agape-love*, coming to man as God's

gracious gift, enables him to love both vertically and horizontally, i.e. God and man. Here stress is laid on man's love for God and neighbour as being primarily a response to the divine love awakened by God's activity in Christ. In other words, love in the New Testament is theocentric and Christocentric rather than anthropocentric. This kind of love does not seek to gratify one's sensual desires. Love that is not centred in God results in various sorts of idolatry. For instance, the rich man cannot enter into the Kingdom of God not because he is rich, but because the object of his love is not God, nor his neighbour, but his wealth. The Jew may be enamored of the Law, or his own righteousness, the Greek of his wisdom—all these signs of misplaced and misdirected love. The root of present-day trouble in marital and family relationships is the complete misunderstanding of the nature and function of love. The kind of love presented in the New Testament has the peculiar property of increasing when extended to others. This view of love changes all our relationships to wife, to husband, to children, to friends, to God.

The other chapters deal with sex attitudes and practices around the Fertile Crescent, and the Graeco-Roman world. Some of the attitudes and practices are treated quite exhaustively, others are treated more briefly. The sexual aberrations treated in this volume would make the Kinsey reports look very respectable by comparison. While the title may strike some readers to be sensational, the subject matter is treated with utmost seriousness and sympathy. This book should be of tremendous help to ministers, social workers, and others who are concerned with the serious problems presented by Sex and Love in our society. The author and publishers are to be commended highly for making this volume available to the reading public.

LOUIS J. SHEIN

McMaster University

APPLIED CHRISTIANITY

How to Serve God in a Marxist Land. By KARL BARTH and JOHANNES HAMEL. New York: Association Press, 1959. 126 pages. \$2.50.

The most interesting part of this small book is a translation of Karl Barth's *Brief an einem Pfarrer in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, which was first published in 1958. Supplementing it, however, is a translation of an essay by Johannes Hamel, *Die Verkündigung des Evangeliums in der marxistischen Welt*. This appeared in the same year as a contribution to a volume celebrating Eduard Thurneysen's seventieth birthday. A translation of a three-page answer to Barth by Hamel is also included in the book, while an extended essay by Robert McAfee Brown introduces the whole.

Dr. Brown wants Barth to choose between East and West on the basis of their comparative goodness, and wishes Barth at some time in his life had taken the trouble to know America at first hand. No doubt, Brown is right that Barth does not really know America and does not appreciate its better side. But how much difference does this make? If he were better informed, his critical attitude and observations would doubtless be moderated. But it is questionable whether his basic position would change. This is apparently determined not so much by the respective political structures, principles, and policies of East and West as by his theology. According to this no earthly government is in any measure to be identified with the kingdom of God. The latter is superior to and triumphant over all economical, political, ideological, cultural, and religious kingdoms of men.

In view of this understanding of the kingdom, it is not surprising that Barth and Hamel are neither pro-Communists nor anti-Communists in the usual sense of these terms.

Their theology also explains their failure

to take Marxist atheism seriously. The true God is not known in terms of human understanding. He is known only to believers in a superhuman way. His existence, therefore, cannot be denied by atheists for they do not know him. It is always a false god the atheist denies.

Such theological views help make the life of a Christian in the Marxist world possible, as does also the doctrine that God is for, not against, atheists, as he is for all men. In this connection Barth affirms that the question of their conversion is of secondary importance.

If Christians in a Marxist land hold such views, they can recognize that God confronts and judges them through their present rulers, imperfect and undesirable in many ways though they be. They can bear witness to the gospel with its good news of the justification of the godless. They can be mindful of the promise of a new hour of salvation for all peoples. And they can use the opportunities for doing good that God still gives them. In no case, says Hamel, should they revolt against the Marxist regime, for this would violate their own gospel.

In all this there is nothing that will conflict too flagrantly with Communist ideas or that is apt to give great offense. In fact, it appears that for Barth there is no full conflict with a regime unless it seeks to prescribe the church's message, as the Nazis did; and for Hamel there is no full conflict unless a regime forbids the proclamation of the gospel as they understand it.

But what if a person cannot agree with the interpretation of Christianity advanced by these men? What if one—on the basis of the Bible as well as his own reflection—besides allowing that God may be using the Marxist regime as an instrument of judgment also believes that the kingdom of God is a way of life for man in terms of values and objectives he can to some extent realize? What if he believes that the God of human thought is

an imperfect, yet as far as it goes dependable, conception of the true God? What if he believes that God's acceptance of man depends upon his repentance and change of life due to the gracious influence of God's Spirit, that freedom of research as well as of speech, press, and religion is essential to the full development of human personality and the establishment of God's kingdom on earth, that dialectical materialism is misleading and false? And what if he should preach and contend for all this in a Marxist land? Is it not likely that he would come into flagrant conflict with the regime much quicker than Barth would or Hamel does? And in that conflict would not the advice of these men prove disappointingly inadequate and inept?

PETER H. MONSMA

Grove City College

Christ and Freud. By ARTHUR GUIRDHAM.

London: Allen and Unwin, 1959. 193 pages. \$4.75.

In *Christ and Freud*, Dr. Arthur Guirdham, a practicing British psychiatrist, studies the psychiatric aspects of religious thinking. Writing with appreciation for spiritual values and for the contributions that faith can make for health and wholeness, Dr. Guirdham is nevertheless quite critical, not only of religion, but also of medicine when hypotheses become formalized into dogma and reason takes priority over experience.

The title of the book is something of a misnomer, although the sub-title adds clarification: "A Study of Religious Experience and Observance." Although Freud comes in for a full critique, there is relatively little attention given to Christ except to point out how far the Christian Church has moved from his teachings. The book is really a critique of the Freudian conception of religion and of the sterility of institutionalized Protestantism. This reviewer senses that Dr. Guirdham stands among those for whom

Jung has been writing, a modern man who is searching for his soul and not finding much help in the institutional church. Throughout the book the author asserts his personal belief as a Protestant but seldom states it in ways that are within the historic Christian tradition.

The critique of Freud and of the most orthodox psychoanalytic practice is especially telling. Freud's cardinal error lay in his conviction that "revealed religion and the direct experience of God did not exist, except in illusory phenomena" (p. 19). In failing to find any genuine religious experience, that is in failing to distinguish genuine religion from the obviously perverted forms of religiosity, Freud made his greatest mistake. Indeed, Guirdham even wonders if Freud's dismissal of religion as a gigantic illusion was not a part of his own personal struggle as a Jew. By destroying religion he was destroying the force which held Judaism together and hence the force which was responsible for the personal persecution and ostracism which he felt so keenly.

Guirdham's specific answer to Freud's handling of religion is stated in three parts. The first, his defense of mysticism, is one of the ablest aspects of the book. Citing the social usefulness of the great mystics as the primary criterion for declaring them healthy rather than pathological, Guirdham points to the mystical experience of Oneness with God as the healthy goal of all religious living. Rather than finding the experience of the mystics to be illusory, Guirdham finds it to be the norm.

The second answer centers in Freud's error in overlooking religious experience as it is found in cultures other than the Hebraic-Christian. Since Freud's views of religion, with its strong emphasis on guilt and the presence of a supreme fatherly authority, is characteristic only of the Jewish conception of God, the arguments based on such conception are not valid for the great religions of the Orient (in particular Hinduism).

and Buddhism). Throughout the book Dr. Guirdham's constant espousal of the values of the Eastern religions makes it clear that, like Karen Horney (who embraced Hinduism before her death), he is drawn to the concept of the annihilation of the self in the achievement of Oneness with God, and that the stress of Christianity on an individual's unique consciousness of himself moves, in his thinking, toward morbidity. Hence, although he declares that he believes in immortality, he sees the desire for it as a cornerstone of religion as neurotic.

Guirdham's third answer to Freud is less easy to accept. He points to how Freud built his argument against religion on man's wishes and needs and then asks: "But what if religion were based partly on God's need of man? . . . If we consider that God, too, may need us as we Him then we are denying Him His status as all-powerful. As soon as we do this we threaten the whole foundation of the Freudian theory of religion" (p. 51). It is here that Guirdham's concept of God differs radically from the God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and becomes much more like the God of the Buddhist and Hindu. Salvation is man's doing, not God's. Redemption comes not through the initiative of God but through achieving Oneness with Him. A transcendent God disappears; God is within and needs only to be allowed expression. Ethical concerns are relatively unimportant, and, indeed, tend to get in the way of achieving union with God.

It is clear that while this orientation may refute Freud's concepts, it is hardly Christian. Nevertheless, Dr. Guirdham's challenge is a genuine one as he points to distortions of the Christian message in current practices that stress the minutiae of the ethical code, that enhance the power of the clergy, that foster preoccupation with self and guilt, and that substitute tirades on sin for movement toward a closeness with God. The book is stimulating in its candid critique of contemporary culture (both British and Amer-

ican), in its brilliant flashes of psychiatric insight, and earnest search for a living faith.

ROBERT C. LESLIE

Pacific School of Religion

God's Image and Man's Imagination. By ERDMAN HARRIS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. xiv + 236 pages. \$3.50.

"Images of God which stimulate the imagination—that is what this book is about" (p. xiii). With these words, Dr. Harris begins a rapid survey of the ideas of God entertained by such disparate souls as John Calvin and Elvis Presley (the latter name is not actually mentioned, but who else has won popularity as a singer partly by the use of suggestive bodily movements?). As a teacher in such schools as the American University in Cairo, Union Theological Seminary, and Yale Divinity School, Dr. Harris has been confronted with ideas of the deity which he describes as "conventional, unconventional, and downright weird."

While Harris does not make such an identification, we may feel that we are approaching the downright weird in the case of Floyd Patterson who was convinced that the Lord was surely with him as he battered his glassy-eyed opponent into insensibility. When the above-mentioned singer "confesses" that God has been good to him, and a well known movie actress refers to God as a "Livin' Doll," we would seem to be moving in the realm of the unconventional. With a running start like this, Harris races along touching lightly the more conventional views of God held by numerous men and schools of thought. Einstein, Jeans, Kepler, Dean Inge, Luther, Wesley, Shaftesbury, Paul Tillich, and John Baillie are a few of the men considered. Sectarian ideas and images of God are represented in the present volume by the Anabaptists, the Moral Rearmament Movement, the Latter-day Saints, Seventh-day Adventists, Spiritualists, Jehovah's Witnesses,

Theosophists and Christian Scientists. There is even a chapter which discusses the images of God found in the great and the not-so-great hymns of the church. This rich variety of sampling makes easy and sometimes delightful reading. Laymen will enjoy it, but scholars who are looking for depth of critical analysis may be disappointed.

Some biblical interpreters will be troubled by Harris' discussion of the God of the Bible. Harris says that the God who presents his back to Moses in Exodus is not quite so anthropomorphic as the God who walks in the Garden of Eden in the cool of the day. Harris explains how ideas of God gradually become more sophisticated as we move up through the centuries. In Genesis, God is not quite sure where Adam and Eve are hiding. Then, progressively, God becomes the storm God, war God, tribal God who hates Israel's enemies, an agricultural God who is sometimes confined to a geographical area, and finally with the prophets and Jesus we arrive at ethical monotheism and a God of love.

G. Ernest Wright (*The Old Testament Against Its Environment*, p. 10) might raise the question whether or not the "evolution of rational concepts is the main problem of our enquiry," when we are trying to understand the biblical man's relationship to God. Is the challenge-response nature of the biblical faith blunted by Harris' emphasis upon men's ideas of God? Alan Richardson (*Preface to Bible-Study*, p. 34) will say "we do not want ideas about God, we want God." Richardson and Barth (who is not once mentioned in Harris' book) will suggest that the excellence of the Bible is not to be found in its ethical or moral teaching nor even in the sophisticated ideas of religious geniuses, but rather in the fact that in the Bible we have God's word to man, a word which demands commitment and obedience.

In mentioning Wright, Richardson, and Barth, we do not mean to imply that we are completely out of sympathy with Harris.

Indeed, we are troubled when Barth seems to say that our sin is in evidence when we ask the question, Who is God? On the other hand, we are eager to avoid the danger of taming God by putting a rational cage around him. Harris' decision to discuss the divine-human encounter of the biblical record in terms of men's ideas of the Deity may not do justice to the dynamic of God's self-revelation to Israel which comes as specific historic events creating both faith and community.

Several other questions also come to mind as we read Harris' book. Does man's notion of a good deity come from a "recognition of the promptings towards the ideal within the human heart" (p. 202)? To what extent does the creative imagination of man produce images of God which will satisfy man's deepest cravings for order and meaning in the universe (p. 80)? And finally, what is the relationship between man's rational concepts and his personal commitment to God? What is the relationship between religion and faith?

As these questions will indicate, Harris does stimulate thought. Detailed answers are not given, but one of the marks of a great teacher (and perhaps this applies to an author) is that he provides his students with the incentive to do further study. Harris' book will do this.

THURMAN L. COSS

Hamline University

THE ATONEMENT

Saved By His Life. By THEODORE R. CLARK.
New York: Macmillan Company, 1959.
xiv + 220 pages. \$4.50.

The author of this volume, a teacher of theology in New Orleans Theological Seminary, has written a clear, devotional, scholarly, and realistic approach to the problem of the atonement. He has an appealing thesis; namely, that some Christian thinkers have too much focused the total atonement

upon the cross, and in so doing have neglected the importance of the incarnation, the earthly life and teachings of Jesus, the Holy Spirit, and the resurrection. In other words, it is the totality of Jesus Christ upon the life of his followers that brings them into "at-one-ment" with God and mankind. Dr. Clark is deeply concerned in taking the resurrection more seriously than is usually the case, and "to deal seriously with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, especially as it relates to the doctrine of reconciliation and salvation."


Not only do too many theologians today focus atonement too narrowly toward the cross, but the same has been true of our great hymns of atonement. Out of 500 hymns in a hymnal it was found that 76 hymns isolated the cross as the only way of salvation, while in the same hymnal but five hymns hinted at the saving significance of the resurrection. From this study the author feels that "Christian hymns should, as far as possible, sing the whole Gospel, or, if not the

whole Gospel, at least one aspect or aspects of the Gospel without distorting the Christian message as a whole." Hymns on the Holy Spirit are too few, and the ones that we have in some hymnals "fail to relate the Cross and the Holy Spirit to the Risen Lord."

Why have we given such an over-prominence to the saving value in the narrower sense to the cross? The author sees three reasons: (1) Christianity came out of an Old Testament system of blood sacrifice; (2) Greco-Roman mystery religions, with their influence upon Christian practices, were involved in sacrifices to avenge their angry gods; (3) Greek rationalism, with its desire to have logical reasons for everything, saw the work of Christ's death as the work of the Son. Hence the cross "came to be understood as the one work that accomplishes reconciliation and salvation."

While the church and the word play major roles in the work of atonement, Dr. Clark is adamant that this atoning accomplishment is

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not done through bibliolatry or through a divided church; especially is the author chagrined that the church's division is largely over the various arguments about the meaning of the Lord's Supper. And if the Bible is to aid in our atonement, "it is not a matter of relating oneself to the Scriptures, therefore, but basically a matter of relating oneself to God in a living faith which in turn makes the Bible come alive as the Word of God to men."

As a whole the author makes his case logical and vital; namely, that atonement for the Christian must result as the *total* impact of Jesus Christ upon man. He writes clearly, with numerous quotations from a solid coterie of scholars to bolster his thesis. His style is readable, his vocabulary well chosen. He keeps his chapters in a devotional idiom, both by interspersing his prayers along with prayers and quotations from others, and by his general tenor of thought. It constitutes a very readable and helpful volume to a rather small number of books which deal primarily with the atonement.

THOMAS S. KEPLER

*Graduate School of Theology—
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MISCELLANEOUS

How We Got Our Denominations. A Primer on Church History. By STANLEY I. STUBER. New York: Association Press, 1959. viii + 254 pages. \$3.50.

This revised edition of a book published over thirty years ago is designed to acquaint "Christian youth and laymen" with the history of their denominations and to provide the basis for better understanding of other denominational groups. The author has sought to attract the interest of the reader by such chapter titles as "The Church of Vision" (The United Church of Christ), "The Church of Beauty" (Protestant Episcopal Church), "The Church of Concern" (The Reformed Church in America), by

summary statements of the beliefs of particular denominations, and by questions for further discussion inserted at the end of each chapter (for example, on the Methodist Church, "What was the Eighteenth Century Like?"). The book has 249 pages of text with 33 chapters; each of the various Protestant denominations is covered in 7-8 pages.

The usefulness of this volume is limited by its design and content. Though one cannot take exception to much that is written, such a cursory treatment of the history of the church results in a sketchy and often superficial treatment of the complexities and excitement of the subject. Anyone would find it difficult to give a meaningful account of Protestantism by devoting two pages to Martin Luther, one page to "The Protestant Pope, John Calvin," and less than a page to Puritanism. Some statements in the book are only partly true. For example, it is not entirely correct to state that "The Congregational Church is a development of the Separatists of England" (p. 177); nor is it quite true to suggest that the Old Side Presbyterians were "indorsing the intellectual attitude and the 'New Side' indorsing the spiritual attitude" (p. 164). It is not particularly noteworthy to find that one of the five main convictions held by the Lutheran Church is that "infant baptism is regarded as proper and fitting" (p. 184). There is much left unsaid. No comment is made about the debate between Luther and Zwingli concerning the Lord's Supper which one would expect in any account of the early years of Protestantism. The Apostle's Creed is inserted early in the text with a paragraph description, yet nothing is said about the issues which the church was facing at the time portions of the creed were formed. The meaning of the Apostle's Creed is unclear without such background, however briefly sketched. The text does include concise and clear statements of the polity structure of various denominational traditions.

Discussions of the theological concerns of the Christian Church throughout its centuries are almost totally absent. It is impossible to deal in any adequate way with the development of the denominational structure of the church without deliniating the theological factors involved. This is as true of Methodism as it is of Unitarianism and Lutheranism. Though the author states that this book "is not prepared for the scholar," the college freshman or the layman should expect deeper probing of how we got our denominations.

The author has an important task in mind. In the view of this reader he has not written the kind of book which can be profitably used in college courses. The appended bibliography mentions very few works published in the past twenty years, studies which have shed new light on leaders and historical periods of various denominational traditions; the book might have been more useful had the results of more recent studies been incorporated into the text.

ROBERT L. FERM

Pomona College

Book Notices

BIBLICAL FICTION

The Unanointed. By Laurene Chinn. New York: Crown Publishers, 1959. 376 pages + maps on endpapers. \$3.95.

Biblical subjects present the novelist with great problems. The Bible itself is great literature and the re-creator of its stories finds himself judged by his predecessors. Moreover, the literature is ancient and remote, presenting problems of historical recreation. These problems have demonstrable solutions of which the amateur Bible student is quite unaware. A great literary artist can transcend these matters of detail. When Mann writes of Joseph and Werfel of Jeremiah, the end product is a new creation, not a re-creation, and matters of antiquarian detail are largely irrelevant.

But *The Unanointed* is not, nor does it claim to be, a work of genius. It is a workmanlike first novel whose author has faithfully done her homework in commentaries and atlases. As her subject she has made the original choice of Joab, David's general, both narrating his career from youth to death, and also revealing the complex reign of David through Joab's loyal but critical eyes. Joab flees Bethlehem, guilty of manslaughter, and joins David's outlaws. He falls permanently in love with Reba (i.e. Ahinoam), who is taken arbitrarily as wife by David. Her son, Amnon, is actually sired by Joab. Joab throughout his career is alternately in and out of David's favor and hence is constantly shuttling between Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Upon David's death, Solomon, who represents the new

ruthlessness of a power-seeking administration, orders Joab's death.

The greatest shortcoming of the novel is its failure to comprehend biblical thought patterns. The court officials of David think like executives of a contemporary corporation; Zadok is even more skeptical than Mackerel of *Mackerel Plaza*. The characters are the familiar stereotypes of current fiction: the dreamy-eyed idealist (Abiathar, who is obsessed with writing manuscripts and burying them in caves), the unscrupulous politician (David), the man of ambition (Absalom), several long-suffering ever-faithful wives, sentimental lovers (Abishag and Adonijah). Throughout there are abundant displays of mammary glands, masculine lusts, and the reiteration that the course of true love never runs smoothly. Joab is more of a Hamlet than the general of David. That is, the author has manipulated her characters through the predestined courses of the biblical narrative and has motivated them by shallow twentieth century clichés. The genuine religious faith and fervor of Israel is not to be found here.

Some scenes come through well, as in the capture of Jerusalem or the death of Absalom. Others fall short, as in the greatly diluted scene between Amnon and Tamar. The novel has some limited values in helping the uninitiated to visualize aspects of life and war in ancient Israel. This reviewer found its twentieth century stereotypes irritating and its narrative much less exciting than the original.

LIONEL A. WHISTON, JR.

Eden Theological Seminary

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(Books marked with an * are hereby acknowledged. Others will be reviewed in subsequent issues of the Journal.)

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The Association

1960 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MIDWESTERN SECTION

The annual business meeting of the Midwestern Section of the National Association of Biblical Instructors was called to order by President C. Eugene Conover on Saturday, February 20, 1960, in Room 205, Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois.

Approximately seventy-five members of the Midwestern Section attended the session.

The minutes of the last annual meeting of the Midwestern Section were adopted as printed in the *Journal of Bible and Religion*, July, 1959.

Professor William J. Moore presented the report of the nominating committee:

President	Phillips Moulton <i>Wesley College</i>
Vice-President	Joseph L. Mihelic <i>University of Dubuque</i>
Secretary	Leo H. Phillips <i>Hillsdale College</i>
Program Chairman	Edwin T. Settle <i>Coe College</i>
Membership Chairman	Emerson W. Shideler <i>Iowa State University</i>
Associate in Council	C. Eugene Conover <i>Lindenwood College</i>

It was moved to accept the report and to elect the nominees to their respective offices; the motion was carried.

Professor Melconian moved that the papers presented in the Symposium: "Trends in Biblical Interpretation" be considered for publication. The motion was seconded by Professor Moore. The motion was carried.

Greetings were conveyed to the section by Lionel Whiston, national president of N.A.B.I. He spoke of the concern of N.A.B.I. on a study of pre-theological education.

President-elect Moulton spoke briefly to the group. There were also brief discussions of qualifications of new members and suggestions for the 1961 program.

Professor Edwin T. Settle presented the report of the Committee on Resolutions, expressing our thanks to Garrett Biblical Institute and its staff for its hospitality, to the officers and program com-

mittee for their labors, and to the participants who presented the papers.

There were introductions of visitors and new members before the business sessions adjourned at 12:15 p.m.

The Program of the Midwestern Section:

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1960

4:00 P.M.

- Opening Session Room 205
 Presiding: C. Eugene Conover, Lindenwood College, President, Midwestern Section, N.A.B.I.
 A Symposium: "The Role of the Department of Religion"
 David S. Noss, Heidelberg College, Moderator
 1. "In a Private Non-Church Related College"
 Andrew J. Eickhoff, Bradley University
 2. "In a General Education Program"
 Lee Osborne Scott, Denison University
 3. "In Pre-Theological Education"
 J. Arthur Baird, College of Wooster

7:30 P.M.

- Evening Session Room 205
 Presiding: Phillips Moulton, Wesley College, Vice-President, Midwest Section, N.A.B.I.
 The Presidential Address: "Problems of Truth in Teaching Religion"
 C. Eugene Conover, Lindenwood College
 Paper (Illustrated): "A Recent Tour of Archaeological Sites in the Middle East"
 Robert J. Marshall, Chicago Lutheran Seminary

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1960

9:00 A.M.

- Morning Session Room 205
 Presiding: Leo H. Phillips, Hillsdale College, Secretary, Midwestern Section, N.A.B.I.
 A Symposium: "Trends in Biblical Interpretation"
 Floyd V. Filson, McCormick Theological Seminary, Moderator

1. "In the Old Testament"
Harmut Gese, University of Tubingen,
Visiting Associate Professor, McCormick
Theological Seminary
2. "In the New Testament"
Robert M. Grant, Federated Faculties,
University of Chicago
3. "As Seen by a Professor Turned Pastor"
C. Umhau Wolf, St. Paul's Lutheran
Church, Toledo, Ohio

11:30 A.M.

Annual Business Meeting

Presiding: C. Eugene Conover, Lindenwood College

— 1:15 p.m.

Afternoon Session

Room 205

Presiding: Lionel A. Whiston, Jr., Eden Theological Seminary, Program Chairman, Midwestern Section, N.A.B.I.

Paper: "The Concept of Tragedy: A Point of Contact for Theology and Literary Criticism"

Preston T. Roberts, Federated Faculties, University of Chicago

Paper: "The Pagan Priesthood of Modern Fiction"

Burton M. Wheeler, Washington University

3:00 p.m.

Joint Session with Chicago Society for Biblical Research

Presiding: Professor Ernest W. Saunders, Garrett Biblical Institute, President of the C.S.B.R.

Paper: "The Historical Values of the Gospel Materials"

Professor Jules L. Moreau, Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

Paper: "The Anomaly of Galatians"

Professor Chalmer E. Faw, Bethany Biblical Seminary

Paper: "The Mystery of Marriage in the Gospel of Philip"

Professor Robert M. Grant, Federated Faculties, University of Chicago

Respectfully submitted,

LEO H. PHILLIPS, Secretary

MEETING OF SOUTHERN SECTION OF N.A.B.I. MARCH 28, 1960

The Southern Section of the National Association of Biblical Instructors held its twelfth annual meeting at the Divinity School, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee on Monday, March 28, 1960 with 63 members in attendance.

The devotional was given by Prof. Joseph A. Johnson, Jr. of the new Interdenominational Theological Center, Atlanta, Georgia.

Dean J. Robert Nelson welcomed the association to Vanderbilt, and commented on the new quadrangle into which the Divinity School recently moved.

"College and University Teachers of Religion and the Pre-Seminary Student" was the title of the presidential address delivered by Prof. J. Allen Easley of Wake Forest College. Professor Easley stressed the positive contribution which an undergraduate major in religion can make toward professional theological education.

Business was conducted as follows:

(1) The minutes of the 1959 meeting were approved as printed in the July, 1959, issue of the *Journal of Bible and Religion*.

(2) Membership Chairman Sam D. Maloney commended the work of state membership chairmen, who had enlisted 50 new members during the past year.

(3) A report on the thirteenth annual meeting of the Southern Humanities Conference, meeting at Hollins College, was given by Emmett Hamrick, who underlined the need for the conference in balancing an industrial society.

(4) J. Allen Easley gave a report from the Committee on Pre-theological Studies, commenting on progress being made in plans for a study of college and university programs.

(5) Committees were appointed as follows:

- a. Resolutions: Professors Mary Frances Thelen, Chairman, James L. Price, David E. Faust (joint committee with Society of Biblical Literature);
- b. Nominations: Professors Lauren E. Brubaker, Chairman, Paul L. Garber, Charles F. Nesbitt;
- c. Place of Meeting: Secretaries of the two societies.

After a coffee break, a symposium was conducted on the subject, "The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Teaching of Religion to Undergraduates." Prof. Edward Lee Beavin of Kentucky Wesleyan College spoke on the contribution of the scrolls to the history and literature of the Old Testament, suggesting that the scrolls are of more value to the study of language and the status of the canon than to Old Testament theology, especially as related to undergraduates. Professor William A. Beardslee of Emory University, in discussing the contribution of the scrolls toward New Testament study with college students, called for considering the Qumran documents "unfinished business," and commented on the baffling impact that a world-denying eschatological faith makes on students steeped in moralistic ethics. The relation of the symposium subject to the Jewish backgrounds of Christianity was treated by Professor Immanuel Ben-Dor of the Candler School of Theology, Emory University. With an emphasis on the contribution which archaeology is making, Prof. Ben-Dor pointed out several parallels between sectarian Judaism and early Christianity. After some time of open discussion, the association recessed for lunch.

In the afternoon business meeting the following officers for 1960-1961 were elected: President, Prof. Everett Tilson, Vanderbilt; Vice-president, Prof. Mary L. Boney, Agnes Scott; Secretary, Prof. Margaret Cubine, LaGrange College. Professor Tilson presided during the afternoon session.

In a paper on "Exegesis as a Theological Discipline," Prof. Leander E. Keck of Vanderbilt developed the suggestion that the relation between exegesis and theology must be in the form of dialogue, in which each questions the other. He stressed the fact that some questions raised by exegesis cannot be answered merely by further exegesis but rather must be directed toward theology.

The major part of the afternoon program was in the form of a symposium on "The Problem of God's Action in History," with Professor Mary Frances Thelen of Randolph-Macon Woman's College as moderator. Professor J. W. H. Rhys of the University of the South dealt with the subject in

the interpretation of the exodus. He pointed out that in history, the interpretation of a fact is usually more important than the fact itself, and that history began to be taken seriously by those who saw in God's saving acts, his nature revealed. A paper by Prof. Eric C. Rust of Southern Baptist Seminary was read by Miss Anne-Marie Salgat of the University of Kentucky Y.W.C.A. Prof. Rust developed the idea that the revelation of God was complete in the resurrection, and that, as the clue to the new humanity, the resurrection destroys the sinfulness in man and ushers him into new life. God's action in history from the perspective of non-Christian religions was dealt with by Prof. David G. Bradley of Duke University. He pointed out the difficulty of finding comparisons because of the fact that religions such as Buddhism and Jainism have no deity to act, and those such as Islam and Hinduism do not consider that time and history are realities for man. Professor Langdon B. Gilkey of Vanderbilt brought the final paper on God's action in history from the perspective of contemporary philosophy and theology. Considerable discussion was provoked by Professor Gilkey's questioning of the intelligibility of contemporary biblical theology. He pointed out that the liberal form in which this theology is cast has led to a belief in the Bible not as a book of the acts of God but as a collection of Hebrew stories. Professor Gilkey strongly challenged a theology which denies historical validity to specific acts, but which insists all the while that "God acts."

Members of the association were guests of the Divinity School at a banquet given Monday evening in the new refectory. Following the dinner a joint program with the Society of Biblical Literature and the American Schools of Oriental Research was given. Professor William L. Reed of the College of the Bible, Lexington, Kentucky gave a slide lecture on "Recent Archaeology in Jordan," showing excavations at Gibeah and Qumran, as well as materials in the museums at Jerusalem and Amman. The meeting adjourned, with most of the members remaining for the sessions of the Society of Biblical Literature the following day.

MARY L. BONEY, Secretary

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BIBLICAL INSTRUCTORS

Proposed Budget—1960

PROBABLE EXPENSES	(1959 figures for comparison)	
A. Publishing the JOURNAL OF BIBLE AND RELIGION		
1. Printing and Mailing Costs	\$7,100.00	
2. Editorial Expenses		
a. General	225.00	
b. Book Review	200.00	
		\$7,525.00 (\$6,900.00)
B. Administration of the Association		
1. Postage	\$ 110.00	
2. Treasurer's Expenses	350.00	
3. Promotion and Membership	100.00	
4. Placement	50.00	
5. General	100.00	
		\$ 710.00 (840.00)
C. Annual Meeting		
1. General	\$ 300.00	
2. Travel	350.00	
		\$ 650.00 (650.00)
D. Section Expenses		250.00 (250.00)
GRAND TOTAL OF ESTIMATED EXPENSES FOR 1960	\$9,135.00	(\$8,640.00)
SOURCES OF INCOME		
A. Membership dues and payments for JBR	\$5,475.00	
B. Institutional and non-members subscriptions	1,700.00	
C. Advertising in JBR	1,350.00	
D. Single copy and back issue sales	300.00	
E. Sale of SYLLABUS	10.00	
F. Miscellaneous—e.g. sale of mailing list	100.00	
G. Interest on savings account	200.00	
GRAND TOTAL OF ESTIMATED SOURCES OF INCOME	\$9,135.00	

Notes on the Budget: The proposed budget has increased the scope of financial operations of the Association by \$495.00 over the budget adopted for 1959; however, a truer picture is presented when it is realized that the actual income during 1959 was in excess of \$9,000.00. Hence, a proposed budget of \$9,135.00 would not seem unrealistic. By proposing a few economies in the administration of the Association, it was possible to present an enlarged budget for the printing and distribution of the JOURNAL OF BIBLE AND RELIGION. The figure presented reflects the trend toward increasing costs in publishing an excellent journal.

OCTOBER 30-31, 1959

In the absence of Martin Rist of the Iliff School of Theology, President Peterson introduced the subject of his paper, "The Gospel of Thomas". It

Bruce McWhorter, *Southwestern College*

Alan Pickering moved the slate be accepted by acclamation. The motion was seconded and passed.

The committee on recommendations, time, and place made its report. Members of the committee were: R. Vernon Ritter, John B. Graber, and Morris J. Morgan, chairman. Alan J. Pickering moved the recommendations be accepted; seconded and passed. Mr. Morgan reported the recommendation that the 1960 meeting of the Rocky Mountain Section be held October 29-30, 1960. Mr. Morgan further recommended that the Rocky Mountain Section accept the invitation of the Central Baptist

Theological Seminary of Kansas City, to meet there in 1960, and that we express our appreciation for the invitation from Billings, Montana, and the standing invitation from Denver, Colorado. The report of the time and place was moved acceptance by Mr. Maxwell. The motion was seconded and passed.

The president declared the business meeting adjourned at 11:05 a.m.

KEITH D. STEPHENSON, Acting Secretary

GRANT FOR PRE-SEMINARY SURVEY

The NABI Committee on Pre-Theological Studies announces the receipt of a grant from the Lilly Endowment Inc. for a "study of pre-seminary education in the colleges and universities of the United States and Canada." This is to be a joint undertaking by the NABI and the AATS under the supervision of a board of directors representing both associations as well as other groups interested in the ministry but not directly connected with the AATS or NABI. The project will be an extension of the "empirical study" already projected by the NABI committee. It will cover four basic areas: the seminaries, the colleges and universities having courses in religion, the denominations working in the field of graduate theological education and finally students from a cross-section of colleges and seminaries who are either still in seminary or have recently graduated. The plan calls for the ultimate publication of its findings, and hopes to contribute to the total cause of theological education by casting much needed light on the study of religion at the undergraduate level.